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This dissertation opens a multimedia archive of contemporary Iranian films, 
documentaries, newspaper articles, and political philosophies in order to rethink the 
complicated relationship between cinema and the Reformist Movement in Iran. The 
existing scholarship has largely reduced interactions between these institutions to modes 
of mutual support, noting Mohammad Khatami‘s backing of the film industry during his 
tenure as Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance (1982-1992) and his liberal cultural 
policies as president (1997-2005). However, the research presented in this dissertation 
indicates that Iranian cinema and the Reformist Movement crucially informed one 
another, and the dynamics of their exchange functioned on an ideological level. More 
than just benefiting from the Reformist Movement, certain films and filmmakers helped 
to shape and articulate its emerging political discourse.  
 
viii 
At the same time, the dialogue between Khatami‘s Reformist Movement and 
Iranian cinema have generated a unique set of aesthetic qualities that includes a revival of 
mystic love, the use of Tehran as a metaphoric site of social and structural reformation, 
and reconfigurations of perceptions of time. I examine films that were released during 
Khatami‘s tenure as Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, his presidential campaign 
and presidency in order to interrogate the relationship between film and reform and to 
theorize the visual language that has emerged to enunciate this relationship. I also 
consider a film and a music video released two years after Khatami‘s presidency ended. 
They did not benefit directly from his cultural liberalism but nevertheless participate in 
central reformist debates. Their experimentation with form suggests that the reformist 
aesthetic possesses a momentum that permits it to develop and transform without explicit 
contact with the political movement that inspired it. 
I argue, therefore, that the Reformist Movement marked a change on the political 
landscape at the same time that it signaled a new trend in the country‘s cinematic history. 
I connect innovations in film to current trends in new media and youth culture and 
propose a new reformist model for the study of cultural productivity in contemporary 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION  
 
For the transliteration of Persian words, I have followed the Iranian Studies 
transliteration scheme. Diacritical marks have been excluded in proper nouns. For the 
names of well-known politicians and filmmakers, I have used the spelling that has 
become standardized in print (e.g. Khomeini, Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei).  
Consonants 
 
z ض b ب 
t ط p پ 
z ظ t ت 
 ث s ع ‗
gh غ j ج 
f ف ch چ 
q ق h ح 
k ک kh خ 
g گ d د 
l ل z ذ 
m م r ر 
n ن z ز 
h ه zh ژ 
v و s س 
y ی sh ش 




short long diphthongs 
a (as in ashk) ā (as in  āb) - 
e (as in fekr) i (as in melli) ey (as in Teymur)   





The Aesthetics of Reform 
 
 
The story of Mojtaba Mirtahmasb and Jafar Panahi‘s submission to the 2011 
Cannes Film Festival, a 75-minute piece called In film nist [This is not a film] (2011), has  
all of the makings of a Hollywood action movie. The video arrived in France on a USB 
stick hidden in a cake that was sent from Iran to Paris. This Is Not a Film was shot by 
Mirtahmasb, who had previously served as Panahi‘s cameraman, using primarily an 
iPhone, and it purportedly examines a day in the life of Iranian director Jafar Panahi in 
his home as he anxiously awaits the verdict to a court appeal and the fate of his personal 
and professional lives. In December 2010 Panahi, along with fellow director Mohammad 
Rasoulof, was convicted by a Tehran Revolutionary Court of conspiring to commit 
crimes against national security and of spreading propaganda against the Islamic 
Republic. He was sentenced to six years in prison and issued a twenty-year ban on 
making films, leaving the country, and talking to foreign media. However, many people 
speculate that Panahi‘s real crime was supporting the efforts of the Green Movement, a 
grass-roots initiative that questioned the legitimacy of the 2009 electoral results that 
guaranteed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s second term as president.  
 While many film critics have focused on This Is Not a Film‘s political urgency 




into what it means to make a film in Iran and how politics have refashioned filmmaking 
in the country. The title This Is Not a Film immediately interrogates film as an 
epistemological category. What is a film if not Mirtahmasb and Panahi‘s provocative and 
philosophical submission to Cannes? On a purely technical level, This Is Not a Film is 
not a film; the digital video arrived at the festival on a USB stick rather than in a canister. 
However, Mirtahmasb and Panahi also examine a broader and more abstract conception 
of film and call into question who has the authority to make a film (rather than a movie or 
a video) and who is responsible for issuing that authority?  These questions are urgent for 
Panahi, who faces a twenty-year ban on filmmaking, and with the title This Is Not a Film 
he self-reflexively pokes fun at his sentence at the same time that he contemplates its 
meaning and its implications.  
 Storytelling is a central concern for Panahi, and a large portion of This Is Not a 
Film is devoted to a script that was recently rejected by the Ministry of Islamic Culture 
and Guidance. The story tells of a young woman who has been accepted to study art at a 
university, but her parents, who disapprove of her plans, lock her in the house instead. Of 
course, the similarities to Panahi‘s own house arrest are not meant to go unnoticed. In 
This Is Not a Film, the director reads from the script and constructs the interior space of 
the young woman‘s home/jail using masking tape on his carpet. However, he abruptly 
stops in the middle of constructing the imaginary floor plan and asks the camera, ―If we 
could tell a film, why make a film? Or, indeed, why write about one?‖ Perhaps it is the 




Despite any categorical differences, This Is Not a Film fits surprisingly well into 
the body of Panahi‘s work. His three previous films, Dāyereh [Circle] (2000), Talā-ye 
sorkh [Crimson Gold] (2003), and Āfsāyd [Offside] (2006), all examine individuals who 
push the legal limits in Iran and often suffer the consequences. However, rather than 
condemning these criminals, Panahi‘s camera sympathetically positions them as victims 
to social disparities and an unfair legal system. In This Is Not a Film, Panahi himself is 
the criminal who is being sympathetically represented on screen.  This Is Not a Film 
ultimately inverts many of the normative features of film, and creates a space in which 
the director becomes a character; the cameraman becomes the director; scripts are read 
rather than performed; cameras are phones; three-dimensional spaces (like houses) are 
reduced to two-dimensional masking tape lines; and a film is not even a film.  
 Panahi‘s emphasis on form and structure cannot be fully considered outside of a 
discussion of the political situation surrounding his project, and This Is Not a Film 
ultimately demonstrates how the cry for reform in the Islamic Republic has deeply 
impacted filmmaking and refashioned many of its conventions. This dissertation seeks to 
understand the coeval, twenty-year development of political reform and cinematic reform 
in post-Revolution Iran. More specifically, this project opens a multimedia archive of 
Iranian narrative films, documentaries, newspaper articles, and political philosophies in 
order to rethink the complicated relationship between cinema and the Reformist 
Movement in the Islamic Republic. While the notion of reform signifies a number of 




my study of the relationship between reform and cinema on the figure of Mohammad 
Khatami, who was the face of reform in Iran and president of the country between 1997 
and 2005. Khatami‘s reformist movement is often referred to as jonbesh-e dovom-e 
khordād or the May 23
rd
 Movement, a name that memorializes the day that he was 
unexpectedly elected as president. Although his election was a surprise for many people, 
it marked the culmination of nearly a decade of nationwide discontent and on-going 
debate about what the Islamic Republic could be outside of a revolutionary framework.   
During the Islamic Republic‘s first decade, Khatami served as the Minister of 
Islamic Culture and Guidance (1982-1992), and his interest in and special relationship 
with cinema date back to that period, as do the origins of his reformism. My research 
indicates that certain films within Iranian cinema helped to shape and articulate his 
emerging Reformist Movement both during and after these formative years. Khatami‘s 
administrative involvement with and continued support of cinema during his presidency 
(1997-2005) made him a point of interest for a select group of filmmakers who undertook 
reform as an ideological project and incorporated Khatami and his philosophies into their 
films. As a result, a dialogue emerged between Khatami and filmmakers, and their 
exchanges profoundly affected the shape and direction of political reform and the course 
of filmmaking in Iran.  
In this study, I examine a select number of films from both periods, Khatami‘s 
tenure as Minister and his presidency, and also consider visual media after Khatami‘s 




interactions between reform and cinema. Limiting my analysis to cases in which the 
relationship between Khatami and a particular film or filmmaker is explicit, I determine 
that within cinema a set of artistic concerns—a new reformative grammar—developed in 
order to articulate the conversation between these two institutions. The unique set of 
aesthetic qualities that emerged alongside the Reformist Movement includes a revival of 
mysticism, the use of Tehran as a metaphoric site of social and structural reformation, 
reconfigurations of perceptions of time, and the democratization of filmmaking through 
the use of digital video. The Reformist Movement, therefore, marked a change on the 




My argument participates in and productively complicates a number of debates 
related to both Iranian historiography and theories of Third Cinema. Iranian studies in 
general and film studies in particular view the post-Revolution period categorically. In 
doing so, they suggest that the Revolution of 1978-79 fundamentally altered Iranian 
culture and marked the beginning of a new temporal category bound together by a single 
set of identifiable features and institutions. Hamid Naficy suggests that the Revolution 




ideological, thematic and production values.‖
1
 Negar Mottahedeh similarly gathers three 
decades of Iranian cinema under the term ―post-revolutionary‖ and locates ―displaced 
allegories‖ regarding the ―veiled [female] figure‖ as a constitutive feature of the filmic 
grammar and syntax of Iranian cinema since the Revolution.
2
  Saeed Zeydabadi-Nejad 
also views the films produced in the Islamic Republic as representative of a single period 
in Iran‘s cinematic history. He argues that a complex series of cultural negotiations on the 
part of directors, filmgoers, and government officials and mediated by the process of 
censorship unify the act of enunciation in post-Revolution cinema.
3
 There is value in 
determining how radical shifts in political power (like a revolution) restructure cultural 
production, but equally present is the risk of describing too broadly a historical period. 
By assigning thirty years‘ worth of films to the single category ―post-Revolution(ary) 
cinema,‖ scholars locate this body of work temporally and at the same time keep it tied to 
a single event, the Revolution. However, Iranian cinema after the Revolution is a 
multifaceted body that comprises a number of distinct periods and trends. By reading the 
history of Iranian cinema within the Islamic Republic through the lens of reform, it is 
possible to identify and begin describing one such trend. 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini‘s death in June 1989 marks an important transition 
as we consider the different phases that constitute Iranian cinema over the last thirty 
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University Press, 2008), 13.  
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years. As the spiritual and revolutionary leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini was charged 
with laying the broad strokes of political and cultural policy after the Revolution. 
Specifically, in his role as the Islamic Republic‘s first Supreme Leader, he was 
responsible for defining and clarifying the country‘s new ideals, including within the 
cultural sphere. In his first speech after returning to Iran from exile in Paris, Khomeini 
declared, ―Cinema is a modern invention that ought to be used for the sake of educating 
the people…It is the misuse of cinema that we are opposed to, a misuse caused by the 
treacherous policies of our rulers.‖
4
 Khomeini‘s mention of cinema in this momentous 
speech demonstrates its importance to the revolutionary cause. More than that, it shows 
that Khomeini had a particular understanding of the role of cinema in the new Islamic 
Republic, how it should function and to what end. However, a great deal of uncertainty 
ensued after Khomeini‘s death in 1989 and the country‘s leaders faced the challenge of 
reconciling a set of paradoxical policies that he had enacted during his ten-year rule, and 
in his absence administrators were left to their own instincts and powers of interpretation. 
The Reformist Movement was one such set of interpretations, with which cinema was 
most closely aligned. Iranian cinema after Khomeini‘s death, therefore, deserves critical 
examination within a framework of reform. 
The interactions between Iranian cinema and the Reformist Movement represent a 
complex and bilateral system of exchange that scholarship has previously simplified as a 
relationship of convenience. During Khatami‘s first year as the Minister of Islamic 
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 Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (London: Routledge 




Culture and Guidance, the Ministry was charged with the regulation of the film industry. 
As a result, from the outset, Khatami and filmmakers had a contentious relationship. On 
the one hand, the Islamic Republic recognized in its earliest years the transformative 
value of film and opted to support the indigenous film industry with subsidies, so it could 
compete with foreign imports. The government continues to provide financial backing for 
one-third of the country‘s film production and offers great incentives to the industry as a 
whole by providing tax breaks and reduced-interest loans.
5
 Scholarship in film studies 
generally refers to post-Revolution Iranian cinema as ―a national cinema.‖
6
 The financial 
arrangement between the government and the film industry permitted in part the 
development of the country‘s national cinema, and Khatami was in charge of the 
governing agency during post-revolutionary cinema‘s formative years. Filmmakers were 
hopeful when Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani appointed Khatami to the Ministry and they 
dubbed his first year in office as ―the year that love entered cinema.‖
7
 However, 
conservative policymakers anticipated his cultural liberalism and blocked his attempts to 
endorse serious cinematic reform.
8
 The government exerts great control over the film 
industry through censorship and the Ministry under Khatami enacted a five-tier 
                                                          
5
 Ghazian, Hossein. ―The Crisis in the Iranian Film Industry and the Role of the Government,‖ The New 
Iranian Cinema: Politics, Representation, and Identity, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I.B. Tarius 2002), 77-
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6
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7
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Towards the end of his time as minister, Khatami became notably frustrated with 
the regulation of cultural productivity that had been built into the Republic‘s legal 
system. During this time, he relaxed considerably censorship practices,
10
 and his last two 
years as Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance are well documented as the ―golden 
age‖ for artistic and literary production in post-Revolution Iran. Khatami ultimately 
resigned from the Ministry in 1992, citing a ―violation‖ of ―all legal, religious, ethical, 
and secular norms‖ in the ―field of culture.‖
11
 As a result, he became a champion for 
artistic rights, and his open support of several controversial works during his last years 
earned him the respect of notable artists, like director Mohsen Makhmalbaf. 
Subsequently, during his 1997 presidential campaign ―filmmakers, who had good 
memories from his time in the Ministry‖ constituted his ―most ardent and active 
supporters.‖
12
 Babak Dad, for example, suggests in his memoir that Khatami‘s electoral 
success was enabled in part by Makhmalbaf‘s very public espousal of him.
13
  
Khatami maintained his support of cinema during his first term as president and 
Film Magazine notes that, ―Everyone who has followed the cinematic products for the 
                                                          
9
 Naficy, ―Islamizing Film Culture in Iran,‖ 39.  
10
 Sussan Siavoshi, ―Cultural Policies and the Islamic Republic: Cinema and Book Production,‖ 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4 (1997), 517.   
11
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past two decades has come to the consensus that...the successful and important works of 
the past four years were enabled by the present government.‖
14
 In this way, the existing 
scholarship categorizes the relationship between the Reformist Movement and Iranian 
cinema in permissive terms. However, in this study I show that the depths of the 
interactions between cinema and reform extend well beyond mutual support. These two 
institutions effectively informed and influenced one another, and the dynamics of their 
exchange functioned on an ideological level. 
This ideological exchange depended in part on cinema‘s engagement with the 
Reformist Movement‘s rhetoric, as films participated in the definition of new terms that 
Khatami introduced into Iranian discourse. Khatami‘s election marked a change in 
political power at the same time that it represented a semantic shift. During Khatami‘s 
campaign and later presidency, terms like democracy, civil society, human rights, and 
citizenship replaced the country‘s revolutionary rhetoric that included imperialism, jihad, 
gharbzadegi (westoxification), revolution, and martyrdom.
15
 By probing cinema‘s 
involvement in these popular and political discourses, it is possible to open up a 
discussion of Iranian cinema‘s relationship to Third Cinema.  
The notion of Third Cinema emerged in the 1960s and 1970s alongside national 
liberation movements, primarily in Latin America. A theory of Third Cinema was first 
articulated by Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, who, in their treatise ―Towards a 
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 Nima Hassaninasab, ―Zhānr-e dovom-e Khordād,‖ 10. 
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Theory of Third Cinema,‖ constructed an argument about cinema based on Frantz 
Fanon‘s premise that in the Third World cultural artifacts are necessarily at the service of 
liberation. While First Cinema represents the hegemonic Hollywood films that promote 
bourgeois values and Second Cinema comprises European auteur films that resist 
Hollywood models but privilege the individual experience of the director, Third Cinema 
is a cinema of collective Third World anti-imperial struggle. Teshome Gabriel later 
expanded the notion of Third Cinema to focus less on ―where it is made‖ and more on 




Anthony Guneratne suggests that scholars have favored classical film theory over 
Third Cinema theory to examine post-Revolution Iranian cinema, despite the fact that 
Third Cinema as a theory and a practice ―undergird‖ the tradition.
17
 The films produced 
during the first phase of Iran‘s post-Revolution cinematic history conform to this notion 
of Third Cinema. These films, created during Khomeini‘s lifetime and the Iran-Iraq War, 
were, by and large, anti-imperialist in nature and devoted to the solidification of 
revolutionary ideals. However, after Khomeini‘s death, many films sought more to 
engage in the idea of reform, which, in its call for change within the existing 
sociopolitical structures, differs significantly from the notion of revolution. This crucial 
shift in cinematic alignment begs the question: how do theories of Third Cinema evolve 
                                                          
16
 Teshome H.Gabriel, ―Third Cinema in the Third World: The Aesthetics of Liberation‖ (Ann Arbor, MI: 
UMI Research Press, 1982), 2.  
17
 Anthony Guneratne, ―Introduction,‖ Rethinking Third Cinema ( London and New York: Routledge, 




or transform as revolutionary rhetoric tempers and reform emerges as the dominant 
discourse?  
Scholars, recognizing the fact that Third Cinema is so wrapped up in the moment 
of liberation that it cannot be sustained indefinitely, have theorized a number of models 
to describe Third World and other minority cinemas post-Third Cinema. In his study of 
―accented cinema,‖ Hamid Naficy looks at how experiences of exile and diaspora impact 
films by filmmakers working outside of their country of birth.
18
 Robert Stam on the other 
hand considers hybridity as a dominant feature of the aesthetics of world cinema.
19
 Both 
of these approaches depend on a transnational understanding of the world‘s cinematic 
system. As a result, they do not accommodate the Iranian case, which is, at least at the 
moment of enunciation, a national endeavor more than a transnational, especially since 
the phase I am describing is tied to a national political movement. The present study 
represents an effort to generate a post-Third Cinema/post-Revolution theory that moves 
beyond transnationalism while still acknowledging Third Cinema‘s roots in Iran‘s post-
Revolution cinema.     
Theories of Third Cinema also open up discussions of categorization and allow 
for the conceptualization of diversity within a single national cinema. In his introduction 
to Rethinking Third Cinema, Anthony R. Guneratne draws attention to several national 
cinemas in which combinations of First, Second, and Third Cinema exist side by side. He 
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 Hamid Naficy, An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
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points to the case of Egypt, which serves as a base for popular cinema in the Arab world 
but at the same time features a renowned auteur cinema lead by filmmakers like Yousef 
Chahine. Guneratne also examines India cinema, in which New Indian Cinema, a Third 
Cinema movement, is constantly reacting to and in dialogue with the country‘s thriving 
First Cinema, whose so-called Bollywood films often borrow plotlines and actors from 
the New Indian Cinema tradition.
20
  
In his early analysis of Iranian cinema in the Islamic Republic, Hamid Naficy 
detects a similar diversity in the country‘s developing industry. He notes the development 
of a ―populist cinema,‖ which ―inscribes postrevolutionary values,‖ alongside the rise of 
what he calls a ―quality cinema‖ that ―engages with those values‖ and critiques ―social 
conditions under the Islamic government.‖
21
 Naficy later revises these terms to include a 
―populist‖ and an ―art‖ cinema.
22
 Although his terminology is at times problematic, 
Naficy‘s identification of two competing cinemas in Iran that correspond with First and 
Third Cinemas is useful. While every effort has been made in this dissertation to avoid 
language that too readily generalizes Iranian cinema or reduces it to a homogenous body 
of films, it is important to note that the present study examines films that belong to and 
grew out of the latter trend and it does not attempt to account for the country‘s popular 
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 Anthony Guneratne, ―Introduction,‖ 22-23.  
21
 Hamid Naficy, ―Iranian Cinema under the Islamic Republic,‖ American Anthropologist 97, no. 3 
(September 1995), 549.   
22
 Hamid Naficy, ―Cinematic Exchange Relations: Iran and the West,‖ Iran and the Surrounding World: 
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 I limit my analysis in this way, because I am principally concerned with 
manifestations of reform in Iranian cinema. Since notions of reform in the Islamic 
Republic necessarily interrogate and critique ―postrevolutionary values,‖ the country‘s 
―quality cinema‖ has emerged as the cinematic trend best suited to house the relationship 
between film and the Reformist Movement.  
 
Seyyed-e Khandān or the Smiling Seyyed  
Mohammad Khatami functions as a central character in this dissertation, and his 
political career serves as its organizing principal. This study is arranged according to the 
main phases of Khatami‘s political life, and these stages are in turn read against similarly 
important and contemporaneous events in Iran‘s cinematic history. Information about 
Khatami‘s political career informs my analysis in the following chapters, and although 
many of the tenets of his platform are examined in more depth later in this dissertation, a 
broad outline of Khatami‘s life and his major intellectual and political contributions 
proves crucial to conceptualizing this project as a whole. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami 
was born on September 29, 1943 in Ardakan, the capital city of the central province of 
Yazd, and grew up in a religious family, and his father was an ayatollah. His early life 
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 Kamran Rastegar has asked the very important question, ―if both sectors [Iran‘s popular and art-house 
cinema] are covered by the same censorship codes, why have they adopted such different aesthetic 
responses?‖ For more, see, Kamran Rastegar, ―Book Review: Displaced Allegories‖ Feminist Review, 97, 
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and education set the foundation for the reformist political philosophies that would later 
define his presidency. Following the completion of his secondary education and 
preliminary seminary study in Qom, Khatami entered the University of Esfahan and 
pursued a degree in western philosophy. He then enrolled at the University of Tehran and 
completed a master‘s degree in education.  
After fulfilling his mandatory military service, Khatami returned to Qom in 1968 
and resumed his seminary studies, which he pursued for seven years to the highest level. 
He was then appointed as the head of the Islamic Center in Hamburg, Germany, one of 
the oldest and most important Shi‘i centers in Europe. Khatami held this position until the 
outbreak of the Revolution of 1978-79 and Ayatollah Khomeini‘s monumental return 
from exile. Khatami returned to Iran after the fall of the Shah in order to participate in the 
rebuilding of the country and the making of an Islamic republic. Khatami‘s life before the 
Revolution is telling of the new brand of Iranian intellectualism that he would come to 
represent by the late 1990s. Even in his early life, he attempted to marry western 
philosophies with traditional Shi‘i thought and he actively engaged in intercultural 
dialogue.  
Upon returning to Iran, Khatami immediately assumed leadership roles in the new 
Islamic Republic, and during the Republic‘s first two decades he served in a wide range 
of positions within the government. He was a member of the Majles (1980-1982), the 
Chief of Keyhān Publishing, head of Islamic Propagation during the Iran-Iraq War, and 




becoming president was head of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance [vazārat-e 
farhang va ershād-e Eslāmi], which he held 1982-1986 and again 1989-1991. Under 
Khatami‘s leadership, the Ministry took shape, defined its purpose, and established the 
mechanisms necessary to oversee and regulate cultural productivity according to the 
Islamic Republic‘s new vision. During his second period as Minister, Khatami 
experimented with the cultural liberalness that he would later more formally introduce 
through his presidency.  
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, his efforts were unorthodox; the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988) solidified devotion to the Islamic Republic and concepts of reform had 
not yet been introduced into popular discourse.
24
 As a result, the conservative Majles at 
the time forced his resignation in 1992, and he assumed a much less visible role as the 
head of the National Library, which he held until his election in 1997. Khatami‘s political 
career within the Islamic Republic serves as a reminder that the reformism that he would 
implement as president was a top-down initiative. Khatami was not a populist candidate 
in 1997; he is a member of the religious class and, like his predecessors, was elected from 
within the country‘s existing leadership. Nevertheless, when he registered his candidacy 
in 1997, Khatami was relatively unknown outside of intellectual and bureaucratic circles, 
which made his landslide victory over Nateq-Nuri, a better known candidate from the 
religious establishment, even more unexpected.  
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During his campaign, Khatami appealed to the country‘s young generation, who 
represented a majority of the country‘s population and who did not participate in the 
Revolution because they were too young or not yet born. By calling for reform, Khatami 
recognized the need for improvement but at the same time maintained his commitment to 
the Islamic Republic and promised to improve the lives of Iranians through the existing 
political framework. As Mehran Kamrava has noted, Khatami‘s platform was 
representative of a broader trend in intellectualism at the time, and a number of religious 
intellectuals, including ‗Ali Reza ‗Alavitabar, ‗Emadeddin Baqi, Abdolkarim Soroush, 
and Ahmad Qabel, were also attempting to reconcile Islam and democracy.
25
 However, 
Khatami gave voice to this movement in popular discourse, and his election marked 
Iranian society‘s readiness for reform. As Ebrahim Yazdi notes, Khatami‘s election in 
1997 was, in some ways, an act of protest on the part of Iranian society, an indicator that 
Iranians were for the most part loyal to the political system but ―intolerant‖ of the 
condition of the country.
26
 
The thrust of Khatami‘s political platform attended to the marriage of Islam and 
democracy within the Islamic Republic,
27
 and the term ―jāme’eh-ye madani‖ or ―civil 
society‖ emerged in his campaign speeches as the means best suited to bring together 
these two entities. However, Khatami‘s appropriation of civil society, a term that had 
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emerged in intellectual circles in Iran several years earlier, was more than just a political 
move. Both during and after his campaign, Khatami sought to define and expand this 
terminology, and as a result his campaign efforts were ―philosophical and discourse-
oriented‖ as much as they were ―political.‖
28
 In Khatami‘s conception, civil society is an 
inherent part of Islam, and a model for civil society was established by the Prophet 
Mohammad in Medina.  He argued that the human rights that any civil society protects 
are fundamentally part of the religion.
29
 Through the concept of an ―Islamic civil 
society,‖ Khatami promised a more transparent political system that thrived on the 
participation and extended equal legal rights to all of the country‘s citizens, not just its 
Muslim population.
30
 As such, the kind of civil society that he proposed for Iran 
depended on ―hokumat-e qānun‖ [rule of law], which recast the Revolutionary slogan 
―hokumat-e eslāmi‖ [Islamic rule].
31
 Khatami‘s use of ―civil society‖ opened up a series 
of related discussions that ultimately formed his vision for the Islamic Republic, which 
included respect for human rights, political participation, religious pluralism, democracy, 
and open dialogue. This vision appealed to Iranian society and gave it hope.  
However, Khatami‘s first term as president tested the limits of that hope. On the 
one hand, he made some strides in his attempt to implement his vision for Iran, including 
the arrest of government officials involved in a chain of murders involving Iranian 
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intellectuals. The liberalization of the press is especially well documented in this period.
32
 
In 1998, he also used his position as the country‘s leader to introduce ―goftogu-ye 
tamaddon-hā‖ or ―dialogue among civilizations‖ to the United Nations General 
Assembly, which would later declare 2001 the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations.  
This effort spoke to Khatami‘s promise to increase accountability in the country, and it 
represents his best-known achievement outside of the country. Unfortunately, Khatami‘s 
efforts to improve the country‘s local economic and social conditions were largely 
unsuccessful, and in many instances conservative members of the Majles blocked his 
attempts to liberalize the country‘s political and social systems.
33
  
Khatami‘s commitment to his own vision for the Islamic Republic was called into 
question in the summer of 1999, when the closure of the reformist newspaper Salām 
resulted in student riots across Tehran. Revolutionary Guards and police forces attacked 
the protestors, resulting in several deaths and many more injuries. Khatami, rather than 
intervening, issued a statement warning protestors that their actions threatened the 
foundation of the Republic, and he urged them to return home. These riots, also known as 
fāje’eh-ye kuye dāneshgāh or the University Dormitories Tragedy, marked a widening rift 
between Khatami and the country‘s young citizens, who had been his primary supporters 
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just two years earlier. Indeed, during these protests the slogan ―Khamenei must go‖ was 
used for the first time,
34
 and this demand challenged velāyat-e faqih [Guardianship of the 
Islamic Jurists], a concept that Khatami continued to support. As Ghancheh Tazmini 
notes, ―every time a newspaper was shut down, or a political rally or meeting 
disrupted…Khatami‘s inability to condemn or counter the act…was progressively 
exposed.‖
35
 His strategic paralysis created an apathetic atmosphere during the 2001 
presidential elections, and although he was re-elected with a majority of votes, thirty-
three percent of the electorate did not participate, significantly less than the previous 
election when over eighty percent of the country‘s eligible population participated in the 
electoral process.
36
 Khatami‘s second term as president was marked by the same political 
gridlock between conservative and reformist leaders, and the power struggle between 
Khatami and the Supreme Leader Khamenei gave rise to serious questions about whether 
or not reform could take place in the existing political structure.  
Although Khatami was unable during his presidency to implement his vision of an 
Islamic civil society by changing the Islamic Republic‘s policies and laws, one should not 
undervalue his intellectual and philosophical contributions to Iranian society. Indeed, the 
present study is an attempt in some ways to recuperate Khatami as a figure of reform and 
to demonstrate how his ideas profoundly impacted one segment of Iranian society, 
namely cinema. Filmmakers took seriously Khatami‘s call for political transparency, 
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pluralism, intercultural exchange, and respect for human rights and incorporated many of 
these tenets in their films. As a result, they established a crucial dialogue with Khatami 
and kept elements of his Reformist Movement visible and in circulation, globally and 
locally.  
 
Visuality in the Islamic Republic 
  This dissertation theorizes the aesthetics of reform in Iran since 1988, and it is 
worth considering why cinema, rather than other art forms like literature or music, 
emerged as the medium best suited to enunciate the relationship between politics and art 
in the Islamic Republic. An important cultural shift has taken place in Iranian society as a 
result of three important events that occurred almost simultaneously: the Revolution of 
1978-1979, the rise of the Islamic Republic, and the start of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988). The coalescence of these three events impacted many aspects of Iranian society, 
and in the cultural sphere there emerged a new visuality that has refashioned the way in 
which various social and political institutions interact and communicate with invested 
parties. As I demonstrate in this section, the language of the Islamic Republic is largely 
visual. Because reform generally attempts to enact change through existing structures, it 
is appropriate that the reformist aesthetic has developed and continues to function within 




In a rather pointed statement, Peter Chelkowski describes the Islamic Revolution 
of 1978-79 as a ―picture-perfect revolution.‖
37
  He and Hamid Dabashi later theorized 
this notion further, arguing that the Islamic Revolution ―was primarily a pictorial 
revolution.‖
38
 They describe revolutionary Iran as ―The Museum of Furious Art…a 
nation engaged in a revolution and a war, relentlessly remaking itself in images and 
forms, shapes, colors, frames of angers and anxieties.‖
39
 One of the successes of 
Khomeini‘s revolution was its ability to mobilize and visualize core Shi‘i symbols, and 
with the use of visual media the Revolution and the Islamic Republic reinforced its 
Islamic revolutionary discourse.
40
 Murals and photographs of martyrs of the Iran-Iraq 
War, billboards of clerics, and state-commissioned graffiti that graphically depicted the 
US as an evil imperial force covered the cities‘ surfaces. Soldiers carried photographs of 
Khomeini with them to the front line, and Khomeini gave his own image as the literal 
face of the revolutionary cause. Similarly, women were required to veil themselves in 
public and many men grew beards to show their support for the Revolution. These visual 
transformations to citizens‘ bodies also profoundly affected the way that country looked 
and was experienced on a visual level.
41
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The nature of this visual campaign marked a radical departure from pre-
Revolution practices. In the fifty years before the Revolution, the Pahlavi regime, under 
the auspices of the Society for National Heritage, attempted to define a national aesthetic. 
In particular, it attempted to appropriate a modernist and Westernized aesthetic in the 
hope that this kind of visual language would reflect the country‘s modernization efforts.
42
 
However, the Pahlavi government and the Society for National Heritage were unable to 
marry on a visual field the country‘s ancient and local histories with imported, Western 
artistic modes and styles. The Pahlavi government also attempted to capitalize on Shi‘i 
motifs and symbols; however, it was never able to deploy religious symbolism 
effectively.
43
 The Revolution immediately achieved what the Pahlavi regime never did: it 
created a national aesthetic and successfully mobilized religious symbolism for political 
purposes.  Part of the Revolution‘s success in this regard rested in its decision to bring 
these two tasks together. The religious symbolism was made visual. In doing so, the 
Revolution ascribed new significance to an Islamic visuality that would become a regular 
feature of the Islamic Republic‘s language.  
As Dabashi and Chelkowski note, the Revolution (and later the Islamic Republic) 
was ―in full semiotic control of the representation of itself.‖
44
 This statement highlights 
an important feature of the visual culture the Revolution created: it was at the service of 
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the Islamic Republic and, therefore, part of a propaganda campaign. Initially, then, it was 
not representative of an important cultural shift; it was not fundamentally different than 
Khomeini‘s statements about how art should function in the Islamic Republic. However, 
with the passage of time, the impact of the top-down efforts of the Islamic Republic to 
create a new visual culture gradually spread and grew. As Roxanne Varzi has noted, 
―More than twenty years later‖ in ―the republic of images… the physicality of daily 
exposure, tactility, must have had some effect.‖
45
And this effect is the creation of ―a 
people that hear with their eyes!‖
46
 If we accept this statement, then clearly there has 
been a fundamental shift in the way that Iranian society interacts with the physical world. 
And, indeed, we can find evidence of this phenomenon in more recent events in Iran. The 
Islamic Republic has and continues to employ graffiti as a means of conveying its 
messages. Certainly, this process originated in the fact that the Islamic Revolution was 
initially a resistance movement and the media that it opted to employ generally fell 
underground. However, the continuation of these images on the wall has created a unique 
and visual interactive forum for political negotiations.  
In his article ―Divār beh masābeh-ye resāleh‖ [Wall as Message], Mahmud 
Esma‘ilnia indicates that there are two types of graffiti in Iran, one of which is at the 
service of the government and the other belongs to the common people.
47
 However, the 
contested electoral results from the summer of 2009 and the various movements that 
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grew as a result demonstrate the ways in which these two types of graffiti are in 
conversation. Following the election results, supporters of Mir-Hossein Mousavi 
decorated city walls with green. While they would do their work at night, during the day 
members of the Basij would revise the Green Movement‘s graffiti statements. For 
example, ―Mousavi‖ written on a wall in green would later read ―marg bar Mousavi‖ 
[Death to Mousavi]. The first two words, marg bar, would be in black and ―Mousavi‖ in 
green. Similarly, a statement like ―marg bar Khāmane’i‖[Death to Khamenei] would be 
transformed into ―dorud bar Khāmane’i‖ [Peace upon Khamenei].
48
 Negotiations for 
power between these two forces, then, are charted in black and green visually and 
strikingly on the walls of the city. This example is significant here because it shows how 
visual Iranian society has become, and the roots of this visuality can be located in the 
propaganda campaigns of both the Revolution of 1978-79 and the Iran-Iraq War.  
The first eight years of the Islamic Republic solidified its visual culture. The 
presence of this visuality fundamentally changed the way that Iranian society perceived 
the physical and abstract world, and it reconfigured the possibilities of resistive space to 
favor a visual orientation. At the same time that propaganda for the Revolution and the 
Iran-Iraq War constantly occupied the Iranian visual field, the country‘s literary 
publishing industry hit its nadir.
49
 However, the Islamic Republic spent this period 
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strengthening its indigenous film industry. The joint effect of these initiatives was a 
fundamental – though limited – shift in cultural value. The Revolution of 1978-79 and its 
immediate aftermath created a society in Iran that puts more stock (cultural, social, 
political, and financial) into film than into literature. This argument by no means suggests 
that Iranian cultural sphere no longer attaches importance to literature, but rather 
contends that Iranian society has redistributed artistic value to favor cinema, because it is 
part of the visual language that has become an integral part of communication in the 
Islamic Republic. Each of the films examined in this dissertation attempt to cast the 
sometimes abstract political philosophies of reform visually; they give image to thought 
and recreate cinematically the debates that were taking place philosophically and 
politically. As a result, the reformist aesthetic that I describe in this study necessarily 
participates in Islamic Republic‘s visuality, as it splashes new colors and shapes onto the 
country‘s visual field.  
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Mystic Love and the Emerging Poetics of Reform 
 
 
So far as the present relationship between man and nature is concerned, we live in tragic 
times. The sense of solitude and monologue, and the anxiety rooted within this situation, 
embody this tragic world. Our call to dialogue aims at soothing this sense of tragedy. In 
addition to poetic and artistic experiences, mysticism also provides us with a graceful, 
profound and universal language for dialogue. Mystical experience, the constitution of 
the revelation and countenance of the sacred in the heart and soul of the mystic, opens 
new existential pathways to the human spirit…The proposal for a dialogue among 
civilizations builds upon the study of cultural geography of various fields of civilization. 
Yet the unique and irreplaceable role of governments should never be overlooked in the 
process.  
--Mohammad Khatami, UNESCO Roundtable, ―Dialogue among Civilizations‖  
 
 
On September 5, 1998, in one of his first international acts as Iranian President, 
Mohammad Khatami addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in New 
York and introduced the concept of goftogu-ye tamaddon-hā [dialogue among 
civilizations] as an alternative to Samuel Huntington‘s ―Clash of Civilizations.‖
1
 The 
U.N. welcomed his invitation to think beyond the limiting dichotomies popular at the 
time—including Iranian/non-Iranian and Muslim/non-Muslim—and declared the year 
2001 a Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. In 2000 during a preliminary U.N. 
roundtable discussion about the concept, Khatami interestingly offered mysticism as a 
means of clearing the way for new intercultural paths and discussion. Khatami indicated 
that international and intercultural dialogue depends on an openness that approximates 
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the expansion of the mystic‘s heart. However, he quite unexpectedly punctuated this 
esoteric call for mysticism with an emphasis on the central role of government.   
In his speech, Khatami uses the word ‘erfān and its derivatives to indicate 
mysticism, mystical and mystic. This term, which is separate from tasavvof [Sufism], 
describes mystical experiences and emphasizes ―esoteric doctrine‖ and ―monist 
philosophy.‖
2
 The word can broadly be applied to varying modes of thinking and texts 
that attempt to unify ―the divine and human realms in the common ground of absolute 
being.‖
3
 However, in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, ‘erfān has been used 
predominately to describe intellectual trends that combine Sufi thought and Twelver Shi‘i 
philosophy. Generally, the intellectual developments that fall into the category of ‘erfān 
stress the ―mystico-philosophical side of Sufism and Shiʿism, in contra-distinction to the 




‘Erfān is derived from the Arabic root ‘ayn-rā’-fā’ which relates to knowledge 
and cogitation. ‘Erfān is in some ways synonymous with the Arabic-derived word ‘elm, 
the word for learned knowledge; however, the former is more concerned with human 
knowledge and access to truth than divine knowledge or truth. The ultimate act of ‘erfān 
is knowing God. However, within this system, God may only be known if He reveals 
Himself, an act that may take the form of scripture, His presence in the heart of the 
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believer, or His attributes in the world of creation. Every act of knowing  carries the 
potential of God‘s self-manifestation, thereby ―giving  the human knower insight into the 
true nature of the things that become the object of human knowledge.‖
5
  
Because this chapter is concerned with mysticism as a whole and mystic love as a 
component of that system, it is important to consider the role of love in mystic thought. 
Because ‘erfān draws heavily on the Sufi tradition, it is worth defining mystic love 
according to Sufism. In his study of Sufism, Arthur John Arberry suggests that mahabba 
[Sufi doctrine of love] is ―of great significance‖ to Sufi thought as a whole.
6
 This 
doctrine, which organizes the Love/Lover/Beloved trinity, transforms the image of God 
from a remote Potenate into a merciful God ―ever taking the first step towards man, the 
elect of His creation, to draw him unto him by the powerful cords of love.‖
7
 Love is one 
attribute of God‘s created world, so knowledge and experience of love are gateways to 
knowledge of God, the ultimate goal of ‘erfān. For this reason, throughout Persian‘s 
literary history (of which cinema is a significant part) images of love have taken on 
allegorical meaning and often signify God‘s love. 
In his speech on ―Dialogue among Civilizations,‖ Khatami collapses the 
metaphysical on the one hand and the political on the other, and this act begs a question 
about the origins of the use of mysticism as an intellectual strategy for the enactment of 
political and social reform in the late twentieth century. This chapter addresses that 
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question by tracing a genealogy of political mysticism in the post-Revolution period. In 
particular, I position Mohsen Makhmalbaf‘s film Nowbat-e ‘āsheqi [Time for Love] 
(1991) as a representative example of cine-mysticism that coincided with other 
intellectual efforts at the time. I further argue that Time for Love functions as one of the 
most crucial moments in the historical development of a complicated ideological 
relationship between certain filmmakers, like Mohsen Makhmalbaf, and Mohammad 
Khatami. As Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance at this time, Khatami‘s support of 
this controversial film opened new articulations to his nascent discontent.  In other words, 
Time for Love mediated a new discourse that conceived of a fresh political paradigm that 
existed outside of a revolutionary framework, and in this way, it foresaw the coming of 
the Reformist Movement.  
This chapter examines Time for Love and the debates surrounding it to 
demonstrate that art, and film in particular, helped to shape certain reformist ideas in the 
early 1990s. Drawing not only on Khatami‘s statements about the film but also 
considering reviews by the reformist philosopher ‗Abdolkarim Soroush, I argue that it 
was Time for Love‘s appropriation of a mystic aesthetic that appealed to these budding 
reformists and informed their support. During the early 1990s, mysticism represented for 
those intellectuals who had devoted themselves to Khomeini, the Revolution, and the 
Islamic Republic a means of reconciling their commitment to Islamic governance with 
their need and desire to create a more flexible system in order to establish a space for 




the reformist aesthetic. Therefore, Makhmalbaf‘s appeal to mysticism in Time for Love 
was a significant intellectual strategy; with this film, he shifted the course of his career 
and reinvented his cinematic vision. This film marked the moment at which 
Makhmalbaf‘s aesthetic no longer corresponded with the ideals put forth by the Islamic 
Republic.  
Mohsen Makhmalbaf was born on May 28, 1957 in Tehran and was raised 
primarily by his religious grandmother. He came of age during the tumultuous 1960s and 
1970s, and he has cited Khomeini‘s failed uprising against the Shah in 1963 as one of his 
earliest memories. In 1972 he formed an urban guerilla resistance coalition and was 
arrested in 1974 for attacking a police officer.
8
 He remained in prison until 1978 when a 
wave of revolutionary activity freed him.
9
 After being released from prison, Makhmalbaf 
turned his attention to more artistic ventures, and he benefitted a great deal from the 
Islamic Republic‘s support of cinema shortly after the Revolution.  
Makhmalbaf was trained as a filmmaker by the War Film Bureau of Bonyād-e 
sinemā’i-ye fābāri [Fābāri Cinema Foundation] (FCF), the cinema branch of the Ministry 
of Islamic Culture and Guidance.
10
 He later helped found the cinema section of the Art 
Center of the Islamic Propaganda Organization (known in Iran as Howzeh-ye honari).
11
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Makhmalbaf‘s early films represented, therefore, his devotion to the propagation of the 
Islamic Republic‘s ideology. His first two films, Towbeh-ye Nasuh [Nasuh‘s Repentance] 
(1983) and Do cheshm-e bisu [Two Sightless Eyes] (1983), are straightforward religious 
narratives that warn against materialism, promote religion, and encourage participation in 
the Iran-Iraq War. Scholars Hamid Dabashi and Eric Egan have charted the various 
stages of Makhmalbaf‘s career in slightly different ways; however, both scholars agree 
that by the mid- to late 1990s, his films were considerably different from these early 
efforts, in terms of both their socio-religious concerns and their quality. By the late 
1990s, Makhmalbaf‘s status as a ―major filmmaker‖ was indisputable, and ―he could no 
longer be dismissed as a committed ideologue of the Islamic Republic.‖
12
This chapter 
argues that Time for Love marked this significant shift, and mysticism played a crucial 
role in Makhmalbaf‘s ability to express his individuality as an artist. 
 In 1982 filmmakers were hopeful when Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi 
appointed Mohammad Khatami as the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, and 
they dubbed his first year in office as ―the year that love entered cinema.‖
13
 This 
historical categorization is useful, because it shows the special relationship that Khatami 
and cinema shared from the beginning, and it casts this connection in the context of love. 
In this way, this description of Khatami‘s tenure as Minister foresees first Makhmalbaf‘s 
film Time for Love and later the emergence of the Reformist Movement. Throughout the 
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Islamic Republic‘s history, the notion of love has threatened the revolutionary foundation 
upon which the Islamic Republic was built. This chapter demonstrates how love, and 
specifically mystic love, functions as an important feature of the reformist movement, 
both as a political and aesthetic category, and it locates the origins of this powerful 
intellectual tool in the early 1990s.  
 
The Politics of Cinema and Ownership 
 
Scholars of Iran generally divide the post-Revolution period into two parts, 
focusing the bulk of their work on either the Islamic Republic under Khomeini or the 
Reformist movement and Khatami‘s presidency. However, scholarship has thus far 
overlooked the reconfiguration of commitment to the Revolution during the first period 
into a set of Reformist policies that diverge considerably from the original ideals of the 
Islamic Republic. At what point did the Revolutionary fervor begin to subside and 
disillusionment set in? This section addresses that question by examining two individuals, 
Mohsen Makhmalbaf and Mohammad Khatami, who played an important role in both 
periods, and it probes their position in a series of debates that emerged following the 
release of Time for Love. Further, this section seeks to position the Time for Love debates 
as an early sign of the Revolutionary discontent that emerges more fully several years 
later and in turn suggests that they represent a pivotal moment in the transition from 




 At the core of this discussion—and at the core of the debates it studies—is the 
question of who controlled art in Iran in the 1990s. The film industry proves especially 
fruitful to this discussion because the Islamic Republic played a significant role in the 
production and release of films. Beyond the practice of censorship, the government 
exerted control over the industry by providing huge subsidies every year. It supplied 
financial backing for one-third of the country‘s film production and offered great 
incentives to the industry as a whole by providing tax-breaks and reduced-interest 
loans.
14
 This dependency developed because the country‘s rigid censorship practices 
curtailed viewership and subsequently foreign imports drew greater audiences. Unable to 
generate enough revenue to cover the costs of production, the Iranian film industry faced 
extinction in the period after the Revolution. The state recognized the transformative 
value of film and opted to support the indigenous film industry with such subsidies. We 
might, subsequently, suggest that this disruption to the supply and demand equilibrium 
created a need for government support.
15
  But with this support came expectation and 
accountability. 
This system gave rise to certain questions about categorization. Should a film be 
classified as the director‘s work or does it, in part, belong to the government? Who is 
accountable for its controversial release? This study is concerned with public perceptions 
and takes as a case study the Iranian responses to these kinds of concerns in their 
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reactions to the film Time for Love. This discussion and the popular opinions it conveys 
serve as a point of resistance, against which we might situate Makhmalbaf and Khatami. 
In other words, a detailed examination of these debates and the shifts in its trajectory will 
illuminate emerging fissures and rising discontent among those individuals charged with 
the creation and regulation of art in the early 1990s. Hamid Naficy has considered these 
debates in terms of their ―immediate impact to the film industry,‖ suggesting that they 
―set in motion a period of anxious uncertainly, from which [the industry] emerged 
relatively unscathed.‖
16
 However, I would like to reflect on the larger implications of 
Time for Love, as a film and a controversy with a lasting legacy. 
Time for Love premiered at the 1369/1991 Fajr Film Festival in Tehran and 
initially sparked controversy with its decisive depiction of un-Islamic practices in the 
greater context of moral relativism, a theory to which the director had recently 
subscribed. The film functions as a complicated and shifting matrix of morality and 
consists of three distinct episodes, each of which tells the same basic story but with a 
different ending. In the first section, a married woman, Güzel, has an affair, which her 
husband ultimately discovers. Outraged and angry, he kills her lover and the episode ends 
with a judge sentencing him to death. In the second version, Güzel once again has an 
affair but this time her lover kills her husband and the same judge sentences him to death. 
Interestingly, the same actor who plays the husband in the first episode plays the lover in 
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the second. In both episodes, Güzel, distraught by the death of her lover, commits 
suicide. In the third and final part, the husband (the actor who plays the husband in the 
first part) once again tries to kill the lover but during the course of their battle the lover 
grabs the husband‘s knife and refuses to kill him. The husband, touched by the event, 
decides to recognize the love between his wife and her lover and plans their wedding. 
The film ends with the wedding ceremony, where the judge from the first two parts is 
present as a guest.  
 While the unyielding order of these three sections marks an important feature of 
the film, the fluidness of the characters, the actors who play them, and of the three 
endings suggests that each situation has a series of specific conditions that ultimately 
determine its outcome, a notion very much wrapped up in the theory of moral relativism. 
The film asserts that a universal set of morals does not exist and morality is, instead, 
dependent on circumstance. Makhmalbaf shot and set his film in Turkey, which serves 
this overall theme and plays on concurrent notions of cultural relativism, but it also 
loosens the film‘s ties to Iran.    
 Despite this distance, people in Iran began reacting to the film almost 
immediately and the country‘s newspapers emerged as a kind of interactive forum for 
debates about the film; writers posited their opinions and reacted to other articles across 
various publications. The debate as a whole (like the film itself) can be broken into three 
episodes. Although some overlap exists, each of these three phases represents a specific 




director to a full-force critique of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, the 
agency in charge of controlling the art industry in Iran, and its head Mohammad Khatami.  
 At first articles targeted the director Makhmalbaf and the film Time for Love 
specifically. The lengthy debate began with an article published in Resālat [Mission] on 
February 21, 1991, in which the author M. Shushtari, lamented ―Oh God, what do I see? 
Can this be the same Makhmalbaf that criticized Golhā-ye dāvudi [Chrysanthemums]?‖
17
 
Religious groups were outraged that Makhmalbaf, who had played an important part in 
solidifying the ideology of the new Republic with early films like Tawbeh-ye Nasuh 
[Nasuh‘s Repentance] (1983), Bāykot [Boycott] (1985) and Dastforush [The Peddler] 
(1987), dared to create a film that was at such odds with Islamic ideals. Hamid Dabashi 
credits Makhmalbaf with the rise of an ―Islamic set of aesthetics‖ that was ―initially 
squarely at the service of the Islamic Revolution…and the Islamic Republic.‖
18
 And this 
film represents the initial decline of that relationship. Shushtari‘s disbelief suggests the 
degree to which Makhmalbaf‘s cinematic goals had changed; clearly, Time for Love 
functions quite differently from his previous films. This film explores the possibilities of 
multiple moralities rather than promoting the Islamic Republic‘s single interpretation of 
morality.     
 A. Nasrabadi noted this change in Makhmalbaf‘s approach to cinema in the article 
―The Film Festival of 1991: Armed with Love and the Negation of Desire,‖ published in 
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Keyhān [Universe] on March 2, 1991 and claims that ―it is no surprise that the 
Makhmalbaf of Nasuh’s Repentance and Boycott has become the Makhmalbaf of…Time 
for Love.‖ He further remarks on the shifting perception of Makhmalbaf among 
intellectuals, indicating that secular thinkers, who until recently ―were shooting at his 
shadow,‖ have reevaluated their position and ―today have abandoned their boycott on his 
films and now include him in the same category as the likes of Shahrnush Parispur.‖ 
Nasrabadi‘s alignment of Makhmalbaf with the novelist Shahrnush Parsipur is at once 
dangerous and in some ways appropriate. Always a controversial and anti-conformist 
figure, Parsipur was arrested three times by the Islamic Republic. News of her 1990 
incarceration for the publication of Zanān bedun-e mardān [Women without Men],
19
 a 
book that openly discusses women‘s sexuality, likely remained fresh in readers‘ minds at 
this time. And Makhmalbaf‘s representation of women‘s sexuality in Time for Love was 





   
 And yet not all parties reacted negatively to this particular depiction of love and 
sexuality. When asked to comment on the film, Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush, an important 
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reformist philosopher who will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, told Omid 
[Hope] magazine that he did not ―understand why earthly love is bad.‖ He questions 
whether it ―is possible to achieve a higher love without the lower love.‖  Nowbat-e 
‘āsheqi, he says, ―is about this earthly love‖ and he ―liked it.‖  
 However, Makhmalbaf did more than simply represent women‘s sexuality; he 
also threatened the Islamic Republic‘s ethical system
22
 by proposing an alternative and 
relativist model for morality. Critics attacked the film as a ―condemnation of morality‖ 




 even suggested that 
Makhmalbaf put his filmmaking career on hold until he had resolved his ―intellectual 
qualms regarding women and the idea that truths are relative.‖
25
 This statement reaffirms 
the religious groups‘ belief in the influential power of film. Undoubtedly this very notion 
underlines the system of governmental support of the film industry in Iran. And this 
arrangement expected cinema to function not as a site of contestation or ambiguity but 
rather as a medium for the propagation of a certain kind of ideology.  
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In particular, cinema was expected to promote a conservative interpretation of 
Shi‘i Islam that located the value of art in its ability to represent idealized types. In 
cinema, this interpretation was codified in 1982, when the Ministry of Islamic Culture 
and Guidance began holding films to a new ―Rule of Modesty‖ that better represented a 
new ―purified‖ culture.
26
 The representation of women was especially contentious in this 
schema, and women were to be limited to characters who embodied the ―idealized‖ 
Muslim woman, especially in her role as mother and wife. Time for Love was problematic 
according to the rules of modesty that determined the film industry at the time the film 
was released, because it represented a woman who causes the disintegration of the 
familial structure with her extra-marital affair. Time for Love does more than fail to 
condemn her actions; the film justifies them by creating a system wherein moral relativity 
is an idealized possibility.  
 By threatening the ―purified‖ culture that it was supposed to be promoting, Time 
for Love generated the need for public accountability, and the second wave in the debates 
consists primarily of attempts to place responsibility for the film‘s controversial release. 
As the dispute began to extend beyond the film itself, blame initially rested on the Fajr 
Film Festival. Critics of the film expressed dismay that ―the festival organizers 
inadvertently allowed the new and improved Makhmalbaf a place in the festival.‖
27
 They 
further suggested that ―it is a shame that at the Fajr Film Festival cheap love is taking the 
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place of higher love.‖
28
 However, according to the journal Film, a statement released by 
the Festival‘s public relations office at this time that neglected to mention Time for Love 
marked its refusal to participate in this debate.
29
 As a result, people began looking higher 
for accountability and aimed their attention at the government and specifically at the 
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. 
 N. Mahdyar first articulated this kind of attack in an article called ―Defective 
Criticism is Wrong. We Should Go After the Roots,‖ published in Keyhān on March 14, 
1991. The author wondered ―which policy charted this downward course for 
Makhmalbaf.‖ This line of questioning suggests a provocative causal relationship 
between official governmental policy and Makhmalbaf‘s cinematic work and indicates a 
significant reversal. Whereas previously his works influenced policy by reinforcing 
revolutionary mentality, with this film, Mahdyar claimed, policy asserted its influential 
power over Makhmalbaf. He further argued that ―Makhmalbaf is a shining example of 
the supervised governmental policy over cinema.‖ And yet Mahdyar‘s harshest criticism 
came with his assertion that Time for Love—which had been thoroughly trashed in the 
newspapers by this point—is ―the product of your guidance and support.‖
30
 With this 
statement, he refocused his point of address and directed his comments specifically at the 
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Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. His choice of words, ―guidance and support,‖ 
served this readdressing purpose by referring to the Ministry‘s name. 
 Gradually criticism against the Ministry became more narrowly focused and its 
head, Mohammad Khatami, emerged as a primary target. Sa‘id Mo‘tamedi, for example, 
addressed the Minister directly and asked: ―Mr. Khatami, if you are actually opposed to 
the cheapness of the West, then why is the film Hamlet (in which the lips of a boy and a 
girl come within a few millimeters of one another) being shown in cinemas right now? 
Your censors…edit the film in such a way that the viewer can easily guess what has been 
cut out.‖
31
 Mo‘tamedi‘s question demonstrates the way that this debate, which began 
squarely focused on Makhmalbaf, had developed into larger commentary on Ministry 
practices. This author expressed no interest in the lasting legacy of Time for Love but 
used its controversy to call into question Khatami‘s own system of beliefs and to censure 
loosening censorship policies. A second critic, A. Dara‘i, also addressed Khatami directly 
and wrote: ―Dear Mr. Khatami…you should have responded to central complaints that 
have entered the press in the Friday sermons of Qom …and asked for forgiveness from 
the people of the Shi‘i community (hezbollah).‖
32
 This kind of request targeted Khatami 
as the agent responsible for the content of Time for Love and positioned him against a 
larger religious community.  
 Dara‘i‘s comment also alludes to an important feature of the debate: much of the 
commentary entered the newspapers through the Friday sermons of Qom. And Ahmad 
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Jannati, the interim prayer leader of Qom, launched the severest criticism of Khatami and 
the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance during a Friday  sermon on March 7,1991 
that was later published in the newspaper Ettela’āt. During his speech, Jannati warned 
that there is a ―movement crawling in the name of art‖ that threatens the ―Islamic 
Republic, the committed artists, and the Revolution.‖ He urged his listeners to ―put up a 
serious fight against these kinds of movements.‖ In an interesting way, Jannati foresaw 
the Reformist movement and its important relationship with art. He also made an 
important distinction between those artists still committed to the Revolutionary ideals and 
those artists who were aligning themselves with this growing movement, and this 
division may have served as a broad reference to Makhmalbaf and his changing role.    
 Interestingly, Jannati‘s speech mirrored in some ways the larger debate at play as 
he shifted its focus from art and the artist to Khatami and the Ministry. His classification 
of the movement as something that crawls further suggests this distance and mobility. 
Later in his speech Jannati claimed, ―They brag that our film has been the subject of 
acclaim and appreciation outside of the country and foreigners conclude that art is alive 
and well in Iran. What a strange kind of art you‘ve created.‖
33
 He significantly changed 
the subject of these two sentences, juxtaposing an ambiguous ―they‖ with an equally 
indistinct ―you.‖ And yet the space and duality he created between these two subjects 
remains certain as he relocates his point-of-address on the second-person. This act placed 
specific blame not on an individual artist but rather on a larger force or system.  
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 However, Khatami took this point of address personally and responded to 
Jannati‘s remarks directly as a means of commenting on the Time for Love controversy 
for this first time. In a speech published in several newspapers on March 12, 1991, he 
cautioned that these words ―raise doubt and create ambiguity.‖ He attempted to trivialize 
Jannati‘s comments and suggested that ―it is unlikely that Mr. Jannati has the base of 
information necessary to assess the cultural and artistic events of this country, including 
film festivals.‖ Nevertheless, he noted that the ―decisiveness‖ with which he ―issues the 
angriest orders disturbs the peace of mind of the experts who are doing this sensitive 
work and upsets the cinema.‖ Khatami reiterated this point and requested ―forgiveness 
from all the people knowledgeable of culture and art‖ for Jannati‘s comments. He asked 
―the dear artists and men of culture to tolerate these unkind things with generosity of 
spirit.‖
34
 Khatami made a powerful statement with this seemingly innocent request for 
forgiveness. Like Darai, he distinguished between the artistic community and religious 
groups and further suggested that an individual must possess a certain kind of knowledge 
to evaluate art effectively. This claim precluded the participation of religious officials in 
the formation of governmental policy that oversees artistic production. Interestingly, with 
this suggestion, Khatami anticipated the 1992 publication of the Culture Principles of the 
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Islamic Republic, a governmental document which recommends that ―the task of 
handling sociocultural issues…be left to the ‗experts‘ and not the clergy.‖
35
  
 The exchange between Khatami and Jannati touches on a defining feature of this 
period. A great deal of uncertainty ensued after Khomeini‘s death in 1989 and the 
country‘s leaders faced the challenge of reconciling a set of paradoxical policies that he 
had enacted during his ten-year rule. His various documents codified, in a sense, the aim 
of the Republic and in his absence administrators were left to their own instincts and 
powers of interpretation. Fakhreddin Anvar, the Deputy Minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance and the head of the Cinema Division, noted the difficulties that came with this 
uncertainty and classifies ―the experience of this year‖ as ―a very sensitive and 
complicated episode.‖ However, he defended the Ministry‘s actions during this time and 
contends that ―we have been very successful.‖
36
 But ultimately the variety of responses to 
the Ministry‘s ―success‖ that emerged during the course of these debates signified the 
factionalism that marks the post-Khomeini period.  
 Khatami‘s response warrants additional consideration and will be examined 
further; however, it remains significant here because it represented the third shift in the 
Time for Love debates. During this final period in the debate, people initially responded 
to Khatami‘s statement and reiterated many of the same points. However, one might best 
classify this wave of reactions as the artistic response. At this point, a series of directors 
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began commenting on the controversy at hand. Many of these filmmakers attempted to 
distance themselves from the two figures at the center of the storm, Mohsen Makhmalbaf 
and the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. Seyfollah Dad, for example, in an 
article called ―The Identity of Iranian Filmmakers,‖ suggested that one of the mistakes in 
the current debates is ―confusing the identity of current cinema in Iran with Mohsen 
Makhmalbaf.‖ He also reminded readers that film did not serve as a ―reflection of…the 
state or the Ministry of Guidance.‖ He ends his article with a poetic warning by Rumi: 
―In Balkh an ironsmith sinned/ in Shustar they cut the neck of an ironsmith.‖
37
 This 
couplet served as a caution against the kind of generalization that rests at the center of 
these debates. In many ways, this wave of response represented the beginning of the 
breakdown of the connection between politics and cinema that was constructed in the 
second phase of the debate. With this breakdown came the dissolution of the perception 
of a heavy-handed relationship between cinema and the Ministry.  
   As writers like Dad downplayed the significance of the interplay between 
politics and cinema, the notion of aesthetics re-emerged as a central concern of the 
debate. These responses remained critical of Makhmalbaf. In an article called ―Cinema 
and the Course of West-Stricken (qarbzade) Intellectualism,‖ director Rahim Rahimipur, 
critical of a cinematic trajectory that would permit a film like Nasuh’s Repentance to give 
way to Time for Love, indicated that ―If [Iranian cinema] continues down this path, only 
God knows where it will end up.‖ He suggests that Iranian society should be ―worried 
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and concerned that Little Jungle Boy, who has gotten married and settled down, gave up 
his battles to present the history of Islam and the Islamic Revolution through cinema.‖
38
 
With this clear reference to Makhmalbaf, Rahimipur insinuated that the director has gone 
soft with his depiction of love in Time for Love and criticized Makhmalbaf‘s neglect of 
more serious issues affecting the country at that time. Rahimipoor lamented the fact that 
Iran does not ―even have one example of one film in line with the goals of the regime and 
reconstruction after the war.‖
39
 With this article, the debate came full circle, as it once 
again examined the purpose of film. However, whereas previously criticism was very 
much tied up in what film should not do (e.g. promote moral relativism), this artistic 
response was concerned more with what film should attempt to do (e.g. reinforce 
reconstruction efforts after the Iran-Iraq War).   
 At this point, the debate as a cohesive body began to break down. A unified set of 
concerns no longer drives the responses and the discussion slowly tapers off as authors 
attempt to submit their final thoughts. By the end of April, Time for Love and the related 
disputes no longer appear regularly in the main newspapers. In June the monthly journal 
Film published a follow-up report that summarized some of the major exchanges of the 
debate and officially brought the controversy to a close. The preceding examination 
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charts some of the major concerns of the Time for Love debates and at the same time 
highlights the public‘s overwhelmingly negative response to the film. This communal 
reaction indicated that the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance had—whether 
intentionally or unintentionally—loosened its grip on the control of the art world and had 
challenged the limits of cultural expression in Iranian society at that time. The disconnect 
between the public criticism of the film and Khatami and Makhmalbaf‘s open defense, an 
analysis of which will form the basis of the remainder of this section, suggests that while 
society in the spring of 1991 by and large situated art in the hands of the government, 
Khatami and Makhmalbaf provided agency to the artist himself.     
 Ultimately, the release of Time for Love and the controversy surrounding it 
suggested a shift in policy, both personal and political. This episode represented a critical 
moment for both men. Khatami and Makhmalbaf had played important roles in the 
Republic‘s first decade but their support of this film reveals that their beliefs were no 
longer in line with the ideals of the conservative revolutionaries. With this film Mohsen 
Makhmalbaf declared his independence as an artist and no longer accepted his role as the 
propagator of the Islamic Republic‘s ideology. Dabashi notes that ―Makhmalbaf‘s early 
career was...seriously implicated in…the Islamic Republic‖ and his works played an 
―integral‖ part in its reign.
40
 The release of Time for Love, however, marked 
Makhmalbaf‘s move away from this ―early career.‖ This shift in the way Makhmalbaf 
perceived himself and his relationship to the government was evident in the two public 
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responses he issued. In the first press release, published relatively early in the debates on 
March 10, 1991, he indicated that ―the writer of these lines knows very well that these 
disputes don‘t even have anything to do with him and the dispute is …between the 
power-hungry forces.‖
41
 Whereas previously Makhmalbaf‘s role was very much tied up 
in this struggle for power, at this point he was distancing himself from that process. 
 In his second statement, issued several weeks later and appropriately during the 
wave of artistic responses, Makhmalbaf addresses an ―open letter‖ to ―Dear Mr. Mehdi 
Nasri, Brother who is committed and revolutionary.‖  However, he quickly corrects 
himself and writes, ―Pardon me, A. Nasrabadi, the managing director and actually the one 
who does everything at Keyhān!‖ With this introduction, Makhmalbaf alluded to the fact 
that Mehdi Nasri, the Managing Director of the newspaper Keyhān, had written a series 
of articles against the film, Makhmalbaf, and the Ministry under the name ―A. 
Nasrabadi.‖ He attacked Nasri‘s failure to sign his articles with his own name and 
accused him of ―benefiting from behind the curtain.‖ Makhmalbaf asked, ―If you claim to 
have faith, why don‘t you stand behind your words?‖ However, his most telling statement 
came when he continued with this line of questioning and inquires, ―Don‘t we, the artists 
of your country, stand like men under your beating sticks with our real names?‖
42
 
Makhmalbaf‘s emphasis on names and signing one‘s work functioned as a way of 
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reaffirming his agency; he accepts responsibility for the controversy but also asserting the 
film as his own.  
 Textual as well as this contextual evidence points to Makhmalbaf‘s shifting policy 
and, indeed, his greatest statement of discontent  and most consequential attempt to 
repurpose his filmic vision remains the film Time for Love itself. The film‘s title is 
especially telling in this regard.  Nowbat-e ‘āsheqi means either ―Time for Love‖ or 
―Love‘s Turn.‖ Both translations fittingly convey the idea that Makhmalbaf and/or 
Iranian society had reached a moment in its post-Revolution history in which it was 
appropriate to discuss love. The film‘s sequence of events carries an equally significant 
message. The first two episodes are wrought with violence and the three main characters 
die in both. However, the third part marks the characters‘ willingness to transcend the 
violence and give love a chance. Makhmalbaf ends his film with this alternative 
perspective, and from the vantage point of a progressive narrative, films, especially those 
portrayals that make no claim to represent an historical event, often leave the viewer with 
the impression that the final scene correlates with the present. This notion is further 
supported by the fact that the post-Revolutionary period in Iran at this time (like the film 
itself) might be divided into three parts. The Revolution of 1978-79 and the Iran-Iraq War 
(1980-1988), like the first two sections of the film, were incredibly violent. At the time 
this film was initially released, the third phase (the period immediately following the war) 
was just taking shape. This film, therefore, represents Makhmalbaf‘s attempt to steer the 




navigational attempt may have been at the cost of his relationship with the Iranian 
government. 
Hamid Dabashi suggests that Time for Love and Shabhā-ye zāyandeh rud [The 
Nights of the Zayandeh River] (1991) are ―excellent exercises in philosophical relativism 
but as ‗films‘ entirely useless, trite, and prosaic‖ and ―add nothing to Makhmalbaf‘s 
cinematic career…‖
43
 However, the preceding analysis effectively demonstrates that 
Time for Love determined a trajectory in  Makhmalbaf‘s career and served as a pivotal 
moment, in which he asserted ownership of and control over his own cinematic vision 
and emerged successfully from a period of artistic juvenilia.  
In his letter to Mehdi Nasri, Makhmalbaf argued that the managing editor 
remained interested only in ―ridiculing the Ministry.‖
44
 Nasri‘s eagerness to criticize the 
Ministry may very well have rested in the agency‘s move away from the conservative 
policies of the Republic under Khomeini. Mohammad Khatami was responsible for 
steering the Ministry in this new direction and his reaction, as Minister of Islamic Culture 
and Guidance, to the Time for Love debates highlights his growing discontent in the post-
Khomeini period. This kind of discontent was contingent on expectations that grow out of 
serious investment in a particular cause. Like Makhmalbaf, who promoted the Islamic 
Republic‘s ideology through is films, Khatami contributed significantly to the formation 
of the Islamic Republic. His affiliation with the Revolution dated back to a period when 
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the Revolution had not yet been fully conceived. In 1961 he began studying under 
Khomeini in Qom and in 1979 at Khomeini‘s urging  he left his post as chair of the 
Islamic Centre in Hamburg, Germany to return to Iran and participate in the events 
unfolding. Immediately following the Revolution, he served as a representative in the 
Majles and acted as the head of the Keyhān Publishing House. In 1982 Khomeini 
appointed Khatami as the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance.
45
 By the time that 
Time for Love premiered at the 1991 Fajr Film Festival, Khatami had been at the service 
of the Republic for over a decade. 
Khatami resigned from the Ministry in 1992, citing a ―violation‖ of ―all legal, 
religious, ethical, and secular norms‖ in the ―field of culture.‖ He further foresaw the 
arrival of an ―unhealthy and turbulent atmosphere‖ and the ―discouragement and 
insecurity of…thinkers and artists.‖
46
 However, his clash with the country‘s religious 
conservatives and this notable shift in ideology were not without precedent at that point. 
And, indeed, his response to the Time for Love episode a year earlier brings to focus 
emerging cracks in his commitment to the Revolutionary ideals. On this issue, Khatami 
gave one speech, which I examined previously as I reflected on Ahmad Jannati‘s 
criticism of the country‘s film industry. In this speech, after addressing Jannati directly, 
Khatami moved on to a broader consideration of the film Time for Love and the 
complaints launched against the Ministry. He suggested that he is proud of the Ministry 
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for ―holding steadfast‖ as weak and narrow-minded people ―try to load their own political 
and cultural agenda on the society as a whole.‖ He defended in this way the liberalization 
of his organization.  
However, the significant ideological shift that took place during the course of his 
speech extends beyond simple defense. Khatami also asserted that ―today our society is 
facing great tragedies‖ and he located the root of these problems in the ―judicious and 
courageous confrontation by his eminence Imam Khomeini with this trend and the terror 
that he caused on various occasions and the fatwa and the provocative opinions he had 
concerning every area, especially cultural and artistic…‖
47
 With this statement, Khatami 
remains respectful of Khomeini and indicates the necessity of his drastic measures. At the 
same time, Khatami felt limited by the policies of the Revolution, especially with regard 
to artistic expression. Interestingly, just as Makhmalbaf‘s film Time for Love promoted a 
kind of moral relativism, so too does Khatami‘s statement advocate for the possibility of 
relativity in policymaking. In other words, he subtly suggested that in the post-Revolution 
period, the policies and aims of the Republic must adjust to fit the changing conditions 
and political environment. This philosophy later emerges in his letter of resignation, in 
which he employs much of the same imagery, including an ominous future and the 
political disruption of artistic expression. Ultimately, this philosophy guides the 
Reformist Movement that Khatami helped to articulate and is demonstrated in his own 
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Mystic Love, Reformist Philosophy 
 Although Mohsen Makhmalbaf released two public statements during the course 
of the Time for Love debates, his most powerful declaration on the topic remains the film 
itself. Just as the controversy surrounding the film suggested a move towards the 
individualization of the production of art, so too does the film promote the individual 
experience of religious, moral, and ethical systems. Time for Love engages a long mystic 
tradition within Persian poetics in order to advocate an alternative to the Islam promoted 
by the Islamic Republic. Abdolkarim Soroush, an important reformist philosopher at the 
time, wrote several favorable reviews of Time for Love, and his open and enthusiastic 
support invites a comparison between his philosophies and the film that ultimately 
underscores mysticism as an aesthetic feature of the Reformist genre. Further, this 
cinematic revival of mysticism imbues the tradition with new forms of political meaning 
previously unexplored.  
 Scholars have drawn comparisons between Makhmalbaf and Soroush, but these 
analyses do not consider material interactions between these two intellectuals. Previous 
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attempts to consider these two intellectuals together have not engaged Soroush‘s 
commentary on Makhmalbaf‘s films or any other tangible exchange between them. 
Instead, this body of scholarship compares broad trends in these two individuals‘ 
philosophical and intellectual works and their shared experiences within the Islamic 
Republic. In his comprehensive study of Makhmalbaf, Eric Egan argues in general that 
Soroush undertook the intellectual work of justifying religiously Mohammad Khatami‘s 
notion of civil society through ―attacks‖ on the ―religio-political manifestations of the 
Islamic Republic.‖
49
 This act, which in part permitted the rise of civil society in popular 
and public discourse, ―meant a relaxation of the censorship laws‖ for filmmakers like 
Makhmalbaf.
50
 Hamid Dabashi sees both Makhmalbaf and Soroush as ―moral and 
intellectual by-products‖
51
 of an Islamic revolution intended to overturn a monarchy with 
deep imperial ties and interests.
52
 As such, Soroush and Makhmalbaf add respectively 
―metaphysical (other-worldly)‖ and ―artistic (aesthetically emancipatory)‖ dimensions to 
the ―political resistance to the classical colonialization of Iranians.‖
53
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Yet for Dabashi these two thinkers are separated by differing ―modes of creative 
emancipation…from the colonial trappings of agential de-subjection.‖
54
 Whereas he sees 
Soroush as ―epistemicly trapped‖ in the ―dialectical paradoxes of Enlightenment 
modernity in its colonial shadows,‖
55
 Dabashi envisions Makhmalbaf‘s ―creative 
outbursts‖ as offering ―a far more emancipatory track out of that cul-de-sac.‖ The 
difference crucially emerges from their respective methodologies. Soroush seeks ―moral 
and political agency‖ by staging a ―hermeneutic encounter…between Islam and 
Enlightenment modernity.‖
56
 Makhmalbaf, on the other hand, navigates this terrain 
―artistically,‖ which renders his work less vulnerable to colonial subjugation. While 
Dabashi astutely notes a historical and intellectual connection between Makhmalbaf and 
Soroush, his anti-imperialist agenda overshadows the creative and aesthetic ruptures that 
unite these two thinkers. In particular, mysticism acts as a force that marries Soroush‘s 
and Makhmalbaf‘s philosophical and creative efforts. Because mysticism and Sufism 
share long, historical ties with Persian poetry and Iranian culture, they are less susceptible 
to ―epistemic trappings‖ and therefore allow me to move beyond the post-colonial 
discourse that limits – and even traps – Dabashi‘s own analysis of this important 
relationship.  
Before expounding the political potential of mysticism as a feature of the 
Reformist aesthetic, it is important to establish Time for Love as a film invested in and 
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indebted to the Persian mystic tradition.
57
 Two important Sufi concepts, ma’refat 
[knowing God] and haqiqat [reality, truth], inform this mystic exploration of Time for 
Love, and the ideas and poetry of Jalāl al-Din Rumi prove instructive in my effort to 
classify Time of Love as a representative example of cine-mysticism in Iran in the early 
1990s. My application of Rumi is particularly relevant here because both Makhmalbaf 
and Soroush have professional connections to Rumi. Makhmalbaf has on several 
occasions quoted Rumi in reference to his films, and Soroush, in addition to being a lay 
religious thinker, is a scholar of Rumi and has edited an authoritative edition of his 
Masnavi.
58
 By coupling these tenets of mysticism with Makhmalbaf‘s published 
philosophy about the film, it is possible to recover the mystic qualities that underpin Time 
for Love.  
In his far-reaching study of Rumi, Franklin Lewis describes the Sufi concept of 
ma’refat as ―an intuitive and experiential knowing of God…achieved not by studying the 
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law, but by loving God.‖
59
 In order to illustrate this categorization, he cites Rumi‘s 
famous verse: 
Love resides 
not in learning 
not in knowledge 
not in pages and pamphlets 
 Wherever the debates of men may lead 




The centrality of love to the mystic experience in Persian literature is well-documented in 
Annemarie Schimmel‘s now classic book As through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam. 
Perhaps slightly overstating the case, she argues that while Persian mystic poets draw on 
three categories of symbols, ―the center of their thoughts is always Love.‖
61
 However, 
Schimmel is quick to identify the metaphoric nature of this love and she draws on the 
proverb ―al-majāz qantaratu’l-haqīqa‖ [The metaphor is the bridge that leads to Truth]. 
Indeed, Persian mystical poetry depends on the tension between human love and Divine 
love, wherein the former may—but not necessarily—function as a metaphor for the latter. 
Schimmel, like Lewis, also notes the opposition between love and intellect in the mystic 
tradition. For the mystic poets, she claims, ―reason, or intellect, leads to talk while Love 
silently reveals the inside of the mysteries.‖
62
 
The title Time for Love underscores the centrality of love in Makhmalbaf‘s film, 
and the public debates surrounding it similarly suggest that love was a point of concern 
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for audiences. These published debates indicate that by and large the public considered 
the film‘s representation of love in earthly terms. Hamid Naficy notes that other films at 
the 1991 Fajr Film Festival were celebrated for their representations of ―spiritual and 
mystic love.‖
63
 The present study attempts to recover Time for Love from a strictly carnal 
reading of love and attribute to it the appropriate and timely mystical elements.  
Abdolkarim Soroush was the first to consider the romantic qualities of Time for Love in 
divine terms when he asked of the film whether it ―is possible to achieve a higher love 
without the lower love?‖
64
 In a second essay, he expanded on the metaphoric power of 
love in the film and wrote that ―being in love is not emphasized or treated topically‖ in 




Mohsen Makhmalbaf‘s own philosophy of the film, which was published in three-
volume collection of essays and reviews called Gong-e kh
v
āb dideh [Muted Dreams] 
(1993), picks up on Soroush‘s classification of the film as mysticism and, like the mystic 
poets of the classical Persian tradition, considers the concept of love both in metaphoric 
relation to the Divine and at odds with intellectualism. It is worth noting that kh
v
āb dideh 
is an idiom in Persian that describes the disorientation of waking up from a dream and 
recognizing the physical shapes of reality once again. This title is fitting for 
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Makhmalbaf‘s work, because the state of gong-e kh
v
āb dideh describes the director‘s 
career and especially his disillusionment with the dream of the Revolution. In this 
scheme, Time for Love is the moment of gong-e kh
v
āb dideh: Makhmalbaf‘s recognition 
of the restrictive realities of the Islamic Republic that are in contrast to the promises that 
the Revolution promised.  
In Gong-e kh
v
āb dideh , Makhmalbaf‘s notes on Time for Love interrogate and 
ultimately collapse two binary oppositions: manteq-e sar, manteq-e del [logic of the 
mind, logic of the heart] and ‘eshq-e zamini, ‘eshq-e āsemāni [earthly love, heavenly 
love].  The tension generated in Time for Love between and through these opposing 
forces ultimately imbues the film with mystic potential. In his discussion of logic, 
Makhmalbaf begins with a statement that appeals to the rational mind: the whole is 
bigger than the part.
66
 However, according to the director, Time for Love allows us to 
image how the heart‘s logic functions differently from the mind‘s, in such a way that this 
generally accepted truth about the relationship between the whole and the part no longer 
seems rational.  
Two moments in the film demonstrate the ways in which the heart‘s logic 
triumphs over the mind‘s rationale.  In the film‘s first section, Güzel‘s husband, to whom 
Makhmalbaf refers in both the screenplay and his other writings about the film as mu-
meshki [dark-haired one], accepts his death sentence and insists, ―I am content because I 
have defended my honor.‖ As Makhmalbaf notes, logically one‘s honor represents only 
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one part of one‘s life as a whole.
67
 The husband‘s willingness to sacrifice his life to 
defend his honor confounds the proportional relationship between the whole and the part. 
Yet this act does not strike the viewer as unreasonable because it appeals to an emotional 
logic, according to which the desire to defends one‘s honor is bigger and more urgent 
than life itself.  
Similarly, in the first two sections of the film, Güzel commits suicide because her 
lover, her true beloved, dies, first at the hands of her husband and later at the hands of the 
justice system. Here again one might reasonably argue that love represents but one piece 
of life as a whole. However, Güzel‘s desire to forsake the whole for the benefit of the part 
conforms to the same emotional logic, a logic that resonates more soundly with human 
desire than the rationalized and rationalizing logic for which humans often strive.  Time 
for Love asserts the differences implicit in the mind‘s logic and the heart‘s logic, but the 
film also shows that human experience privileges the latter. The characters make 
decisions based on emotional rather than rational impulses, and it is only by deferring to 
the undeniable pull of an emotional logic that the viewer is able to make sense of the 
characters‘ actions and reactions. Makhmalbaf argues that ―if it weren‘t so, we would 
have to consider all of the people in this story raving mad.‖
68
 
The strain between these differing modes—emotional and rational, heart and 
mind—is captured in the film by the two characters Güzel and her mother, representing 
the emotional and the rational respectively. At one point in the film, the mother pleas, 
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―My daughter, not all of life is love,‖ and this statement stresses for both Güzel and the 
viewer that the whole is bigger and more valuable than the part. The film further exposes 
the mother‘s rational attempts when Güzel is in the hospital and asks why she was not 
allowed to choose her own husband. The mother replies by explaining that she chose a 
husband for Güzel based on two achievements: completion of military service and 
ownership of a taxi. For the mother, these two accomplishments make the husband a 
rational choice; he is responsible and has the means to provide financial stability. In 
general, he can provide a good quality of life, which is ultimately more urgent than the 
pull of love. However, shortly after hearing this reasoning, Güzel kills herself, and the 
implication for the viewer is clear. While rational thought appeals to a logic of the mind, 
it cannot compete with the emotional logic that often determines one‘s life decisions.  
Mystic love, like the kind represented in Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love, defies 
simple categorization, and the film‘s third section complicates the privileging of the 
heart‘s logic that is established in the first two sections. The viewer understands by the 
time the third sequence begins that the love that Güzel shares with her beloved is greater 
than life itself. It is worth dying for, and the film‘s third cycle allows the viewer to 
imagine that love realized in a moment foreseen by the thirteen-century Persian poet 
Fakhr al-Din ‗Erāqi, who describes the coalescence of lover, beloved, and love.
69
 Güzel 
and her lover not only live but are married, and their love is sanctioned by her husband in 
what should be an idyllic ending. However, the film‘s final words rupture the possibility 
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of happiness for its protagonist. The lover says, ―We‘re finally together,‖ and Güzel 
replies, ―I‘m still not happy.‖ The film‘s conclusion thereby accords with ‗Erāqi‘s 
assessment that ―The separation which is the aim of the beloved/Is a thousand times 
better than the union.‖
70
  
Indeed, it is the failure of this love‘s realization in Time for Love that permits its 
assumption of metaphoric meaning, and within the mystic tradition romantic concerns 
most commonly signal divine love. In his notes, Makhmalbaf interrogates the categories 
of ‘eshq-e zamini [earthly love] and ‘eshq-e āsemāni [heavenly love]. He aptly observes 
some of the shades of gray that naturally exist between these two interconnected 
concepts; he notes, for example, that love between a man and his wife is earthly because 
it is physical but divine because it has been sanctioned religiously. However, the director 
arrives at the firm conclusion that sexual acts undoubtedly fall into a carnal category, 
regardless of their relationship to love. He indicates that it is significant that Güzel‘s love 
is never consummated even after it has been sanctioned.
 71
 The lack of sexuality leaves 
her love within the realm of mystic possibility because it does not preclude the possibility 
of a divine or heavenly connotation. That Güzel‘s desires are not sexualized within the 
narrative is significant insofar as it both demonstrates the shortsightedness of most critics 
who objected to the film‘s carnality at the time of its release and confirms—contrary to 
these critics‘ objections—the mystic possibility of the love represented by Time for Love. 
As Schimmel argues, ―the constant oscillation between the two levels of experience‖ fills 
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the mystic tradition with an ―ambiguity between the human and superhuman levels‖ that 
ultimately defines it. The love for which Makhmalbaf calls in his film exists in a similar 
ambivalence.  
The very notion of ambivalence that defines this cinematic representation of love 
resonates with a second mystic principal engendered by Time for Love. At the same time 
that the film creates, through its various episodes, altering and differing meanings of love 
contingent on a slippery and shifting system of context and pretense, it also more 
generally theorizes the existence of multiple realities and their corresponding relativities. 
In his director‘s notes, Makhmalbaf insists that Time for Love is philosophical at its core, 
and for him it is the possibility of multiple avenues constructed from a set of unique 
circumstances and the film‘s interest in exploring those circumstances that ultimately 
lend it its philosophical character.
72
 The very possibility of circumstance generates 
multiple realities and truths, and this notion in Time for Love recalls self-consciously a 
similar idea in mystic poetry. On at least two occasions, and once in direct reference to 
this film, Makhmalbaf has alluded to a well-known anecdote from Rumi that illustrates 
this idea:   
The truth is a mirror that shattered as it fell from the hand of God. 
Everyone picked up a piece of it, and each decided that the truth was what 
he saw reflected in his fragment rather than realizing that the truth had 
become fragmented among them all.
73
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In his director‘s notes, Makhmalbaf similarly describes his project as an exploration into 
the ―role of ‗circumstance‘ on the fate of every single human being.‖
74
 Thus, it is 
individualization of the reception of truth that occupies a paramount position in Time for 
Love. Soroush sees the film in a comparable light and argues that what the film promotes 
is the idea that whether an event is ―good or bad, right or wrong, when two people change 
places, they are like one another.‖
75
 For Soroush Time for Love brings to focus the fact 
that circumstance can for two individuals create ―two spheres, wherein one finds fault in 
the other and one is even willing to kill another.‖
76
 
This analysis by Soroush underscores an important and often overlooked feature 
of Time for Love. Although many of the discussions and debates about the film revolve 
around Güzel and her propriety, it is actually the two men who function as variables in 
the film and participate as subjects in Makhmalbaf‘s study. This feature is inscribed 
visually by the film‘s actors and its mise-en-scène. It is significant that the actress who 
plays Güzel remains the same in all three sections, and the character‘s circumstances 
leading up to the film‘s events remain similarly consistent: she has fallen in love with a 
man who is not her husband. The film reinforces visually the character‘s stability 
throughout the three episodes, and each episode begins with the same shot of Güzel 
standing in front of a house right before a train passes in front of the camera. The film 
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also ends with the same shot, which suggests the continuation of this pattern and the 
possibility of other truths and realities beyond those posited by the film‘s three episodes. 
 It is ultimately the consistency of the representation of Güzel that signals for the 
viewer the repetition of the film‘s main narrative in each of the three sections. 
Makhmalbaf replicates exactly certain frames of Güzel from the first episode in the 
second. At other times, the director stages a frame in the second episode in exactly the 
same manner as the first, but while Güzel‘s placement remains the same, the male 
characters have switched places. Each instance reveals Güzel and her circumstances as 
constants while the men switch and change, and it is their shifting circumstances that 
prove to be of interest to the director and his film.   
Because the men in Time for Love are only identified in the film‘s screenplay by 
their physical characteristics, mu-meshki [dark-haired] and mu-bur [blonde], and not by 
names, when the actors switch roles in the second episode, one must assume that the 
characters have similarly changed places. Through the switching male actors and 
characters, the film imagines multiple possibilities and realities, each conditioned by a 
particular set of circumstances. Quite simply, Time for Love creates the opportunity for 
two rivals to act according to the other‘s circumstances. The film‘s second section, for 
example, creates the possibility that if fate had granted the blonde lover of the first 
section a taxi and a certificate of military completion (like the dark-haired man of the first 
episode), then he would have been Güzel‘s husband. However, by being her husband he 




nor a certification of military completion, then he might have become Güzel‘s lover, 
privy to a love he was denied in the role of her husband. And this possibility becomes his 
fate in the film‘s second section.  A complex web of circumstances and conditions 
thereby defines both men and their relationships to Güzel, and by engendering an 
empathetic perspective, wherein the viewer is made to consider the circumstances of both 
men before reaching conclusions about their actions, Time for Love advocates a new 
relative order in which both text and context determine morality.  
Despite their investment in the role of shifting and varying circumstances, both 
the first and second episodes of the film conclude similarly. The dark-haired character 
slays the light-haired character and receives a death sentence, and meanwhile the death of 
her lover inspires Güzel to commit suicide in both episodes. The dark-haired man‘s role 
changes from husband to lover, but his act of violence and the violence he inspires in 
Güzel remain the same. With these sources of continuity between the first and second 
episodes, Time for Love considers the possibility that these moments of violence are 
predestined and unalterable, despite the different routes and conditions that ushered their 
arrival. The kind of predestination that the film posits, in which multiple paths—each 
conditioned by unique circumstances—coalesce at a single reality, evokes the Sufi 
concept of haqiqat [truth or reality]. While the mystic poets of the Persian tradition use 
the word haqiqat in a number of ways, including its literal meaning of truth, which is the 
meaning suggested in the Rumi anecdote quoted by Makhmalbaf, as a concept the word 




there are an endless number of individual (and individualized) paths or tāriqs that arrive 
at this stage. Time for Love, as a contemporary interpretation of the mystic tradition, 
engages similar questions about the meaning of truth and the multiple and twisting roads 
that lead to it.   
Just as the film‘s third section confounds its established commentary on love, so 
too does this third episode betray a critique of the predestination explored in the first two 
sections. Makhmalbaf has suggested that the film‘s third episode is intended to reflect on 
―the relative role of man‘s freedom
.‖77 
His use of the word ―relative‖ suggests his 
unwillingness to forego completely the notion of fate; however, Time for Love suggests 
with its third episode the ability of one‘s free will to break free of historical cycles. 
Although the blond lover has the opportunity to kill the dark-haired husband, he refuses, 
arguing that ―We were not put on this world to kill each other so I will not kill you. But I 
am willing to be killed by you for the sake of my love.‖ It is the revelation of this 
circumstance—the strength of the love shared between Güzel and her blond lover, a love 
for which he is willing to die—that inspires the dark-haired man both to spare the lover‘s 
life and to sanction his wife‘s love for him. Within the film‘s narrative, an understanding 
of individual circumstances and contexts deliver a time for love and of peace. Time for 
Love by extension calls on Iranian society to consider the possibility of a moral relativity, 
which is based upon the acknowledgement of current circumstances and empowered to 
alter the course of the individual and political experience.  
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In his description of the film, Makhmalbaf argues that perfectionism in man‘s 
behavior depends on similarly perfect conditions, and he quotes a famous couplet from 
Hāfez: ―If the Holy Spirit casts His blessings once again/Others too will do as Christ 
did.‖
78
 This relationship between fate and circumstance on one hand and legal and ethical 
conditions on the other is mediated through the character of the judge. Makhmalbaf 
suggests that the presence of the judge confirms the film as a philosophical endeavor.
79
 
More generally, the judge‘s role in the film imbues its mysticism with political element 
as well, because within the context of the Iranian legal system, which is based on 
religious law and carried out in an Islamic republic, issues of and judgments in morality 
always assume a political dimension.  
The judge plays an interesting role in the film as the only character who is aware 
of – or at least acknowledges – the film‘s episodic structure. In the third section, he 
laments the repetition of similar but contradictory events in the first two parts and resigns 
from his post. As Makhmalbaf notes, in the first two episodes the judge too willingly 
conforms to social norms and acts in a manner too ―expedient.‖ The director describes his 
role as ―judicial.‖
80
 However, in the film‘s third episode, the judge reflects on these 
expedient and judicial rulings and asks, ―How could I have condemned individuals whose 
preordained conditions are far more effective on their actions than their personal share?‖ 
He continues by emphasizing his desire to empathize, an act that cannot be carried out in 
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the present legal system: ―I carefully thought of each convict and without a doubt if I had 
been in their exact situation, I would have behaved exactly as they did.‖ Issues of 
morality and the human ability to arbitrate them accurately become for both the judge and 
viewer increasingly muddied once the film introduces multiple variables and dimensions 
into the equation.  
The judge more clearly delineates the role of condition in one‘s ability to 
empathize as he defends his resignation. He says, ―Whenever I contemplate the grave 
consequences of a criminal‘s actions, I condemn him at once, but when I consider the 
specific reasons underlying the crime, I see him as acquitted.‖ The judge‘s recognition of 
the film‘s structure, which increasingly makes space for the recognition of incident and 
stipulation, ultimately leads to his advocacy of it. The judge‘s position calls into question 
man‘s ability to render proper judgment and make true decisions. The film reveals man‘s 
access to truth as conditional, multiple, and variable, and at the same time it demonstrates 
that by appreciating the conditions that breed a particular situation and thereby 
approximating a truer truth, man falls whim to empathetic and sympathetic pulls, which 
alter his ability to judge the situation at hand.  
Makhmalbaf suggests that the film‘s first two episodes are intended to 
demonstrate the predestination of one‘s actions, and the final episode advocates for the 
―relative role of man‘s freedom.‖
81
 And it is with this freedom to sympathize and act 
accordingly that the film ends and an unfinished fourth episode begins as the viewer is 
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once again confronted with the image of Güzel standing in front of a house and a train 
passing by. The unfinished and cyclical nature of Time for Love adds to its mystic texture 
by creating within this representational space a place for the interrogation of multiple 
truths, the literal and metaphoric powers of love, the relationship between fate and 
circumstance, and man‘s ability to know God.  
The classification of Time for Love as a mystic text might initially strike the 
reader as problematic. The film‘s three cycles each depend on suicide or the viewer‘s 
knowledge of Güzel‘s suicide in previous sections, and Sufism, as an ascetic movement 
within Islam, disavows suicide. How can a film that is sympathetic to suicide fall within 
the ranks of Islamic mysticism? The answer to this question rests within the notion of 
‘erfān, which was defined at the beginning of this chapter. ‘Erfān as an intellectual 
movement in twentieth-century Iran stresses the mystical and philosophical elements of 
Sufism rather than the rules and regulations that govern that lifestyle. Suicide is 
permissible within the realm of ‘erfāni mysticism because it underscores the 
philosophical debates that Makhmalbaf mentions in his notes. As we shall see in Chapter 
4 of this study, suicide is a regular feature of the reformist genre, because it creates 
tension between the role of man‘s freedom and the laws that help form the foundation of 
Islam. This tension, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, acts as a productive site for the 
reconfigurations and reformations of the Islamic Republic‘s ideology in such a way that 
the tenets of Islam might exist harmoniously with the twentieth- and twenty-first-century 




Making Mystic Meaning: The Revival of Mysticism 
A number of other films in the late 1980s and early 1990s similarly drew on the 
mystic tradition, including Abbas Kiarostami‘s internationally successful Koker Trilogy: 
Khāneh-ye dust kojāst? [Where is Friend‘s House?] (1987), Zendegi va digar hich [Life 
and Nothing More] (1992), and Zir-e darakhtān-e zeytun [Through the Olive Trees] 
(1994). However, Dariush Mehrjui‘s Hāmun [Hamun] (1990) best captures and theorizes 
the rise of mysticism among Iranian intellectuals at this time. Hāmun premiered at the 
Fajr Film Festival the year before Time for Love and was identified in 1997 by Film as 
the best Iranian film, dethroning Mehrjui‘s 1969 classic Gāv [The Cow] of that title. The 
film is a psychological drama, which comprises a series of scenes that alternate between 
dream and reality, fantasy and life. The film‘s title character, Hamid Hamun, is an 
intellectual figure, who has been struggling for years to finish his doctoral thesis on love 
and faith. In the meantime, he has taken on a job in the corporate world in sales in order 
to support his family, especially his wife Mahsid, who is accustomed to a more 
comfortable lifestyle.  
His life begins to crumble when Mahsid demands a divorce and takes custody of 
their only child, and the film examines Hamun‘s mental state by navigating the 
psychological terrain of memory on the one hand and anxiety on the other. In addition to 
the narrative that takes place in the present, Hāmun features a number of flashbacks that 
go as far back as the protagonist‘s childhood but primarily chart the course and collapse 




style dream and fantasy sequences that express Hamun‘s anxiety about losing his wife, 
family, and ultimately control over his life.These scenes, which approach the absurd, 
capture the breakdown of the character‘s psychological wellbeing and function as wild 
alternatives to the stagnation of his own existence.  
The film revolves around the decay of Hamun‘s power as both a man and an 
intellectual, two identifiers that are, for the protagonist, tightly woven together. Before 
the complete eruption of his marriage, Hamun brings Mahsid to a psychiatrist in a 
desperate attempt to cure her of her inability to love him. However, Hamun seems just as 
interested in availing himself of the doctor‘s services, cornering the psychiatrist on his 
way to the bathroom. Hamun reveals his state to the doctor, mixing metaphors—
―sinking‖ on the one hand and ―suspended‖ on the other—to create the impression of 
being completely stuck, but the psychiatrist matter-of-factly declares Hamun‘s state 
―unexceptional.‖ This diagnosis allows Hamun‘s situation to represent a larger set of 
concerns in Iranian society, to mirror the stories of others who are ―forty and suspended.‖ 
Hamun responds to this evaluation by versifying the circumstances of his generation in 
one of the film‘s most famous lines: Mā āvikht’hā beh kojā-ye in shab-e tire 
biyāvizim/qabā-ye zhendeh-o-kapak zadeh-ye kh
v
odemun ro? [Where in this dark night 
should we who are hanging (i.e. suspended) hang/our tattered and rotten frock?].  
That this stagnation is Hamun‘s pro-filmic starting point is significant insofar as it 
serves as a base from which the film‘s narrative visually construct his further 




Revolution to depict a man, and especially an intellectual man, in a weakened state in a 
non-redemptive way. The previous wave of films attempted to commit the viewer first to 
the Revolution and the Islamic Republic and later the Iran-Iraq War, tasks that required a 
strong male figure.  Hamun is in many ways the quintessential Iranian intellectual hero: 
wrought with brooding ―anguish and tortured self-examination‖ at the same time that he 
is ―a man of great physical vitality and charm.‖
82
 However, Hāmun renders its 
protagonist socially, emotionally, and physically weak at various points in its narrative.  
At one point in the film, Hamun is enraged by his wife‘s plans to divorce him, and 
he confronts her violently as she is hanging laundry on the roof of their apartment 
building. Their neighbors have to come and separate them. As Hamid Reza Sadr notes, 
these violent moments in the film were the first time that a man and a woman touched on 
screen in post-Revolution cinema.
83
 However, far from being sexualized, this moment 
reveals Hamun as uncontrolled and unraveling. The film visually reinforces this 
conclusion with a flood of neighbors who take over the frame with scorn and 
condemnation.  
At other points in the film, Hamun is reduced to child-like tears, ashamed of his 
own actions and heartbroken by his wife‘s. The breakdown of his physical prowess 
occurs as he unsuccessfully tries to complete the sale of medical equipment. The doctor 
in charge rejects the initial offer, so Hamun decides to stage a demonstration. He attempts 
to supply the necessary sample of blood himself and inadvertently passes out because he 
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has drained too much. This scene in the film is the ultimate metaphor for the collapse of 
the intellectual man in post-Revolution Iran; he is literally dried up and unconscious.  
Hamun attempts throughout the film to ground his life through a series of 
mystical journeys. Specifically, he goes in search of ‗Ali, his ostād or spiritual guide, 
who has achieved Sufi unity despite the tragic loss of his family. Hamun likens him to 
Hallāj, a great mystic figure, and explains, ―you leapt into the silver pond and reached 
yourself and God.‖
84
 Hamun yearns for this spiritual unity and he believes that he can 
only achieve it by uniting with ‗Ali. In this way the spiritual guide becomes a kind of 
beloved figure. However, typical of a mystical journey, Hamun never reaches his 
destination and never finds that for which he is searching. He travels from Tehran to 
‗Ali‘s village only to discover that ‗Ali is in Tehran. Later Hamun passes ‗Ali in a car, 
which leads to a frantic car chase that ends in Hamun colliding with another car. This 
scene demonstrates how the closer one gets to the beloved the farther he actually is. Even 
though Hamun sees ‗Ali in the next car, his crash ultimately causes his life to spin out of 
control even more, undermining his search for stability. This theme is picked up again by 
the film‘s ending. Hamun tries to drown himself but he is rescued by ‗Ali. It is only in 
this momentary death that he can be reunited with his beloved figure.  
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One of the film‘s flashbacks returns Hamun to his childhood during ‘āshurā, the 
Shi‘i mourning ceremony for the martyrdom of Hussein. Six-year-old Hamun navigates 
the rituals of self-flagellation in search of ‗Ali ‗Abedini.
85
 He eventually finds ‗Ali, who 
appears to be the same age as he is during the film‘s present, thirty-five years later. ‗Ali‘s 
agelessness captures the timelessness of this mystic journey. At the same time, Hamun‘s 
search represents an alternative to the communal religion represented by the mourning 
ceremonies. 
 It is the possibility of this alternative that allows us to return to mysticism as a 
historically grounded event in post-Revolution Iran. The film Hāmun theorizes how those 
intellectuals who felt disempowered and stagnant found purpose and meaning in 
mysticism, as an alternative to the religion being promoted by the Islamic Republic. The 
early 1990s represented a unique period in Iran‘s history, shaped by the death of 
Khomeini, the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and the gradual abatement of revolutionary 
fervor. After a decade of excitement and movement, the late 1980s and early 1990s 
represented a political and intellectual lull. While the extreme circumstances of the 
Revolution and the War were no longer in place, the corresponding policies, which 
limited economic, social, and political mobility, left many intellectuals feeling trapped, 
and mysticism represented the possibility of redemption.  
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The turn to mysticism represented in Time for Love and Hāmun allows us to 
rethink the implications of cine-mysticism in Iran, particularly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The appropriation of a mystic aesthetic at this juncture in Iran‘s history represents 
a point of concern for critics like Hamid Dabashi, who sees cine-mysticism as a ―sad and 
rather pathetic outcome of the dispirited Iranian bourgeoisie‘s loss of confidence‖ in the 
Revolutionary project.
86
 He classifies this effort in Iranian cinema as ―strange flirtation 
with ….a belated attraction to a bourgeois version of Persian mysticism.‖
87
 Dabashi 
laments that ―To see that mise-en-scène of abject resignation sublated into attempts at 
literary and visual art is positively hideous.‖
88
 Referring specifically to Makhmalbaf‘s 
experiments in the mystic realm, he describes the director‘s efforts as ―debilitating‖ and 




Dabashi describes cine-mysticism as a ―disease‖ and potentially ―fatal,‖
90
 and the 
moment of redemption for Makhmalbaf occurs when he recovers from this illness. 
Dabashi finds value in Makhmalbaf‘s mysticism, which he describes as ―ghastly,‖ only 
through the idea that this brush with cinematic death ultimately strengthened his later 
films. Although Dabashi does not explicitly refer to Derrida, his description of 
Makhmalbaf‘s early films as both the illness and the disease recalls ―Plato‘s Pharmacy,‖ 
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in which Derrida argues that writing is both a poison and a remedy. However, while 
Derrida sees the space created by the collapse of this binary as wrought with potential 
and productivity, Dabashi considers it a barrier which must be overcome, which he calls 
the ―decisive moment,‖ and thereby establishes a new limiting binary between 
Makhmalbaf‘s early films and his later films.
91
   
However, Dabashi‘s analysis neglects the possibility that mysticism functioned 
for Makhmalbaf as a strategic effort to claim his own creativity, and  by reducing this 
mystic aesthetic to bourgeois dabbling and brushing it aside, Dabashi misses the 
productivity that comes with considering cine-mysticism within its historical context. 
Indeed, his studies of Makhmalbaf represent an effort to recuperative ―a creative 
restoration of historical agency in the post/colonial subject,‖
92
  which he locates in the 
director‘s later films. As a result, he analyzes the director‘s earlier works through the lens 
of his later films: death avoided, illness overcome.  However, this narrow observation 
fails to acknowledge meaningful possibilities of mysticism both within the context of 
Makhmalbaf‘s career and Iranian cinema more generally. The value of mysticism in films 
like Time for Love extends well beyond an ―ideological exorcism.‖ This cine-mysticism 
resonated with other intellectual efforts, which also drew on the mystic tradition, and 
together foresaw the coming of Khatami‘s Reformist Movement less than a decade later.  
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The philosophical contributions of Abdolkarim Soroush are a particularly salient 
point of departure for this kind of argument, because the film Time for Love clearly 
appealed to his philosophical, aesthetic, and political sensibilities. By identifying the 
mysticism implicit in his philosophies and by reading these works against Time for Love, 
it is possible to position mysticism (in both its cinematic and philosophical 
manifestations) as a politically potent strategy that resonated with imminent revolutionary 
discontent and an emerging set of reformist concerns. Soroush credits Rumi with 
introducing him to a ―love-based mysticism‖ that is at odds with and ultimately saved 
him from the fear-based mysticism of Al-Ghazali. Historian Afshin Matin-asgari notes 
that Soroush‘s philosophies feature a ―strong mystical tendency‖ that draws from and is 
structured around references to Rumi and his poetry. Matin-asgari further argues that a 
―deep and unresolved tension‖ exists between this mystic tendency and his attraction to 
philosophical reason.
93
 The incongruities between these two modes of thought inevitably 
result in contradictions in Soroush‘s writings; nevertheless in the 1990s he maintained 
that his understanding of morality appeals to ―a mystical esthetics of divine beauty,‖ and 
in a 1992 lecture he argued that mysticism is the ―only path‖ out of the post-modern 
condition because it ―doubted rationality from the onset.‖
94
 
By the mid-1990s, Soroush‘s espousal of mysticism was replaced by a call for the 
rationality of science. Matin-asgari cites an important lecture that Soroush gave in 1996 
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on ―Iranian identity,‖ in which he claimed that mysticism fosters ―fatalistic thinking 
(jabr-andishi) and perplexity (hayrat)‖ within Iranian society. As a solution, he 
advocated the rational and critical philosophy of Kant. It is within this move towards 
rationalism and away from nihilism that Matin-asgari locates Soroush‘s contribution to 
the secularization of Islamic thought.
95
 Matin-asgari‘s useful delineation of the 
development of Soroush‘s philosophy brings to focus an important aspect to the study of 
this important figure. Soroush‘s philosophy comprises an expansive and expanding body 
of works, and each of his beliefs is grounded in a particular historical moment. To ignore 
that historicity is to violate the very nature of his philosophy. Therefore, I intend to focus 
on Qabz va bast-e te’urik-e shari’at: nazarieh-ye takāmol-e ma’refat-e dini [The 
Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Religious Law: The Concept of the Evolution 
of Religious Knowledge] (1990), a book published from a four-part series of articles that 
the author wrote between May 1988 and March 1990. The same historical circumstances 
from which Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love emerged also gave rise to the ideas and beliefs 
presented in this book. By reading these two cultural products side by side, I shall 
demonstrate that mysticism represented a broad trend among the country‘s intellectuals in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and this mystic project corresponded both temporally and 
ideologically with a nascent but budding reformist discourse.  
Soroush‘s choice of title, The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Religious 
Law, immediately signals the book‘s mystic tones. In the original Persian, the first two 
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words, qabz [contraction] and bast [expansion], signify two Sufi concepts that describe 
the movement of a mystic‘s heart: the literal tightening and loosening of the muscle and 
the corresponding symbolic desolation and elation. In The Theoretical Contraction and 
Expansion of Religious Law, Soroush appropriates these terms to describe ―altering 
moments of epistemic openness and closure of Islamic societies‖
96
 to generate a mystic-
based model that he hopes will fill an epistemological and theoretical gap in the efforts 
by Islamic reformists and revivalists.
97
 In its most basic form, the theory of contraction 
and expansion aims to distinguish ―religion and people‘s understanding of it,‖ wherein 
―That which remains constant is religion [din]‖ and ―that which undergoes change is 
religious knowledge and insight [ma’refat-e dini].‖
98
 While religion itself represents 
perfection, human understanding of religion, or religious knowledge, is wrought with 
imperfection as a product of the human experience. We can only gain access to religion 
through interpretation, a human science, and as Soroush notes, ―defects abound in 
exegeses.‖
99
 The role of reason in this theory is to acknowledge the distinction between 
religion and religious understanding. Reason, Soroush maintains, does not ―complement‖ 
religion; ―it struggles to improve its own understanding of religion.‖
100
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Soroush describes religion as ―unblemished by the artifacts of the human 
mind,‖
101
 and this description captures the temporality of religious knowledge, which is 
weighed down by the historical artifacts of the human mind. He goes so far as to state 
that the degree of the temporality of religious knowledge approaches ―the 
synchronization and adaptation of this branch of human knowledge with the sciences and 
needs of each age.‖
102
 The nature of religious knowledge may, thereby, more closely 
approximate historically the contours of human knowledge than true meaning of religion. 
Soroush is able as a result of this supposition to reconcile a tension he detects between 
eternity and temporality, and by extension he renders moot debates about tradition and 
modernity in the Islamic world.
103
 Ultimately the separation he maintains between 
religion and religious knowledge brings to mind the distance in Sufi poetry between lover 
and beloved and the divine implications of this mystic love. As Ashkan Dahlén notes, this 
theory ―is connected to mysticism in that it renders meaning to the traditional distinction 
between shari’at, tariqat (the esoteric way), and haqiqat,‖ and this distinction is 
―grounded in the eternal differences of hermeneutical methodology.‖
104
  
The critique of absolutism that surfaces in Soroush‘s approach in The Theoretical 
Contraction and Expansion of Religious Law echoes the mysticism put forth by 
Makhmalbaf in Time for Love. Although Soroush and Makhmalbaf interrogate slightly 
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different terminologies, both are interested in human access to a definite, and presumably 
religious, truth. These models suggest the relativity of that access. Makhmalbaf‘s film 
suggests that the perfect judgment, that is, a judgment that corresponds precisely with 
religious truth, depends on the perfect conditions. Soroush‘s argument helps refine this 
idea as it is presented in Time for Love. That religious knowledge of truth is necessarily 
grounded in and conditioned by the trends in the historical trends of flawed human 
thought, which in turn shapes the mechanisms that govern societies, is significant here 
insofar as it suggests the impossibility of perfectionism within the human condition. In 
both Soroush‘s philosophy and Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love this rejection of absolutism 
opens the door to a pluralism that accepts the possibility of multiple paths to a universal 
truth. In Time for Love this pluralism takes the form of moral relativism and is 
represented by the film‘s structure, which features a number of moral paths without 
imposing a privileging system on any of them. For Soroush, the resolute denial of 
absolutism clears the way for plurality of the religious community, which is a ―shallow 
indicator of the plurality of souls,‖
105
 and he uses this indicator to call for tolerance.  
Soroush‘s philosophies also enable us to envision the political possibilities latent 
in mysticism in contemporary Iran, including the kind represented in Time for Love. 
Although Soroush examines the religious and mystical nature of an Islamic hermeneutic 
process, the political implications of his argument are undeniable. The very call for 
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pluralism implicit in Soroush‘s discussion threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic, 
which depends on velāyat-e faqih [guardianship of the Islamic jurist], a ruling system that 
privileges and enforces a single religious understanding under the guise of religion 
itself.
106
 Soroush‘s use of mysticism to discredit the system of velāyat-e faqih is 
significant because Khomeini‘s construction of the concept drew on mystic thought.
107
 
Therefore, Soroush used Khomeini‘s own scholarly tools to refute his most important 
political and intellectual contribution to Iranian society. Moreover, the application of 
Soroush‘s ideas to political reform is paramount. As Oliver Roy argues, he provided ―the 
‗political philosophy‘ of the Khatamists‖ by considering ―how to secularize politics in a 
society which cannot afford to reject its heritage and origin: an Islamic Revolution.‖
108
  
While Roy‘s assessment, written in 1999, grounds Soroush and mysticism in the 
present (i.e. Khatami‘s presidency), Mangol Bayat‘s study Mysticism and Dissent: 
Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran allows us to see a historical trajectory of Iranian 
intellectualism that drew heavily from the mystic tradition. In particular, Bayat traces the 
genealogy of dissent in Iranian social and religious thought, and she demonstrates that the 
Sufis of the seventeenth century produced an intellectual model for dissent that would 
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inform the social and political restlessness of the nineteenth century and later the 
Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) and the Islamic Revolution (1978-1979). Bayat 
considers, for example, Mulla Sadra (1572-1641), who appropriated Sufi terminology to 
fight against the dominant jurisdiction at the time, which forbade individual and esoteric 
access to certain kinds of religious knowledge. As Bayat notes, Sadr argued that ―True 
knowledge…is neither jurisprudence, nor philology, nor grammar, nor medicine; for all 
are nothing but the external garbs of the Koranic science,‖
109
 and this belief certainly 
foreshadowed Soroush‘s distinction between religion and religious knowledge.  
This historical resonance positions mysticism within a political framework at the 
time that Makhmalbaf released Time for Love. Since Bayat proves the historical 
significance of mysticism to dissident thought, which has functioned as a dominant 
political mode in modern Iran, one can argue that mysticism has been epistemologically 
wrought with political meaning. Therefore, Makhmalbaf‘s appropriation of mysticism in 
Time for Love is necessarily political. The film, through its critique of absolutism and its 
promotion of moral relativity, gently challenges the status quo in the Iranian political 
system by creating a complicated space for the many complications and possibilities that 
arise from modes of human moral judgment. As such, at the same time that Time for Love 
marked a new phase in the careers of Makhmalbaf and, it also signaled a revival of  the 
political appropriation of mysticism. The film traces a new contour in this mystic-
political trajectory; it moves away from resistance and towards the ideals of humanism.  
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 The politicalization of Soroush‘s philosophies and their resonance with 
Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love demonstrate that mysticism, far from just representing a 
desire to escape the Islamic Republic‘s interpretation of Islam, also functioned in the 
early 1990s as a deliberate strategy for the enactment of political and social reform. Both 
Soroush and Makhmalbaf used mysticism to stress the importance of considering 
temporality in matters of governance and jurisprudence. Their emphasis on context 
represented an important step on the part of reformists to locate the Islamic Revolution as 
a historically grounded event, rigid but necessitated by a certain set of extreme 
circumstances, rather than as ongoing and ahistorical process. As such, reform, and later 
the Reformist Movement, became a means of reconciling a glorified history with the need 
to move beyond the closed policies that Khomeini and his revolution enacted.  
 This emphasis on temporality allows us to return to Khatami, who similarly 
stressed the importance of historical circumstances in the creation of policy. In both his 
reactions to Time for Love and later in his letter of resignation, Khatami suggested that 
the laws governing the regulation of the art were no longer the product of current 
circumstances. In a sense, he acted upon the film‘s call for a consideration of 
circumstance and attempted to alter and expand possibility and permissibility, first from 






Documenting Election and the Urban Reality of Reform 
 
 
In an interview with Sight and Sound, director Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad notes, ―I 
am sure that if Mohammad Khatami hadn‘t been elected, this film [May Lady (1999)] 
would never have made it onto the screen.‖
1
 With this statement, she suggests an 
increasingly permissive relationship between the Reformist Movement and Iranian 
cinema, wherein the latter benefits from the former‘s liberal cultural policies. However, 
Bani-E‘temad‘s observation does not alone accommodate the complexity of the 
interactions between these two institutions. Khatami‘s election denoted more than just a 
new, more liberal approach to cultural policy; it also marked the Reformist Movement‘s 
entrance onto the big screen. During Khatami‘s presidency, the Reformist Movement 
allowed cinema to push thematic boundaries and the limits of representation, and at the 
same time it became a major character within films.    
This chapter investigates the dynamics of this overlapping relationship by 
considering two films by Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad: Zir-e pust-e shahr [Under the Skin of 
the City] (2001), a feature film that takes place during the 1997 elections, and Ruzegār-e 
mā…[Our Times…] (2002), a documentary about the 2001 elections.   More specifically, 
this chapter charts Bani-E‘temad‘s ambivalence towards the Reformist Movement by 
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analyzing her portrayal of urbanism and her interrogation of the documentary form. The 
films together indicate that the harsh realities of life in the city create the need for 
political hope but at the same time block attempts to satisfy it. By examining Bani-
E‘temad‘s cinematic relationship with the city of Tehran, I demonstrate the director‘s 
critique of the Reformist Movement, which focused on repairing Iran‘s global reputation 
rather than addressing its local problems.
2
  
Under the Skin of the City and Our Times… are well-suited to an investigation of 
the ideological interactions between cinema and the Reformist Movement, because both 
films depict Mohammad Khatami at important electoral moments.  During these 
elections, the Reformist Movement outlined its political platform and employed a 
heightened political discourse. These acts opened public debates that demanded 
clarification and accountability. Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s films participate in these 
debates at the same time that they contribute to the promotion and mystification of the 
Reformist Movement by representing it within a cinematic space. The city of Tehran 
plays a prominent role in both films and this chapter demonstrates that in order to 
understand fully the films‘ commentary on the Reformist Movement, one must 
conceptualize Bani-E‘temad‘s portrayal of urbanism and her appropriation of the 
documentary form, two modes of representation that, within the history of Iranian 
cinema, have perceived their relationship to the ―real‖ as intimate and urgent.   
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The development of Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s career parallels the emergence of 
Iran‘s post-Revolution cinematic tradition. She studied directing at the College of 
Dramatic Arts in Tehran and graduated in 1979, immediately before the Revolution‘s 
purification process closed down many of the country‘s universities. She thereafter 
designed sets, directed documentaries for television, and served as an assistant director 
for several feature films.
3
 In 1988 she released her first full-length feature film, Khārej az 
mahdudeh [Off Limits], just as post-Revolution Iranian cinema was coming into its own 
and gaining international recognition. Since then she has become Iran‘s most prominent 
female director, both locally and globally, winning prizes at the Fajr (Tehran), Locarno, 
Montreal, Moscow, and Torino film festivals. Despite Bani-E‘temad‘s insistence that she 
be classified as neither a female nor feminist filmmaker,
4
  the existing scholarship on her 
work focuses almost exclusively on her role as a female director and her representation of 
women.
5
 However, she has a body of work that indicates a distinctly urban style. The city 
of Tehran functions as both the setting and a complicated character in all of her films. By 
examining two of these metropolitan narratives, I shall move away from a strictly 
feminist reading and theorize her urban aesthetic.  
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Under the Skin of the City and Our Times… together suggest that Bani-E‘temad‘s 
cinematic city depends on three filmic features. The director employs a fusion of 
documentary and narrative styles that complicate the viewer‘s understanding of 
representation and reality. She plots economic and class difference geographically on 
Tehran‘s north-south axis to suggest a multiplicity of urban experiences. Finally, both 
films depict housing crises in the south of Tehran and locate architectural experiences as 
nodal points through which other economic and class struggles are mediated. As this 
chapter will demonstrate, Bani-E‘temad‘s urban aesthetic emerged as the style best suited 
to represent, promote, and criticize the Reformist Movement during the critical elections 
in 1997 and 2001. My analysis of Bani-E‘temad‘s representation of these two elections 
and my delineation of the resulting urban aesthetic begin with a study of the role of 
documentary and urbanism in Under the Skin of the City (2001) and concludes with a 
discussion of Bani-E‘temad‘s bid to reset a traditional documentary time in Our Times… 
(2002).  
Under the Skin of the City opened in 2001 to wide critical and popular acclaim 
and won the award for best director at both the fourth annual Cinema House Festival and 
the second annual Social Films Festival. It was also the first film by Bani-E‘temad to be 
distributed in the United States.
6
 Under the Skin of the City, which takes place during the 
1997 presidential elections, tells the story of a house and family, whose members each try 
to carve out a meaningful existence for themselves in an unfair and unforgiving urban 
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landscape. Tuba provides her family with its main source of income as a factory worker 
and finds comfort in the stability of homeownership. Her husband, Mahmud, once a 
political activist, is injured and unable to work but attempts to assert control by plotting 
to sell the family home to a builder who is buying all of the neighboring houses. Mahmud 
is encouraged by their eldest son, ‗Abbas, who works as a delivery boy and who must, 
therefore, navigate the various districts of the city. He needs the money from the house to 
process travel documents so he can fulfill his dream of going to Japan to earn money. 
‗Ali, the younger brother and a promising student, who is teaching his mother to read, has 
abandoned his own studies to participate in campaigning efforts much to the dismay of 
his family members, who hope that he can save them from financial hardship by going to 
college. The youngest child, Mahbubeh, pursues a close friendship with her neighbor 
Masumeh, whose drug-addict brother beats her regularly. Tuba‘s second daughter, 
Hamideh, is also a victim of domestic abuse. Married to an abusive husband, she has one 
child and is pregnant with another; she regularly returns to her family‘s home to escape 
the abuse.  
The narrative comes to a head when Mahmud and ‗Abbas sell the house, but the 
travel agency processing ‗Abbas‘ paperwork disappears with his money. In a desperate 
effort to recover the money, he agrees to an underground job delivering drugs. However, 
‗Ali foils his efforts by secretly dumping the merchandise during the long drive outside 
the city. Meanwhile, Masuhmeh has fled her abusive brother, abandoning Mahbubeh and 




also flee, and the film ends on Election Day with Tuba‘s announcement that she has lost 
everything. However, at the same time, she describes her reasons for voting and therein 
articulates a hope for change that remains with the viewer long after the film‘s images 
have left the screen. This moment in the film, in which Tuba mediates her personal 
desires through the electoral system, signals Bani-E‘temad‘s commitment to social 
commentary. Tuba makes a connection between her own situation and her country‘s 
circumstances. The parallel that she draws between herself and the collective brings to 
focus the fact that Under Skin of the City‘s social concern is greater than just one woman 
or one family.  
 
Documentary and Commitment, Reality and Representation 
In an interview with Massoud Mehrabi, Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad described the 
relationship between film and reality by suggesting that cinema is a system within Iranian 
society that is ―duty-bound to attend to reality.‖
7
 She attributed this level of commitment 
to the shared experiences of her generation of filmmakers who began working and 
flourishing under the dire conditions of first a revolution and later an eight-year war. 
Bani-E‘temad aptly identifies a trend in Iranian New Wave Cinema, in which filmmakers 
reveal a sense of obligation to reality and at the same time interrogate the ways in which 
film represents it. Many of Bani-E‘temad‘s contemporaries achieve this dual purpose by 
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appropriating a neorealist style
8
 that calls forth the mid-century Italian tradition by the 
same name and draws on the related French cinema vérité movement. The Iranian revival 
of Italian neorealism is historically justified by similarities between the political and 
physical condition of postwar Italy and the economic and structural damage to Iran both 
during and after the Iran-Iraq war. ‗Abbas Kiarostami has further indicated that Italian 
neorealism revealed to him the power of film to represent the ―real‖ and ―ordinary‖ 
experiences in a way that Hollywood cinema never could.
9
  
Scholars have aesthetically likened Iranian New Wave Cinema to its Italian and 
French antecedents in a number of ways. Stephen Weinberger identifies in films by 
Kiarostami, Majidi, and Makhmalbaf a number of neorealist trends, including the use of 
non-actors, shots on location that often highlight rural poverty or urban destruction, and 
an interest in the working-class experience.
10
 Chaudhuri and Finn (2003) describe what 
they call the ―open image‖ or ―a certain type of ambiguous, epiphanic image‖ in films by 
Bahman Ghobadi, Kiarostami, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, Samira Makhmalbaf, and Jafar 
Panahi. They argue that the ―open image‖ is a means of connecting Iranian post-
Revolution cinema to Italian postwar neorealism, because it functions as an apolitical 
                                                          
8
 Although the term ―neorealist‖ is contested when applied to Iranian cinema  because it clearly references 
Italian neorealism without providing sufficient credit to the Iranian poetic and cinematic traditions present 
in these films, Chaudhuri and Finn, Weinberger, and other scholars have made a compelling argument for 
its applicability in this case. I appropriate its usage because it conjures up a fitting set of expectations 
regarding this style; nevertheless, I acknowledge the category‘s shortcomings. 
9
 Philip Lopate, ―Interview with Abbas Kiarostami,‖ Totally, Tenderly, Tragically (New York: 
Anchor/Doubleday, 1998), 352-353.  
10




aesthetic symptom of political repression in both cases.
11
 Hamid Naficy notes that in 
Nemā-ye nazdik [Close-up] (1989), Kiarostami exploits a cinema vérité style to 
―investigate and question reality by intervening in it or provoking it.‖
12
 In each instance, 
the scholarship references a hybrid fictional-documentary form that is constitutive of this 
Iranian neorealist style. This hybrid form is generated when the film‘s camerawork 
appropriates a documentary purpose, and the filmmaker gathers visual evidence that 
becomes part of his or her narrative film.  
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s commitment to reality in Under the Skin of the City is 
significantly different than the style appropriated by Kiarostami and others. Bani-
E‘temad‘s film is invested in the documentary form, but it does not gather documentarian 
evidence or employ a cinema vérité style. Instead, Bani-E‘temad creates a fictional 
documentary crew in her film. The viewer hears the male director‘s voice (which clearly 
does not belong to Bani-E‘temad) and sees the film crew‘s equipment. Images of the 
crew‘s ―documentary‖ are mediated through the equipment‘s various screens. For 
example, we see Tuba in the viewfinder and on video displays as she is being recorded by 
this fictional crew. These images are different than Kiarostami‘s Close-up, where the film 
is the documentary. Under the Skin of the City has an additional layer of representation: 
the camera captures another camera capturing a documentary subject.  
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Unlike Kiarostami, who ―intervenes‖ in and ―pokes‖ at reality, Bani-E‘temad 
fictionalizes documentary filmmaking. This technique invites the viewer to rethink his or 
her understanding of representation and reality, and specifically the ways in which film 
creates reality and viewers access it. The reconfiguration of representation and reality in 
Under the Skin of the City reveals the director‘s critique of the Reformist Movement.  
The film trains the viewer to challenge the ways in which the Reformist Movement both 
has been represented and has represented itself. Bani-E‘temad creates a complex system, 
in which the documentary form is subverted in order call into question conceptions of the 
real and the reality of the Reformist Movement.  
Bill Nichols has noted that the complexity of documentary arises from the fact 
that it represents rather than replicates reality.
13
 He argues that documentaries participate 
in ―discourses of sobriety,‖ which are sobering because they envision their relationship 
―with the real as direct, immediate, transparent.‖
14
 Despite documentary‘s claim to 
reality, the nature of images and image-making undeniably necessitates a critical gap 
between object and representation that cannot be closed.
15
 Under the Skin of the City, a 
narrative film that introduces documentary filmmaking into a fictional realm, blurs and 
intervenes in the relationship between representation and reality, narrative and 
documentary. A clear delineation of the documentary and narrative forms proves 
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instructive to an analysis of Under the Skin of the City, which invites the viewer to 
examine each of these two genres next to and within the other. By better identifying the 
relationship between these complex forces (representation and reality, narrative and 
documentary), one can more effectively assess Bani-E‘temad‘s depiction of the 1997 
elections, a historical event premised similarly on ―discourses of sobriety.‖   
Nichols, acknowledging the difficulties of fixing the meaning of a fluid term, 
offers a three-part definition of documentary that explores it from the perspective of the 
filmmaker, the text, and the viewer. Documentary filmmaking as an institutional practice 
constitutes a community of filmmakers bound together by a set of ethical standards and a 
shared interest in the historical world rather than by a willingness to relinquish control 
(over subjects, content, etc.).
16
 Bani-E‘temad considers herself a part of such a 
community; a notion upon which I shall expand later. For now, my immediate concern is 
a discussion of documentary as text, the relationship to other texts, especially narrative 
films, and how its textual practices inform viewer expectations. Documentary and 
narrative film differ most significantly in the way that they accommodate and configure 
conceptions of space and time, and the designation between different modes of time and 
space is determined at the moment of evidentiary editing, when the film‘s continuity 
between and within scenes  is established.  
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Documentaries are generally organized around an ―informing logic,‖ the 
―economy‖ of which determines an ―argument about the historical world.‖
17
  As a result, 
a documentary‘s sounds and images function as evidence in the introduction, discussion, 
and possible solution of a problem of the ―lived, historical world.‖ Jumps in time and 
space are tolerated by the viewer so long as they conform and contribute to the 
documentary‘s overall argument-based structure. Narrative films, on the other hand, are 
typically driven by plots: the introduction of characters and the creation and resolution of 
conflict in an imaginary world (that may or may not resemble the lived, historical world). 
As such, continuity between disparate times and places is achieved through storyline 
references and editing techniques that create similarities between scenes and navigate the 
viewer‘s gaze through various temporal and spatial domains. Therefore, while narrative 
fiction combines various spaces together in order to generate for the viewer the 
―impression of one continuous world that spills beyond the frame in every direction,‖ 
documentary films are more concerned with arranging different temporalities in order ―to 
give the impression of one continuous argument.‖
18
 
Viewers, many of whom are adept consumers of visual media, have a conscious 
or unconscious awareness of these structural differences and use their understanding of 
genre to construct complementary sets of interpretative skills. In other words, viewers 
make sense of documentary and narrative films in different ways. Whereas viewers 
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formulate a story around the sounds and images of a narrative film, they participate in a 
documentary film by using its audio-visual material as evidence to construct an argument 
that they assume exists because their previous experience with documentaries tells them 
that the argument structure is the basic organizing principle in documentary filmmaking.  
As such, the ―mode of engagement‖ for a narrative film involves recognition of fiction 
and a desire to believe it is true. Documentary film imbues within the viewer a similar 
tension, but ―oscillation now swings between recognition of historical reality and the 
recognition of an argument about it.‖
19
 What emerges from the friction created between 
these two viewing strategies is an assumed ―indexical relationship‖ between the profilmic 
event and the historical world, wherein the former has ―undergone little or no 
modification in order to be recorded on film and magnetic tape.‖
20
  It is ultimately 
through the viewer‘s expectations that the documentary genre lays claim to the real. 
However, this claim is deceptively simple and the history of documentary within the 
Iranian cinematic tradition demonstrates the existence of a set of reflexive documentaries 
that problematizie their own relationship to reality as a means of critiquing the social and 
historical worlds they index. 
In Iran the tension between documentary and narrative film draws on the 
country‘s early cinematic history, which was crucially shaped by documentary 
filmmaking. The origins of Iranian cinema can be traced to 1900, when Mozzafar al-Din 
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Shah traveled to Europe and purchased a motion picture camera,
21
 and the first Iranian 
films were a series of scenes commissioned by Mozzafar al-Din, filmed by Mirza 
Ebrahim Khan ‗Akkasbashi, and intended for an audience of servants.
22
 These scenes, 
which might be considered the first Iranian documentaries, sought to record the official 
and unofficial lives of Mozzafar al-Din Shah‘s court and included a mix of public and 
private moments. Later, the professionalization of documentary filmmaking occurred at 
the hands of Khan Baba Khan Mo‘tazedi, who studied engineering in Paris and worked at 
the Gaumont film factory. He returned to Iran in 1925, after the fall of the Qajar Dynasty, 
and filmed Majles-e mo’esesān [The Founders‘ Assembly]. In 1926 he filmed the twenty-
minute Rezā Shāh dar majles-e mo’esessān [Reza Shah at the Founders‘ Assembly].
23
 He 
continued to make documentaries and to produce newsreels about the Shah‘s public life. 
This early narrative of Iranian documentary filmmaking brings to focus several important 
and reoccurring themes in this tradition. First, it demonstrates the centrality of the 
documentary form to Iranian cinema as a whole. Second, it historically identifies 
documentary filmmaking as a tool for education and propagation. Finally, it brings to 
light early friction between two opposing forces: foreign on the one hand and local-
governmental on the other.  
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 During the late 1920s and 1930s, documentary filmmaking in the country was 
dominated by foreign nationals, who came to Iran to record the country‘s development, 
and they covered diverse topics such as the condition of factories, the development of the 
railroad, and the status of nomadic tribes. However, these films effectively demonstrated 
the ―poverty, backwardness, and primitive lifestyles‖ of Iran,
24
 and as a result, many of 
them were banned from being shown in the country. In the 1940s, Iran witnessed a 
decline in the film industry as the country suffered economically as a result of World War 
II and politically because of the abdication of Reza Shah. Nevertheless, the rise of Reza 
Shah‘s son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to the throne and growing Cold War concern in 
the United States began the process of repairing the film industry in Iran and particularly 
documentary filmmaking. In 1951, a joint effort between the United States Information 
Services (USIS) and the Iranian Fine Arts Administration (which would later become the 
Ministry of Culture) brought a team of technicians from Syracuse University to train 
filmmakers and create a series of 88 documentaries on topics such as sanitation, nutrition, 
and national geography. The Syracuse University delegation also helped found an audio-
visual production center within the Fine Arts Administration. These efforts and 
developments led to the national rise of documentary as a governmental propagandist 
institution that ―represented the country at the end of its backwardness.‖
25
 These official 
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productions provided a counter-narrative to the foreign documentaries from the 1920s 
and 1930s that emphasized the country‘s struggle to modernize.  
This use of the documentary form in the 1950s led in the 1960s to what Bill 
Nichols calls a ―shift of epistemological proportions.‖ Of the American tradition, Nichols 
explains that whereas previously documentary ―suggested fullness and completion, 
knowledge and fact,‖ more recently it has taken on the character of ―incompleteness and 
uncertainty.‖
26
 In Iran, the 1960s and 1970s marked the arrival of this new reflexive 
documentary style that coincided with the New Wave movement, which is generally 
regarded as a trend within narrative filmmaking. These documentaries, which included 
Ebrahim Golestan‘s Kharābābād [Ruinville] (1962), Forugh Farrokhzad‘s Khāneh siāh 
ast [The House is Black] (1962), Kamran Shirdel‘s Tehrān pāytakht-e Irān ast [Tehran is 
the Capital of Iran] (1966) and Un shab keh bārun umad [The Night It Rained] (1967), 
Nader Afsharnaderi‘s Balut [Oak] (1968),Naser Taqva‘i Nakhl [Palm] (1970), 
Manuchehr Tayab‘s Ritm [Rhythm] (1972) , and Parviz Kimiavi‘s Peh mesl-e pelikān [P 
as in Pelican] (1973), attempt to unravel documentary‘s claim to the real by 
problematizing its informing logic. This corpus of films challenges the presumed 
indexical relationship to a lived, historical world, and it inspired a trend within Iranian 
cinema that uses this ―truth form‖ to reveal counter-intuitively a series of untruths.   
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Kamran Shirdel‘s Un shab keh bārun umad [The Night It Rained] (1967) is a 
representative example of the move in Iranian documentary filmmaking that calls into 
question the filmic formation of truth. The film provides a particularly engaging 
exploration into the nature of the relationship between documentary and the real within 
the Iranian tradition. The documentary takes as its starting point a story from recent 
headlines and constructs the viewer‘s initial understanding of the event by showing the 
printed media‘s coverage of it. At the start of the film, a barrage of newspaper headlines 
and articles flash across the screen. A young boy heroically stopped a 200-person 
passenger train outside of the village of Gorgān before it reached a bridge that had been 
washed out by heavy rains. The film reveals its purpose by showing a letter from the 
Ministry of Art and Culture that commissions the film crew to make a documentary about 
the event. The film primarily comprises a number of contradictory statements by 
journalists, railway employees, and government officials, none of whom can agree about 
the specific details of the event or even if it happened at all. The most contested detail is 
whether or not the boy would have been able to use kerosene to light his jacket on fire in 
order to signal the train to stop during a heavy rainstorm. While logic prevails for many 
of the subjects interviewed, the most devoted advocates of the story insist that it was 
possible for the boy to ignite his jacket despite rain heavy enough to wash away a bridge.  
Shirdel skillfully juxtaposes contradictory statements to underscore the 
unreliability of evidence, and in the process he casts doubt on the whole system of 




highlights a disconnection between the spoken voice and the corresponding images on the 
screen: ―Conversations between the men of Lāmelang‖ signals the image of men standing 
silently with cigarettes in their mouths and ―Lāmelang with its pleasant climate and 
hospitable inhabitants‖ cues several shots of dogs playing in the rain.
27
 The uncertainty 
comes to a head late in the film, when the documentarian voice promises an interview 
with the heroic boy, who, the viewer hopes, will clarify the inconsistencies that the 
documentary has thus far uncovered. The boy‘s statement conforms more or less to the 
affirmative statements in the film; however, Shirdel interrupts his version of the story 
with images and sounds of contestation: ―it‘s a pack of lies‖ and ―unfortunately, that is 
not the case.‖ This technique breaks up and destabilizes the boy‘s own account.  
The viewer is later ushered into a one-room schoolhouse where a young boy is 
reading aloud from his textbook. The story that aurally unfolds is precisely the same 
sensational story that the newspapers and government have claimed for the boy, complete 
with the detail about the lit jacket, and the film never concludes whether the boy‘s heroic 
act was inspired by the story or whether the textbook story led the boy to make up a 
similar story. The Night It Rained ends in the same pool of uncertainty it has created. A 
letter from the local governor to the Ministry of the Interior confirms the event reported 
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in the newspapers is correct, which prompts a flood of audio-visual material that point to 
the story‘s many fallacies. This analysis of The Night It Rained demonstrates within the 
Iranian tradition a subversive use of documentary intended to compound the viewer‘s 
conception of reality by providing layers of uncertainty and contradictory evidence. By 
calling the category of evidence into question, the film also questions the construction of 
truth. In the case of The Night It Rained, who is responsible for determining the truth? 
This unanswered question in the film serves to interrogate epistemological uncertainty as 
well. The Night It Rained‘s appropriation of the documentary form to question these 
categories ultimately shaped future cinematic efforts in Iran, including Rakhshan Bani-
E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the City.  
Bani-E‘temad‘s long and complicated relationship with the documentary has 
critically informed her representation of it in Under the Skin of the City. Like Iranian 
cinema, the director‘s career began with documentary. She directed documentaries for 
television early in her career and has continued to make documentaries alongside her 
feature films. The director notes that ―Documentary filmmaking is my first love,‖ and she 
claims that ―it is a way of keeping in touch with the multiple layers of society‖
28
 and it 
allows her to ―mediate more directly‖ her social ―apprehensions.‖ 
29
 However, Bani-
E‘temad also laments the fact that ―documentaries are seen less often and discussed less 
frequently.‖ As a result, she locates the value of narrative film in its ability to ―relate 
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more often and more easily to a sympathetic audience.‖
30
 Ultimately, Bani-E‘temad finds 
the documentary medium ―More appealing, and this aspect comes out consequently in 
[her] narrative films.‖
31
 The director reconciles her competing desires to create 
documentary and to attract and affect a wider audience by blending narrative and 
documentary forms, and Under the Skin of the City is representative of this composite 
style at the same time that it destabilizes it. The director shows the documentary 
filmmaking process, creates documentary-style footage and includes sound bites from 
real political speeches, but the film was released as a feature and at several points it refers 
to its own creative structure.  
The classic theory of suture proves useful to demonstrating the effect of Bani-
E‘temad‘s amalgamated style in Under the Skin of the City. At their core, theories of 
suture consider how a narrative film‘s visual structure calls the viewer into subjectivity 
and invites the viewer into the narrative space. Through a series of mediated gazes and a 
carefully controlled shot/reverse-shot pattern, the viewer is made to identify with 
characters in the film. Once the gap between the screen and the audience, the object and 
subject, has been closed, the viewer increasingly yearns for the comforts of narrative, 
especially at moments when the film‘s act of enunciation is revealed or potentially 
revealed.
32
 In Under the Skin of the City, references to documentary filmmaking and 
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documentary-style footage break up the signifying chain created by the suture. As a 
result, the viewer is denied full entrance into the visual pleasure of narrative and is 
instead left grounded in a lived, historical reality, signified by the documentary moments. 
The complexity of Bani-E‘temad‘s ensures the reverse-operation‘s functionality.  
Although suture scholarship focuses primarily on narrative film, it is worth 
considering a parallel process for documentary films, wherein the viewer is intellectually 
immersed in the process of constructing and identifying an argument about the historical 
world. Under the Skin of the City, which destabilizes its documentary-ethos with its 
narrativized qualities, prevents the viewer from giving in completely to a documentary‘s 
argument-based structure. Like Shirdel‘s The Night It Rained, Under the Skin of the City 
uses both contradictory evidence and competing modes of representation to destabalize 
the historical world it attempts to represent.  
Under the Skin of the City‘s narrative is framed by two documentary moments. 
The film opens with a close-up shot of a film crew‘s video display. The blurry image in 
the display focuses to show the head of a woman. A man‘s voice says, ―Let‘s roll‖ before 
reminding the woman, ―Your scarf…Fix your hair!‖ She promptly adjusts her headscarf 
and the man asks, ―How do you assess the role of female workers in the upcoming 
elections?‖ As the woman attempts to answer, the camera moves left and settles on the 
display-image‘s source: the woman sitting at a table with a man and a camera aimed at 
her. The woman is unable to answer the question beyond a statement of religiosity, and 




and requests some shots of the women working at their factory posts. These images roll 
along with the opening credits. This first scene plays an important role in the 
establishment of the film‘s documentary-ethos. Iranian censorship codes prohibit the 
appearance of women in close up shots and women must remain properly covered 
whenever on screen.
33
 The film‘s first moments both push the boundaries of acceptability 
and provide the viewer with the sense of witnessing something unproduced and not yet 
ready for public consumption. The film‘s first active moment—the display‘s pull to 
focus—reinforces the scene‘s raw feel.  
The film crew never formally exits the film‘s narrative, and the viewer is left to 
wonder whether the crew has been incorporated into the film‘s diegetic space or if the 
film crew acts as a bridge between the film‘s diegesis and the film‘s extra-diegetic and 
self-conscious documentary world. The reappearance of the same crew in the film‘s very 
last scene complicates further this distinction. A transition between a wide shot of ‗Abbas 
running through the streets and a close-up of Tuba signals the film‘s final scene. This 
transition also marks the moment at which the camera once again shares its perspective 
with a documentarian‘s. Asked to explain why she is voting, Tuba eloquently articulates 
her reasons for voting, but a high pitched beep interrupts her several times and finally a 
familiar voice (the interviewer from the film‘s first scene) asks her to start over because 
of technical problems. Clearly frustrated, Tuba complains, ―Just forget about it! I just lost 
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my house, my son ran away, and people are filming all the time.‖ Her final observation 
allows the viewer to consider the possibility that the same film crew has been following 
her throughout the course of the film, in which case this documentary‘s informing logic 
would hinge on the development of Tuba‘s political identity as enacted by the film‘s 
events. By taking on the classification of ―documentary,‖ as the framing permits, Under 
the Skin of the City would make the claim that the world it represents bears an indexical 
relationship to the lived, historical world.  
However, just as easily as Bani-E‘temad suggests the possibility that this film is a 
documentary so too does she provide evidence to the contrary. To return to the film‘s first 
scene, when the video-display pulls to focus, the viewer encounters Golab Adineh, a 
well-known actress in Iran. Bani-E‘temad noted that she envisioned Adineh in that role 
when she started revising the screenplay six years before production began.
34
 The 
director‘s decision to employ professional actors, including her own daughter Baran 
Kosari in the role of Mahbubeh, runs contrary to the trend in Iranian New Wave Cinema 
to employ actors who have little or no acting experience. The result of this decision in 
Under the Skin of the City‘s is the viewer‘s simultaneous desire to read the opening scene 
as documentary and to acknowledge the fact that the woman in the frame does not work 
in a factory but is instead a popular actress. Slavoj Žižek‘s concept of ―interface,‖ a self-
conscious screen within a screen that threatens a film‘s delicate fictive web,
35
 further 
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obscures generic classification. The film crew‘s video display, by referencing the act of 
production, shows how Under the Skin of the City refuses to submit the normative 
features of narrative film.  
In the film‘s final scene, the director similarly complicates the audience‘s ability 
to negotiate the real and the performative, the historical and the imagined. After noting 
that she is constantly being filmed, Tuba emotionally pleas, ―I wish someone would come 
and film what‘s going on right here. Right here! Who do you show these films to, 
anyway?‖ Tuba thus probes the limits of the documentary form and questions its inability 
to capture the depths of human suffering. She also questions the ability of documentary 
filmmaking to reach wide audiences. Film critic Rahul Hamid argues that this criticism 
by Tuba ―betrays Bani-E‘temad‘s ambivalent feelings towards…the movie craze in 
Iran—and perhaps the political efficacy of cinema itself.‖
36
 However, this categorization 
describes too broadly the reach of Tuba‘s statement. Bani-E‘temad instead reveals an 
unmediated tension between documentary and narrative styles, in which the socially 
committed documentary form lacks affective prowess and therefore fails to reach diverse 
audiences.  
Hamid‘s misreading of this scene results from a misunderstanding of Tuba‘s final 
question, ―in film’hā ro be ki neshun midin?‖ [Who do you show these films to, 
anyway?]. This question, which clearly references the narrow reach of documentary 
filmmaking, is also an ironic and self-referential act on the part of Bani-E‘temad. Who Do 
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You Show These Films To, Anyway? is the title of a documentary that Bani-E‘temad 
directed in 1993. It focuses on a poor housing community in south Tehran and, therefore, 
shares similar concerns with Under the Skin of the City. This reference to Bani-E‘temad‘s 
corpus of work combined with Tuba‘s affected plea interrupts the informed viewer‘s 
inclination to read this final moment as documentary, because the director stages a 
confrontation with the artificiality of documentary filmmaking, which runs contrary to 
the viewer‘s expectations regarding the relationship between documentary and the real.   
Tuba‘s closing statement thereby captures the complexities of Bani-E‘temad‘s 
composite style in Under the Skin of the City. Her words, which criticize the sterile 
question-and-answer documentary form, enact an affective desire that is perhaps satisfied 
by the film‘s fictional structure and scenes. At the same time, this criticism creates a 
sense of urgency and relevance that ends the film. By creating and resolving, mediating 
and destabilizing, the tension between documentary and narrative forms, Bani-E‘temad 
interrogates a relationship between truth and myth. This relationship is central to Under 
the Skin of the City, in which the city of Tehran represents an urban reality that is capable 
of demystifying a popular but misinformed representation of the Reformist Movement.    
 
Urban Myth 
While films by ‗Abbas Kiarostami, Majid Majidi, and Mohsen Makhmalbaf often 






 which dates back to Dariush Mehrjui‘s Gāv [The Cow] (1969), 
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s films constitute a separate track in Iranian New Wave Cinema 
that interrogates urban spaces and experiences. For Bani-E‘temad, Tehran is a site of 
―perplexing contradictions‖ that function alongside a ―concentration of politics, 
economics and social issues‖ to make the city seem bigger and more ―chaotic‖ each 
day.
38
 As such, Tehran serves as a complicated and unstable character in all of her films. 
Even in Gilāneh [Gilaneh] (2004), the story of a disabled veteran and his mother living in 
the quiet hills of northern Iran, Bani-E‘temad notes that Tehran asserts its presence 
through the threats of displacement and urban migration.
39
 Under the Skin of the City 
(2001) represents one of Bani-E‘temad‘s most complex portrayals of Tehran. In this film, 
the director explores the political possibility of the metropolis and she envisions the 
capital city and its many paradoxes as signifiers of a reality covered up or overlooked by 
the Reformist Movement‘s mythic presence.  
Like documentary, urbanism allows Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad to investigate the 
representation of reality and to consider the ways in which multiple urban realities 
coalesce. This effort resonates with a long tradition in Iranian cinema, and in particular 
with a set of pre-Revolution metropolitan films that use the city of Tehran to expose the 
realities of harsh living conditions under Pahlavi rule. Farrokh Ghaffari‘s Jonub-e shahr 
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[South of the City] (1958) was the first film to provide a critical representation of Tehran. 
The film tells the story of a woman who slowly discovers a friend‘s secret profession as a 
prostitute, and this plotline, as Hamid Reza Sadr notes, permits the exposure of the city‘s 
―dark underbelly.‖
40
 Through this revelation, Ghaffari provides an alternative narrative to 
the Pahlavi government‘s promotion of the country at the time as an oil-rich, modern 
nation. Through displays of unjust violence, the film also criticizes the luti system, a code 
of urban masculinity that has been valorized throughout much of Iran‘s modern history.
41
 
A luti genre of films popular in the mid-twentieth century especially mythologized this 
urban figure and turned him into a kind of Robin Hood character.
42
 South of the City, 
however, casts the luti in the role of pimp and thug and shows him as a deeply troubled 
character who lives outside of the rules of society not for the betterment of his 
community but rather for his own benefit.  
Ghaffari‘s depiction of the truths that underlined modernization and the luti myths 
required that the director violate the thematic and technological norms of Iranian cinema 
at the time. Indeed, South of the City was the first Iranian film to leave the set behind and 
shoot on location in the city‘s streets. This innovation led to a gritty and realistic 
representation of Tehran‘s poor districts that left many viewers unsettled. The film‘s 
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main actor, Ebrahim Baqeri, was even assaulted for his controversial portrayal of the luti 
system and this act brings to focus the power of Ghaffari‘s realistic style. The Pahlavi 
regime was also threatened by the unfavorable and realistic representation of life in south 
Tehran, and the film was banned and confiscated shortly after its release. The 
government reissued the film under the title Reqābat dar shahr [Rivalry in the City]. This 
version of the film was so heavily censored that it no longer bore the critical traces of its 
predecessor, and it was even promoted as ―preserving the traditional customs and beliefs 
of the honorable lutis.‖
43
 The case of South of the City is productive to the present 
analysis of Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the City because it serves as a precedent 
within the Iranian cinematic tradition for probing the city of Tehran to uncover and 
complicate politico-cultural myth by providing urban images of the real (the real streets 
of Tehran, the real effects of modernization, and the real qualities of the luti) and thereby 
establishing a counter-narrative.  
It is worth noting that Ghaffari‘s film had a significant impact on other directors, 
who began using the city in this way. Notably, Kamran Shirdel was commissioned by the 
Shah to create a series of documentaries that exalted the government‘s modernization 
project. Instead, the director took his camera to the streets of Tehran and created an 
eighteen-minute documentary called Tehrān pāytakht-e Irān ast [Tehran is the Capital of 
Iran] (1966)  that included startling images of city‘s poorest citizens sleeping on 
sidewalks and in back alleys. The message was clear: streets of Tehran were the reality of 
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the Shah‘s modernization process, which excluded and hid a huge portion of the 
country‘s population that did not fit into the orderly system that the Shah envisioned.
 44
 
In Under the Skin of the City, Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad excavates the urban 
structures of Tehran in order to unravel the myth of the Reformist Movement. More 
specifically, she attempts to expose the hopes and promises of the Reformist Movement 
as they are reflected in a sprawling and unrelenting cityscape. This process resonates with 
Walter Benjamin‘s The Arcades Project, a mammoth and unfinished text concerned with 
the ―dissolution of ‗mythology‘ into the space of history.‖
45
 Benjamin envisaged The 
Arcades Project, which he began in 1927 and worked tirelessly on until his death in 
1940, as a means of clearing away ―the undergrowth of delusion and myth‖ from ―the 
terrain of the nineteenth century.‖
46
 Paris, as the capital of the nineteenth century, 
represents a dreamworld of modernity, and its inhabitants, a dreaming collectivity, ―find 
their expression in the dream and their interpretation in awakening.‖
47
 The moment of 
awakening, or interpretation, becomes the negation of myth. In The Arcades Project, this 
process is achieved through an excavation of Paris, wherein the ―afterlife of the recent 
past provides for an archeology of dreaming.‖
48
 Paris as metropolis is particularly 
meaningful for Benjamin as a site of obsolete objects and dialectal images. On the one 
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hand, ―the outmoded object defetishizes and demythifies the commodity and the process 
of its production, exchange and consumption in the city.‖
49
 On the other hand, the 
dialectal image, as an apparatus that acknowledges the ―telescoping of the past through 
the present,‖
50
 facilitates the ―decay‖ of history ―into images, not into stories‖
 51
 It is 
modernity‘s claim of progress, continuity—the end of the myth—that Benjamin opposes, 
and Paris in the early twentieth century, underneath its intoxicating pull, illuminated the 
fallacy of the various mechanisms, like capitalism and progress, that allowed modernity 
to participate in myth-making.    
Benjamin‘s The Arcades Project is bound geographically, temporally, and 
thematically to Paris, the nineteenth century, and modernity. Nevertheless, through his 
work he articulates a vocabulary for representing the city, its complexities and 
disintegration, in order to highlight movement and conflict but not progress. In particular, 
the author employs a methodology in The Arcades Project that permits ―text-as-city‖ and 
―city-as-text.‖
52
 In other words, Benjamin invites the reader to consider the city as a text, 
a collection of symbols, images, and motifs that can be interrogated and interpreted to 
further our understanding of urban realities. At the same time, he promotes the notion that 
urban content should generate a distinct urban form that replicates in some manner the 
structures and experiences of the metropolis. Susan Buck-Morss (1989) and Graeme 
Gilloch (1996) agree that the impetus for The Arcades Project began not in France but in 
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Italy with his short essay ―Naples‖ (1924).
53
 Benjamin‘s magnum opus, therefore, 
constitutes the culmination of a decade-long strong struggle to represent the 
fragmentation and disorientation of the metropolis. It is from these larger concerns about 
representing city and myth that I derive utility from Benjamin‘s methodology in The 
Arcades Project and appropriate his ideas to my reading of Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the 
Skin of the City.  
Benjamin clearly states his approach in The Arcades Project: ―Method of this 
project: literary montage. I needn‘t say anything. Merely show.‖
54
 As such, The Arcades 
Project comprises an expansive collection of fragmented source material and 
commentary arranged in loosely organized and sometimes thematically overlapping 
convolutes. This approach, which Gilloch calls an ―archeo-monadological practice‖
55
 that 
reorganizes old fragments into new configurations, accords with Benjamin‘s Thesis III in 
the ―Theses on the Philosophy of History‖ that the historical materialist ―recites events 
without distinguishing between the major and minor…‖
56
 At the same time, this level of 
fragmentation and materiality textually replicate the experience of the city, a space of 
intoxicating perplexity. Despite one‘s desire to see the city as a continuous whole, the 
ability to experience it in its entirety remains evasive, and one must instead construct an 
understanding of city through disjointed encounters with it. 
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 Benjamin‘s literary montage has its origins in photography and film.
57
 In his 
famous treatise ―The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction‖ (1935), which 
was written at the same time that he was working on The Arcades Project, Benjamin 
notes that:  
Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, 
our railroad stations, and our factories appeared to have us locked up and 
hopeless. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the 
dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung 




Cinema processes the ability to introduce us to ―an unconscious optic‖ of the city in the 
same way that psychoanalysis uncovers ―unconscious impulses.‖
59
 It creates new urban 
perceptions by reorganizing conceptions of space and time through techniques like the 
close-up and slow motion and historically redeems the urban center by isolating objects. 
Film captures and preserves the fleeting fragments of the city and flattens the space 
between the viewer and the viewed, subject and object.
60
 Benjamin articulates a spatial 
relationship between cinema and the city that anticipates in interesting ways the so-called 
―spatial turn‖ in cultural theory of the 1970s and 1980s.  
 Tehran‘s spatiality is exceedingly important to Bani-E‘temad‘s style of 
representation in Under the Skin of the City. Although Hamid Dabashi claims that in this 
film the director‘s ―camera has lost its touch‖ and fallen into the category of ―routine 
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 I argue that through a series of spatially organized fragments, Bani-
E‘temad‘s camera uniquely and innovatively redeems Tehran from the Reformist 
Movement‘s dreamworld. The terms of the Reformist myth are established early in the 
film. The film enters its narrative after the documentary-framing by means of a bus ride 
through the streets of Tehran. It is fitting that as both Tuba and the viewer journey into 
the fictional domain they are made to listen to a political speech delivered by Khatami. 
Although the 1997 elections serve as a regular feature in the film‘s background, it is only 
in this moment early in the film that the Reformist Movement is given voice. Bani-
E‘temad cleverly manipulates the authentic sound file to highlight the Movement‘s 
mythic premise. Khatami says, ―And we shall broaden democracy and progress toward a 
civil society. We will try to strengthen continually the dignity and stability of this nation. 
Our developments were the product of a great revolution and our problems…‖ At this 
point, noises from a street fight drown out Khatami. The speech returns as Khatami says, 
―The result was first and foremost a recovery of ourselves and particularly of our 
youth…‖ before fading out once again. In many ways, this speech is very typical and 
likely recognizable to Iranian viewers. It pays homage to the revolution, emphasizes the 
importance of engaging the youth, and outlines Khatami‘s goals for his country, 
including democracy and civil society, two words that frequently entered his rhetoric.   
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By controlling the viewer‘s access to the audio clip, Bani-E‘temad constructs and 
articulates a particular view of the Reformist Movement that informs the film throughout. 
It is significant that Bani-E‘temad chooses to disrupt the speech with noises from the 
street. This clip, like a film‘s soundtrack, exists in an extra-diegetic space and not within 
the characters‘ lives or world. It instead plays over the fictional realm. The fact that 
noises on the streets can interrupt the speech establishes a central thesis in Under the Skin 
of the City, as it becomes apparent that the viewer‘s audio-visual encounters with the 
urban experience alter and reconfigure his understanding of the Reformist Movement.  
This rupture occurs at crucial part in the speech, right as Khatami is preparing to 
describe the country‘s problems. The implication of this cut is that Khatami and the 
Reformist Movement have no conception of local problems. The images of the scene—a 
brawl between members of the basij and young campaigners—reinforces this idea by 
providing a visual alternative to the words ―democracy‖ and ―civil society‖ that play 
moments before. The rupture in speech also tears the narrative‘s suture. In other words, 
the speech and the contradicting images pull the viewer‘s attention away from the 
narrative (i.e. Tuba‘s journey home) and towards the historical world (i.e. Khatami‘s 
election). This method heightens the viewer‘s awareness of fragility of both truth and 
fiction, because Bani-E‘temad interrupts both real, recognizable speeches and her own 
narrative.  
Jāme’eh-ye madani or civil society formed the basis of Khatami‘s moderate 




system and the nature of factionalism in Iran at the time, Khatami was cautious not to 
define clearly what he meant by ―civil society‖ or how he intended to deliver the country 
to that ideal. Mohsen Kadivar, a well-known theologian, suggested that civil society 
represented during the elections an alternative to velāyat-e faqih, the basis for the 
governmental system in the Islamic Republic.
62
 As such, Khatami easily garnered support 
from young voters, who were increasingly frustrated with the political and economic 
status quo in the late 1990s, without ever revealing a salient civil-society agenda. 
However, as Mehran Kamrava has noted, shortly after Khatami‘s election, Iranians began 
demanding accountability and sought to understand how the new president intended to 
revise the Islamic Republic‘s legal system to include the ideals of civil society, like 
tolerance, freedom, and mutual respect.
63
 Over the next two years, and especially after a 
series of violent attacks on student protestors in 1999, people became increasingly 
skeptical of Khatami‘s ability to deliver on his promise of civil society.
64
  
Although Under the Skin of the City takes place during the 1997 elections, it was 
filmed and produced in 2000, as disillusionment with Khatami and his promise of a civil 
society were on the rise. Bani-E‘temad, therefore, re-examines the historic elections and 
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gently uncovers in Tehran‘s cityscape the ways in which Khatami‘s rhetoric of 
democracy and civil society failed to address the country‘s problems even in 1997. There 
is a commonly held belief that Khatami‘s efforts to enact reform were blocked by 
conservative forcers
65
 and that had he been successful, the country would have 
experienced a political, cultural, and economic revival. This understanding of the 
situation constitutes the myth of the Reformist Movement, 
66
against which Under the 
Skin of the City reacts. For Bani-E‘temad, the city of Tehran functions as a particularly 
poignant example of the ways in which broad notions of democracy and civil society—
reform within the existing structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran—were  never able to 
address local and economic problems. Khatami, as a cleric and former associate of 
Khomeini, was attempting to create reform from the top-down, but Bani-E‘temad‘s 
Under the Skin of the City returns this political narrative to the street level and this 
vantage point is revealing.  
The street-level perspective adds a fragmented dimension to the representation of 
Tehran in Under the Skin of the City. The film is absent of wide-angle shots that show 
large segments of the city and does not feature any aerial views that attempt to capture 
visually the city‘s entirety. Michel de Certeau distinguishes between those who read the 
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city from above with panoramic views and those who walk the city, writing it without 
being able to read it.
67
 (de Certeau 1987: 92-3).  In Under the Skin of the City, Bani-
E‘temad‘s camerawork invites the viewer to identify with the latter. The film‘s title is 
especially instructive in this regard; it suggests that the director seeks to probe the urban 
existence beyond images of the surface. This film title is a reference to Faridun Goldeh‘s 
1974 film Zir-e pust-e shab [Under the Skin of the Night].
68
 The phrase zir-e pust-e shab 
generally means ―nightlife‖ and is also the Persian term used to refer to a genre of films 
popular in the 1960s and 1970s. These films, usually geared towards western audiences, 
depict a glamorous and enticing nightlife in various Asian cities like Beirut, Shanghai, 
and Tehran. Goldeh‘s film provides a counter-narrative to this genre by showing one poor 
man‘s unsuccessful attempts to gain access to the city‘s nightlife. Both Under the Skin of 
the Night and Under the Skin of the City, therefore, dispel popular myths through 
representations of a diverse range of experiences in Tehran. 
In order to capture several different urban perspectives, Bani-E‘temad creates a 
fragmented picture of Tehran, as the camera moves disjointedly from one geographic 
location to another but never provides a large-scale image of the space traversed. The 
film‘s visual and narrative structures depend in large part on complementary and 
thematically-related scenes from different sectors of the city. An architectural firm on the 
top floor of a skyscraper in downtown Tehran is contrasted, for example, with the textile 
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factory where Tuba works. The office scene features classical music playing in the 
background and shows an orderly arrangement of desks and offices occupied by men and 
women in colorful western-style clothing. The noise of the machines in the factory 
provides an uncomfortable point of contrast for the viewer, who has just been drawn in 
by the soft sounds of classical music in the office. The factory is employed only by 
women, who are all dressed in traditional black veils. The vertical scan of the office‘s 
skyscraper and the camera‘s horizontal movement in the factory emphasize the city as a 
three-dimensional space. The value of occupying the city‘s highest point is highlighted 
by the film as ‗Abbas enters the skyscraper and his friends warn him, ―Don‘t‘ forget us 
little people on your way up!‖  
Under the Skin of the City similarly compares geographically diverse social 
structures, and the family is a particularly rich area of exploration for the film. In one 
scene, Tuba arrives home and discovers her granddaughter playing in the narrow alleys of 
the neighborhood. Explaining her unexpected arrival, the granddaughter says, ―Daddy 
beat up Mommy and told her to get lost…so we came here!‖ The members of the family 
have competing approaches to Hamideh‘s arrival and her presence becomes a source of 
contention. Their reactions range from Mahmud‘s anger to Mahbubeh‘s meddling to 
Tuba‘s pragmatism that the family does not have the physical space or financial resources 
to care for a pregnant woman and her young daughter. The house‘s architecture and, 
specifically, its courtyard mediates the conversation and emphasizes the family‘s lack of 




a central courtyard. In this instance, Hamideh stands in the small central courtyard and 
the family members offer their commentary from the various rooms or during their 
passage between them .The lack of privacy both within and outside of the home is 
apparent, and at one point, Tuba, afraid that the neighbors will hear, reprimands Mahmud 
for yelling through the door.   
The scene switches to a house in an affluent neighborhood in north Tehran, and 
the camera captures the area‘s desirable hilltop view of the city. Inside, the home‘s 
texture is rich with lush fabrics and it comprises only interior spaces, unlike the 
traditional court-yard structure that the film emphasizes in the preceding scene. A fight 
between mother and son ensues; the son has been stealing car radios despite having the 
financial means to buy them and the family‘s reputation is at stake. ‗Abbas interrupts the 
quarrel and the son mocks him for his work ethic, even though they are approximately the 
same age. Mother and son fight for control of the car keys; the son is eventually 
victorious and speeds away, nearly hitting ‗Abbas as he walks on the side of the street.  
Bani-E‘temad‘s technique with these juxtaposed scenes is reminiscent of 
Benjamin‘s method of laying out fragmented and often related observations and pieces of 
information as a means of encouraging the reader to draw his or her own inferences and 
make his or her own connections. Within film studies, montage as a cinematic 




in terms of ―conflict.‖
69
 For Eisenstein, montage represents the development of an idea 
through the ―collision of independent shots.‖
70
 The dynamism that results from the 
collisions of independent shots acts as a site for the production of new ideas and 
concepts. In other words, unexpected contradictions and conclusions explode from the 
collision of two shots ―opposite to one another.‖
71
 In Under the Skin of the City, the 
fragmented vignettes underscore a geographically and economically diverse set of urban 
realities that equally constitute Tehran. At the same time, these fragmented scenes 
together generate some threads of continuity related to the experiences of family and 
reputation.  
Under the Skin of the City thus fragments the city of Tehran by providing the 
viewer with juxtaposing sights ―that are experienced on an individual scale by the man in 
the street in big-city traffic.‖
72
 The film itself, however, is not fragmented and features a 
cohesive narrative structure that allows Bani-E‘temad to connect different segments of 
Tehran. Under the Skin of the City was one of the most successful films in Iran in 2001, 
and this achievement indicates the ways in which the film appealed to popular audiences, 
including the expectation of a coherent narrative. Rahul Hamid notes that ―The majority 
of screen time is devoted to Abbas‘s exploits, but Tuba is at the core of the film.‖
73
 The 
reason for this disparity in screen time rests in the fact that ‗Abbas plays a functional role 
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in the film‘s geographic shifts. Under the Skin of the City consists, for the most part, of 
corresponding images from the north and the south, mediated by transitional highway 
scenes. ‗Abbas, as a delivery boy, possesses the mobility necessary to permeate both 
spaces and functions as the viewer‘s guide. These regional shifts encourage the viewer to 
make comparisons—visually and socially, spatially and economically—between the two 
parts of the city and to consider the different ways that people make sense of their urban 
spaces and the vast differences in these approaches based on their geographic location 
within Tehran. 
Highways, cars, and traffic as points in between these various locations together 
constitute a distinct kind of space in Under the Skin of the City that generates a 
constitutive set of economic, political, and social features. ‗Abbas travels the streets and 
highways of the capital on his small scooter. Using a car borrowed from his boss, the 
entire family only makes one road trip together to north Tehran during the course of the 
film. This journey, which takes place early in the narrative, plays an important role in 
determining the symbolic distance between south Tehran and the financial districts of the 
north. Before the family enters the highway, they are stopped by a passing train, which 
stays on screen for over ten seconds. The viewer is thus made to wait just as the 
characters do, and the train‘s presence emphasizes the ways in which mobility is blocked 
or limited for those citizens in the southern part of the city. The scene continues with a 
series of shots that accentuate the highway‘s unrelenting size and capitalize on north 




Although the family begins its journey in daylight, the point of arrival is marked 
by the darkness of night, and Bani-E‘temad thereby adds a temporal aspect to the city‘s 
spatial configuration. Tehran‘s structure depends on a spatial and social stratification that 
emerges along the city‘s horizontal axis to divide this urban space into clear north and 
south divisions. The city‘s middle- and upper-class residents live almost exclusively in 
the northern half of the city, and as geographer Ali Madanipour notes, this polarization 
remains ―clearly visible in Tehran.‖
74
  
Under the Skin of the City demonstrates how this structure maintains social 
stratification through spatial means and effectively keeps Tehran‘s poorest citizens out of 
the city‘s financial centers through a highway system that is inaccessible to those 
individuals without a car. The absence of car ownership in the south is revealed in the 
film through an aerial shot of Tuba‘s neighborhood. The sound of a car alarm encourages 
the viewer to search through the monochrome sprawl of buildings and alleyways for the 
source the sound: the borrowed car uncomfortably parked in a drain. The southern 
neighborhood clearly lacks both the financial and spatial resources necessary to acquire a 
car, and Under the Skin of the City brings to light at several different points the difficulty 
of navigating Tehran‘s vast geography without one. The challenges of public transit 
emerge as Tuba and her coworkers are slowed by the sail-effect of their chādors while 
attempting to catch their bus home. Meanwhile, the perils of pedestrianism are conveyed 
to the viewer as ‗Abbas walks back to work after returning a car to his boss‘s home and  
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is almost hit by the same car as a seemingly endless city sprawls before him. These 
moments test the bounds of access to urban space while drawing attention to social and 
economic diversity within the city.     
For Bani-E‘temad, the city‘s ability to represent the various human experiences 
that exist on its concrete surfaces extends beyond spatial and even temporal dimensions. 
Tehran functions as an affective surface that captures and mirrors the emotional 
responses and impulses of its inhabitants. In this way, Bani-E‘temad‘s cinema gives in to 
Benjamin‘s notion that film opens up the viewer‘s perceptions of the city and, through 
camera work and editing, inscribes it with features that have previously gone unnoticed. 
In Under the Skin of the City, the streets and buildings of Tehran match the characters‘ 
excitement and elation, pain and suffering.  For example, after ‗Abbas declares his love 
to one of the women working in the architectural office and she receives him favorably, 
he flies on his scooter, weaving  through the city‘s streets, which have been decorated 
with colorful lights for the Iranian New Year celebration called Nowruz. In the absence of 
music, ‗Abbas‘ excitement in this moment is conveyed to the viewer through the city‘s 
visual appeal. The film‘s background thus takes on the characteristics of the protagonist, 
and this scene brings to focus the fact that the city is not always a site of impasse and 
fragmentation but also a place of inclusion. The city supports the characters in a way that 
they cannot necessarily support each other. It is Tehran‘s paradoxical ability to facilitate 




Nowhere do these contradictions become more apparent than within the cycles of 
construction and destruction that grow, rejuvenate, and paralyze every metropolis. The  
narrative, including the contractor who attempts to buy Tuba‘s house and ‗Abbas‘ work 
with an architectural firm, provides the film with ample opportunity to show construction 
sites throughout the city, and it is never quite clear whether the viewer is witnessing a 
building in the process of construction or deconstruction. The visual similarities of these 
two in-between moments capture the fact that that they are interrelated. That the city is 
replete with these cyclic processes becomes clearer when they are laced with human 
emotion. ‗Abbas plows through the streets of Tehran after discovering that he was the 
victim of a scandal that robbed him of all his savings and the money acquired from the 
sale of his family‘s home. Despite his rapid progress through space and time, he is always 
framed by buildings that are being (de)constructed. These shells without windows or 
doors, concrete skeletons, reflect his anguish. His own financial, moral, and emotional 
destruction are captured perfectly by the half-completed/depleted structures, and his 
inability to escape them suggests the city as a dynamic space that functions outside of the 
bounds and laws of normal spatial experience by accommodating affective as well as 
temporal variables.  
These moments of deconstruction are redeemed only at the point of construction. 
As Tuba packs and prepares to move, reduced once again to the role of tenant, her house 
is literally being torn down around her. The house that held her life together and once 




the film‘s final scene reveals Tuba‘s political hope as she lists the loss of her house and 
son as reasons for voting. This political hope, examined in greater depth later, is 
significant now because it functions as an act of productivity born of the destruction that 
film‘s events have facilitated.   The relationship between the collapse of Tuba‘s house 
and the birth of her political identity suggests the city of Tehran as a cyclic site, a fact 
reinforced by the cycles in Tuba‘s own life and especially her return as a tenant. In her 
final statement, Tuba notes the historical cycles in which post-Revolution Iran has also 
been caught: ―There was a time when we complained but you said we were fighting a 
war. It was the truth, so we accepted it. After the war, you asked us for patience because 
the country was in ruins, so once again, we put up with it all… Now there is someone 
who wants to save us, so I‘m here to vote.‖  Her use of the word ruins (kherābeh) is 
particularly interesting. Combined with the film‘s many demolished and collapsed 
sites/sights, it indicates the ways in which the city‘s surface encapsulates the country‘s 
social and economic problems. More than that, Tuba‘s final declaration, ―I am here to 
vote,‖ suggests that these ruins—both despite and because of their cyclical nature—can 
be appropriated as spots for improvement and reform, a characteristically urban process.  
Under the Skin of the City‘s representation of Tehran through geographic 
fragmentation, cycles of de/construction, and an intimate relationship between building 
and affect sympathetically guides the viewer‘s gaze to the unique experiences of the 
city‘s marginalized poor working-class citizens. As a result, the film shows particular 




background) plays out in these poorer, districts of south Tehran. The director reinforces 
the existence of a relationship between the political system and south Tehran by locating 
the elections‘ presence only in the city‘s southern half. References to the Reformist 
Movement and the upcoming elections only appear in the sections of the film that focus 
on the southern part of the city. In his examination of Paris, Benjamin also takes an 
interest in the city‘s marginalized characters. He is particularly attracted to those 
individuals who position themselves outside of the normal cycles of consumerism and 
commodity; these figures on the cityscape become essential to his effort to uncover the 
myth of modernity.  In a similar effort, Bani-E‘temad focuses on Tehran‘s margins to 
expose the Reformist myth, and these characters and the neighborhoods they inhabit 
represent the holes left unfilled by the Reformist Movement‘s political platform.   
The development of Tuba‘s political identity rests at the center of Under the Skin 
of the City. The film‘s documentary framing represents more than a generic reference; it 
also signals a documentary‘s informing logic.  The documentary-framing at the beginning 
of the film signals to viewer that this film requires the interpretive skill set for an 
argument-based structure rather than a narrative plot. Therefore, if one were to evaluate 
Under the Skin of the City as a documentary—as the film‘s framing structure 
encourages—then one might interpret the rise of Tuba‘s political identity as a speculative 
solution to problems that the film depicts. Tuba‘s inability at the beginning of the film to 




statement suggest that the film‘s tragic events have informed and inspired her newfound 
political involvement.  
However, implicit in her statement is tension between the factors that have led her 
to vote and the aims of the candidate for whom she is voting.  Tuba‘s remark that ―Now 
there is someone who wants to save us, so I am here to vote‖ is punctuated by references 
to the loss of her house and son. The Reformist Movement—as represented in the film by 
Khatami‘s speech about democracy and civil society—seems unprepared to handle the 
economic and social concerns that have impacted Tuba‘s life. Making sense of this 
tension and determining the exact relationship between the hopes and needs of south 
Tehran and the Reformist Movement‘s proposed political shift represent one of the film‘s 
greatest challenges. Inequalities in housing and gender are two categories that prove 
useful to the analysis of the political incongruity that the film reveals.  
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad has focused much of her career on the housing crisis in 
Tehran. She has directed three documentaries on the topic: Gozāresh-e 71 [Report of 71] 
(1991), In film’hā ro be ki neshun midin? [Who Do You Show These Films To, 
Anyway?] (1993), and Bahār tā bahār [Spring to Spring] (1995). Her interest in 
architectural and residential experiences figures into her feature films as well, including 
Under the Skin of the City. In this film, housing informs both the director‘s sociopolitical 




long shots, and the intended effect was to mimic ―peeping into a neighbor‘s house from 
on top of the wall.‖
75
  
It is important to note that traditional Iranian houses are surrounded and separated 
by walls that configure private and public spaces. That is, homes in Iran are fully private 
spaces, visually inaccessible to passersby on the street. Farzaneh Milani notes the 
relationship between this architectural feature and the practice of veiling, arguing that 
―Like walls that enclose houses and separate inner and outer spaces, the veil makes a 
clear statement about the disjunction between the private and the public.‖
76
 In Under the 
Skin of the City, the wall as unique neighborly architectural feature is highlighted. It 
serves as a meeting point for Mahbubeh and Masumeh, who climb up ladders and meet 
on top of the wall that separates their homes to study and gossip.  
The film provides the viewer with a neighborly perspective that encourages the 
same kind of empathy as communal living. The film‘s form adds force in this way to its 
critical observations on the status of housing in south Tehran. At the center of this crisis 
is a lack of physical space and a rapidly growing urban population; these problem 
necessitate the reorganization of traditional horizontal living structures to vertical 
structures that can accommodate more people. This desire to build up motivates the 
constructor who ultimately buys Tuba‘s house, and this impetus is reinforced in the film 
with wide horizontal shots of the neighborhoods in south Tehran juxtaposed with narrow 
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vertical shots of north Tehran.  The desirability of physical space in Tehran allows the 
contractor in the film to buy out entire neighborhoods in south Tehran, where the 
immediate need for access to financial resources outweighs the stability of 
homeownership.  
The sale of Tuba‘s house affords ‗Abbas the opportunity to purchase a visa to 
pursue his dreams abroad (with the additional promise of financial return), and it allows 
Mahmud, who is unemployed, to re-assert his power as the head of the home. However, it 
is Tuba who provides for the family and finds comfort in the stability of owning a home. 
After ‗Abbas and Mahmud sell the family home, she laments, ―I used to carry stuff on my 
back, moving from one rented house to another…Now, at this old age, when I need was 
some space, you had to do this?‖ Although Tuba believes that she has earned the right to 
homeownership, it eludes her because she is a woman, and the contractor, who tells Tuba 
to ―Go to your man. I don‘t deal with womenfolk,‖ demonstrates the dynamics of gender-
segregation in homeownership. Tuba‘s namesake, likely a reference to Shahrnush 
Parispur‘s novel Tubā va ma’nā-ye shab [Tuba and the Meaning of Night] (1989),
77
 
similarly highlights a relationship between gender and homeownership. In Parsipur‘s 
historical novel, Tuba‘s status as a female homeowner at the turn of the century—the 
result of her young marriage to an older man and the subsequent divorce—distinguishes 
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her, and the financial and practical comforts of homeownership sets her on a path of 
discovery that allows her to uncover within Iranian society a fully engrained patriarchy 
that oppresses women at every turn.
78
 In Under the Skin of the City, it seems unlikely that 
Khatami‘s broad discussion of civil society can undo a deeply and historically determined 
system of economic and gender injustice.  
Housing functions as a point of access to an array of gender inequalities that rise 
to the surface in Under the Skin of the City, the most important of which is violence 
perpetrated against women. The film engages two acts of domestic violence that together 
elicit a number of practical and political responses. Hamideh, who is beaten by her 
husband, is forced back into the cycle of violence because Tuba must accept the fact that 
the family does not have space in their home to accommodate a pregnant woman and her 
daughter. During Hamideh‘s stay at the house, the film includes several shots of the 
interior spaces, partitioned and divided with makeshift curtains assembled from old 
sheets; these crowded images underscore the lack of physical space in the home. 
Hamideh‘s situation is contrasted with Masumeh, the family‘s next-door neighbor and 
Mahbubeh‘s best friend. Masumeh is abused by her brother, who, although a drug addict 
himself, beats her and cuts off her hair after he discovers that she went to a concert. 
Masumeh breaks this cycle of violence by running away. She and Mahbubeh later meet 
in Mellat Park and her style of dress and heavy makeup convey to the viewer that she is 
                                                          
78
 For a more detailed discussion of this novel as a feminist statement, see Kamran Talattof, ―Feminist 
Discourse in Postrevolutionary Women‘s Literature,‖ The Politics of Writing in Iran: A History of Modern 




working as a prostitute.
79
 When police raid the park, both girls are arrested, and Tuba is 
unable to bail Mahbubeh out of jail, because she no longer has the deed to the house, 
which she needs as collateral for the bail money. In this way, Bani-E‘temad ties this 
social problem into the economic conditions that determine the building industry.  
Tuba‘s son ‗Ali, a young political activist campaigning for Khatami, responds to 
the violence against the women around him by arguing that ―these sorts of things happen 
as long as women are ignorant of their rights.‖ The irony and futility of this statement are 
rendered apparent by Tuba‘s lack of rights in homeownership. More than that, ‗Ali‘s 
statement, which accords with the Reformist Movement‘s answer to women‘s 
problems,
80
 encourages Iranian society to reconsider the way it thinks about women and 
their rights within an existing political structure rather than revising that structure as a 
whole. However, Tuba‘s dismissive reaction to her son‘s statement suggests that this 
approach is unable to accommodate practically her socioeconomic reality. And it is 
ultimately this reality—the experience of one family in south Tehran—that destabilizes 
the Reformist myth and highlights the fact that Khatami‘s broad vision for his country 
was out of touch with most of its citizens. The city of Tehran functions a particularly rich 
site of exploration for Bani-E‘temad because its numerous bring to focus the many ways 
                                                          
79
 Khabargozāri-ye Mehr estimates that 80% of runaway girls fall victim to illegal activities, mainly in the 
form of prostitution and drug smuggling, within their first twenty-four hours on the street. 
(http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=112382).  
80
 The feminist journal Zanān published an interview with Mohammad Khatami during the 1997 elections. 
Khatami‘s answers the journals questions about status of women in Iran indicate that Reformist Movement 
collapsed the solution to a variety of problems into the category of ―civil society.‖ For Khatami, adhering to 
the ideals of democracy and civil society would have a similar positive effect on the social and economic 
problems that plagued the country. For more, see ―Khātami darbāreh-ye zanān che mi-guyad?‖ [What does 




in which the Reformist Movement was never equipped to deal with the country‘s 
immediate, local problems. Under the Skin of the City was produced in 2000, at a time of 
growing criticism of the Reformist Movement‘s inability to enact broad change for a 
better society. I argue, therefore, that the articulation of Tuba‘s political aspirations in this 
film represents nostalgia for a lost hope, covered and obscured by the Reformist 
Movement‘s phantasmagoria.  
 
Mapping Tehran and the Untimeliness of Documentary 
The lost hope that emerges in Under the Skin of the City is taken up and explored 
further in Bani-E‘temad‘s Ruzegār-e mā…[Our Times…] (2002). Identified by the 
Iranian journal Film as one of the most important cinematic events of 2002 (Jalili 2002: 
18), Our Times… is a documentary that examines the period immediately preceding the 
Khatami‘s reelection in 2001. This film shares common concerns with Under the Skin of 
the City; in particular it represents Khatami‘s Reformist Movement alongside housing 
crises in the south of Tehran and within the context of documentary filmmaking. These 
points of intersection between the two films enable a productive comparison that exposes 
Bani-E‘temad‘s critique of the Reformist Movement. In other words, these two films are 
meant to be complementary texts that work together first to reveal the political hope, 
necessitated by an urban experience, that underpinned the Reformist Movement‘s popular 
rise and later to reorganize one‘s understanding of how the Reformist Movement failed to 




underscoring the spatial and geographic features Tehran as a means of resisting the 
traditional chronological and temporal markers that guide a viewer‘s understanding of 
documentary. As a result of this reconfiguration of time, Bani-E‘temad freezes time as a 
powerful statement on the Reformist Movement‘s inability to progress or enact reform.  
Our Times… comprises two seemingly disjointed parts. In the first section, Bani-
Etemad follows a group of young people campaigning for Khatami. Many Iranians were 
disillusioned with Khatami after his first term in office. He was unable to create the 
changes he had promised because his efforts were blocked by conservative forces. As a 
result, the young campaigners meet resistance at every turn. However, in spite of these 
challenges, they are ultimately successful and the film‘s first section ends with Khatami‘s 
re-election. In the second part of the film, Bani-E‘temad tracks down the forty-eight 
women who had registered to run for president that year. The Guardian Council discarded 
their names because women in Iran, although able to run for parliament, may not seek the 
office of president. Bani-E‘temad interviews several of them but focuses the bulk of this 
part of the film on one of them, a woman named Arezu. The director follows Arezu as 
she scourers the city looking for an apartment because she is being evicted from her 
current residence. Arezu‘s effort is complicated by the fact that she is an extremely poor, 
young, single mother, who has no husband to petition on her behalf. Only twenty-five 
years-old, she was married twice before, both times to heroin addicts. She eventually 
finds a new living arrangement, but the film ends as she returns to her job the next day to 




Determining a relationship between these two disparate parts represents one of the 
film‘s greatest challenges. How does one make sense of a film that begins as a 
documentary about the 2001 elections and ends as a documentary about one woman‘s 
attempt to find a place to live? The filmmaker, who provides Our Times… with a 
narrative voice, initially suggests a chronological structure. In a transitional scene that 
shows the director driving through the busy streets of Tehran, Bani-Etemad says that she 
is worried that her daughter will have questions that she won‘t be able to answer. She 
never identifies the nature of these hypothetical questions, but the camera continues to 
follow Bani-Etemad during her drive and the viewer gets the sense that she is moving 
forward searching for these answers.  
The film‘s second section begins with the sound of interviews being arranged; the 
image shifts to an office scene before quickly returning to Bani-Etemad in her car as 
several more interviews are lined up by cell phone. The repeated use of footage of the 
director in her car suggests that these interviews, and the entire second part, take place 
after the car ride and therefore well after the elections. The viewer makes sense of the 
disjointedness of the film by constructing a chronological reading facilitated in large part 
by this transition. The election in the first part of the film raises questions and as a result 
the documentarian collects visible evidence in the second section to answer these 
questions. The construction of this kind of argument conforms to viewers‘ expectations 




However, during the course of the second section, Bani-Etemad unravels the 
chronological structure that the viewer has come to accept. As the central character, 
Arezu, searches for a house, news of the upcoming elections slowly permeate the film‘s 
background. Well into her story, Arezu buys a paper and the camera focuses on the 
headline, which reads ―A vote for Khatami is a vote for Reform.‖ Later, a radio 
announces that there are ―Only a few more days left until the election, and the candidates 
have started their campaigning efforts…‖  Because in Iran candidates have a limited 
campaigning period, this announcement suggests that perhaps the two sections of the film 
are not even synchronic and that Arezu‘s story, despite occupying the second position in 
the film, actually commences before the first section. The second section, like the first, 
ends on Election Day. As a result, the viewer is forced to recognize the overlap of time 
and as a result must question the argument-based structuring process that Bani-E‘temad 
claims for her project.  
In the absence of a linear structure, Our Times… interpretation through Tehran‘s 
topology. The city‘s structure depends on a spatial and social stratification that emerges 
along the city‘s horizontal axis to divide this urban space into clear north and south 
divisions. This division, geographer Ali Mandanipour notes, represents ―the main feature 
of the city‘s spatial structure.‖
81
 The city‘s middle- and upper-class residents live almost 
exclusively in the northern half of the city, which is settled comfortably at the base of the 
Alborz Mountains and enjoys ―a wide range of social and physical privileges over the 
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 Geographically, these benefits include ―a more diverse skyline and a 
degree of visual supremacy over the south,‖ better flood control, and a more moderate 
climate.
83
 The desirability of this space means that the northern part of the city comes 
with ―larger houses, lower densities, higher land prices, smaller households, higher rates 
of literacy and employment, higher concentrations of modern facilities and 
amenities,….more green space…a better water supply and a higher defensive value.‖
84
 
Throughout the twentieth century, city planning efforts—lead by three consecutive 
governments—reinforced this divide.
85
 Therefore, the affluent districts of the north and 
the poor districts of the south are separated by an insurmountable social and physical gap. 
And this polarization remains ―clearly visible in Tehran.‖
86
  
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s work, as viewable medium, both captures this visually 
inscribed urban feature and is informed by it. While the first part of the film (about the 
young campaigners) takes place in North Tehran, the second part unfolds in the southern 
part of the city. This sets up a series of juxtapositions that confirm the visual supremacy 
of the North. The film‘s representation of the North consists of scenes that show 
greenery, planned pedestrian spaces, and striking panoramic views of the cityscape. On 
the other hand, the film‘s focus on South Tehran emphasizes the lack of green space, an 
absence of pedestrian resources, and the dilapidation of physical structures. 
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These visual disparities are compounded temporally: the first section on the North 
of Tehran lasts eighteen minutes and the second section is three times as long. This 
distribution of time mimics the city‘s population. The North of Tehran, as a privileged 
area, consists of a much smaller number of people, while the South is bigger in terms of 
both land space and density. Although the second part of the film tells one woman‘s 
story, it is representative of a much broader experience. The social and economic 
struggles that Our Times… portrays in the south of city apply to a large number of 
people. However, the film‘s first section documents a narrow experience open to a 
specific class of young Tehranis who have the financial resources and support to engage 
in campaigning efforts. In light of the horizontal axis that the film visually and 
temporally sketches, it is worth reconsidering the transitional scene that connects the 
film‘s two parts. The shots of the director driving in her car, more than just representing a 
mystic search for the truth, suggests relocation and physical movement as she repositions 
her documentary subject in the South.  
By laying her narrative structure over a map of Tehran‘s north-south divide, 
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad encourages a comparative perspective that illuminates how the 
political process that she is portraying plays out in these two distracts. The northern part 
of the city is alive with excitement about the upcoming elections. The campaigners are 
engaging people in political debates; the streets are covered in posters and other 
campaigning materials; and there are rallies in which Khatami addresses a stadium full of 




the background at best. They make appearances only in the form of a brief radio 
announcement, a newspaper headline, and a few scattered posters. The people in this part 
of the film are uninvolved and seemingly uninterested in the political system. For this 
reason, it is easy to overlook the lack of a linear chronological structure. In contrast to the 
heightened political activity of the first section, the political apathy of the second signals 
the absence of elections.   
However, the most startling difference between the two parts of the city (and the 
film) involves the acquisition of private space. Arezu‘s story in the film is marked by an 
inability to locate housing for her family. This struggle and her frustrations are shown on 
screen for almost an hour. However, the first part of Our Times… opens with the young 
campaigners cleaning and setting up their headquarters. They easily secure an office on a 
quiet residential street to use as the base for their campaigning efforts. This space is 
crucial to their political participation; without it, they would be unable to organize their 
campaigning strategies. By the same logic, Arezu‘s lack of private space prohibits her 
political participation. Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad selects Arezu as a documentary subject 
because she was one of the few women to register to run for president. When asked why 
she wanted to become president, Arezu identifies a number of social and economic 
problems that plague poor communities in Tehran. Ironically, she is unable to participate 
in the very process for which she registered. In the end, Arezu is so consumed by her 
search for housing that she does not even have time to vote. At once, then, her urban 




Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s geographic structure allows us to contemplate a notion 
of documentary time. Because documentaries construct arguments about the lived, 
historical world and establish what Bill Nichols calls ―discourses of sobriety‖ that 
imagine their relationship to the real as ―imminent,‖
87
 one might assume by extrapolation 
that documentary time is necessarily real time. However, Our Times…comprises two 
disjointed parts that overlap chronologically and refuse temporal cohesion. The film is 
premised on an argument and a reasoning logic that depends on linear progression that is 
ultimately and paradoxically unsupported by its visual evidence. This documentary‘s 
temporality is, in fact, untimely. This concept of ―untimeliness‖ has gained moment 
recently in discussions of critical theory. Wendy Brown, who has played a crucial role in 
the articulation of this model, argues that untimliness offers ―a different sense of the 
times and a different sense of time‖
88
 Our Times…challenges the viewer‘s conception of 
time in order to challenge his or her understanding of the times. The film‘s title, Ruzegār-
e mā…[Our Times…], plays with thgis idea further by serving as an umbrella category 
for multiple narratives that are far from unified, and the director‘s opening commentary 
emphasizes this difference. She says, ―Spring 2001: Strange, stormy days. The 8
th
 
Presidential Elections in Iran. I intended to make a record of that era, but where should I 
start? From what point of view? Society was filled with fear and hope, doubt and trust.‖  
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Brown argues that ―untimeliness deployed as an effective intellectual strategy, far 
from being a gesture of indifference to time, is a bid to reset time.‖
89
 It is through her 
efforts to reset time that Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad visualizes her critique of the Reformist 
Movement. By holding time still, she suggests the lack of progression, and especially 
improvement or reform. Khatami‘s election to the presidency in 1997 represented more 
than just a change in political power; it also marked a semantic shift. Phrases like ―civil 
society‖ and ―democracy‖ replaced the revolutionary rhetoric popular in the Republic 
during its first twenty years. However, his first term proved unsuccessful in delivering the 
changes that these concepts promised. In fact, in four years, none of the country‘s 
economic and social problems had been addressed. By holding time constant and making 
geography a variable, Bani-E‘temad made her film undeniably local, inextricable from 
the very city it depicts. By fixing the viewer‘s gaze on the city of Tehran, she stages a 
confrontation with its problems. Khatami focused much of his energy on repairing Iran‘s 
global reputation through concepts like a ―dialogue of civilizations.‖ However, Bani-
Etemad‘s film brings to focus the local economic problems that were for many Iranians 
more urgent.  
Bani-E‘temad‘s effort to hold time still resonates with Walter Benjamin‘s concept 
of the ―Angel of History,‖ Thesis IX in ―Theses on the Philosophy of History‖ (1940). 
Benjamin imagines a construction of history in which we look backwards while being 
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propelled forward by a ―storm‖ called ―progress.‖
90
Inspired by a Paul Klee painting 
called ―Angelus Novus,‖ the Angel of History is caught between the momentum forwards 
and backwards and held momentarily at a standstill.  Khatami‘s Reformist Movement 
was similarly stuck: constantly staring back at the Revolution, unable to look away  but at 
the same time pushed forward by its own desire to progress. Bani-E‘temad‘s Our Times… 
demonstrates that for the Reformist Movement the tension between past and the future 
resulted in a static present.  
 
Conclusion 
 Under the Skin of the City and Our Times… together articulate a political hope 
that is discovered and later lost in the urban desires that once gave force to the Reformist 
Movement. The almost messianic quality of the Reformist Movement that emerges when 
Tuba announces, ―Someone has come to save us, and I am here to vote‖ gives way to 
near negation when Arezu is unable first to run for president and later to cast a vote. 
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s cinematic unraveling of the dreams and desires that 
paradoxically grounded and destabilized Khatami‘s movement endowed the reformist 
aesthetic with a new sense of space and time, wherein Tehran functions as a site of 
constant change and never-ending unchange. These spatial and temporal reconfigurations 
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recover economic, political, and social urgencies that exist on coordinate planes separate 
from a Reformist Myth.  
 Bani-E‘temad‘s political assessment in Under the Skin of the City and Our 
Times… betrays a cinematic relationship with Mohammad Khatami and his Reformist 
Movement that is much deeper than just modes of critique. Both films depict and criticize 
the political process, and this level of representation is unprecedented in modern Iranian 
history. By relaxing the codes of cultural control and inaugurating artistic forums for 
open political debate and critique, Khatami made significant strides towards the ideals of 
democracy and civil society that he envisioned. Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the 
City and Our Times…—despite their criticism of the Reformist Movement—are, 
therefore, representatives of a group of Iranian films that participated in the formation, 





A Genre of the Second of Khordād 
 
 
In 1998 eighteen-year-old director Samira Makhmalbaf, daughter of Mohsen 
Makhmalbaf, wowed international film audiences with her debut film Sib [Apple] (1998). 
Her presence at Cannes that year made her the youngest director ever to participate in the 
official section of the film festival. Apple tells the story of eleven-year-old twin girls, 
Massumeh and Zahra Naderi, who have been kept indoors their entire lives. Their 
parents, a blind woman and unemployed man, attempt to overcome their 
disempowerment by exerting excess control over their daughters‘ lives, and especially 
their access to the outside world. Concerned neighbors alert social workers, who 
intervene on behalf of the girls, and the film covers their entrance into the real world. 
Apple, which is based on real events and features the involved parties, examines issues of 
entrapment, isolation and confinement, and it considers the individual psychological 
effects that these modes of control impart upon their victims. For example, because of 
their confinement, Massumeh and Zahra have a limited ability to communicate in 
Persian. Instead, the girls have developed a language between themselves, a linguistic 
system that keeps them further isolated at the same time that it protects them. We also see 
the girls‘ reaction to seeing their reflection in a mirror for the first time, and we watch 




but also freedom. All of these features in the film demonstrate the ways in which 
confinement has profoundly affected the formation of the girls‘ individual identities, both 
linguistic and social.  
Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the film‘s writer and editor, has suggested that this 
individual narrative is an allegory for much bigger circumstances, and he describes the 
real-life events that inspired the film as ―the story of our nation…We have all been kept 
in a cave by our fathers. We can‘t even look at the sun.‖
1
 Hamid Dabashi notes that 
Makhmalbaf made this observation immediately following Khatami‘s election in 1997, 
and from this statement one might extrapolate that the film‘s hope—the fact that the girls 
do, in the end, see the sunlight and discover their freedom—reflects the hope of the 
Reformist Movement. Indeed, Dabashi claims that Samira Makhmalbaf‘s film ―may 
serve as the manifesto‖ for the director‘s generation, who was deeply invested in 
Khatami‘s reforms as a post-ideological movement.
2
 Indeed, it is the central thesis of this 
dissertation that certain filmmakers in Iran aesthetically engaged Khatami‘s Reformist 
Movement and transformed individualized experiences into metaphors for the hope and 
the disappointment that the Movement ushered into the country. In Samira Makhmalbaf‘s 
Apple, one can discern the contours of this reformist aesthetic, and Makhmalbaf‘s 
statement and Dabashi‘s interpretation point to the possibilities and insights that emerge 
when reform is used as a tool for analyzing a particular set of Iranian films.  
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This chapter further explores these possibilities by proposing a ―Genre of the 
Second of Khordād,‖ a category of films grounded in Khatami‘s unexpected victory on 2 
Khordād 1376/23 May 1997. I begin with an analysis of Abbas Kiarostami‘s films Ta’m-
e gilās [Taste of Cherry] (1997) and Dah [Ten] (2002) and argue that the Reformist 
Movement significantly altered this well-established director‘s aesthetic. I conclude by 
examining Bahman Farmanara‘s Bu-ye kāfur, ‘atr-e yās [The Smell of Camphor, the 
Scent of Jasmine] (2001), a film that redefines the Iranian intellectual in reformist terms. 
While the relationship between Samira Makhmalbaf‘s Apple and the Reformist 
Movement is more contextual than textual, the films that form the basis of this chapter‘s 
analysis are directly tied to Khatami. By focusing my analysis in this way, I hope to 
determine precisely the qualities of this genre and determine a reformist model that might 
be later applied to other films with less explicit connections to Khatami and his Reformist 
Movement. 
 
Theorizing a Genre of the Second of Khordād 
 As Khatami‘s first term came to an end, film critic Nimā Hassaninasab published 
an article called ―Zhānr-e dovom-e khordād‖ [Genre of the Second of Khordād] in Film, 
Iran‘s foremost film studies journal. In this article, Hassaninasab suggests that Khatami‘s 
first term as president profoundly impacted Iranian cinema, and he notes that ―everyone 
who has been following cinematic production for the last two decades agrees that some of 




after the appearance of the present [i.e. Khatami‘s] government.‖
3
 Hassaninasab 
provocatively proposes that these films together constitute a new genre, which he calls 
the Genre of the Second of Khordād.  2 Khordād 1376/23 May 1997 was the day that 
Khatami was elected for the first time, but that date came to represent something much 
bigger in Iranian society. Following Khatami‘s victory, he and his followers became 
known as jonbesh-e dovom-e khordād or the Second of Khordād Movement. For many 
Iranians, the reforms that Khatami promised represented a new beginning in the Islamic 
Republic, and by memorializing the date of his election in this way, this segment of 
Iranian society sought to reset its historical clock and generate a new starting point. 
Hassaninasab‘s clever name carries this meaning as well. The Genre of the Second of 
Khordād similarly functions as a new point of periodization, one that marks a new period 
of aesthetics. While the Second of Khordād Movement represents political change, the 
Genre of the Second of Khordād points to artistic innovation. Hassaninasab‘s 
classification suggests that cinema can do more than represent politics. A cinematic trend 
can also reshape itself vis-à-vis a particular political system.  
 According to Hassaninasab, the films that constitute the Genre of the Second of 
Khordād are bound together by their ―engagement with themes that had previously been 
forgotten or unattainable.‖
4
 Broadly surveying many of the films that were released 
during Khatami‘s first term, he outlines a number of new themes, including immigration, 
marginalization, love triangles, and unanswered needs of the youth, but he focuses the 
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bulk of his analysis on four areas that best represent the thematic developments in Iranian 
cinema during the first four years of Khatami‘s presidency. Hassaninasab observes that 
following the Revolution, the dearth of political films represented a huge absence in 
Iranian cinema, one that was overcome in the films released during Khatami‘s first term, 
in which one sees a rise in political content.
5
 Similarly, during this period parts of Iranian 
cinema began engaging critically the Iran-Iraq War. Khatami‘s cultural openness and the 
passage of time allowed filmmakers for the first time to represent the war in a critical 
way and especially to consider the devastating effect it had on an entire generation of 
young people in Iran.
6
 The Iran-Iraq War helped shape Iranian cinema in the post-
Revolution period, because much of the government‘s support of cinema (including 
financial incentives and training initiatives) were initiated to create propaganda for the 
war efforts, intended to raise morale and support for the war. The fact that certain 
filmmakers go back during Khatami‘s presidency and rewrite the filmic history of 
representing this war marks a significant cinematic reform.  
During these four years, Iranian cinema witnessed in unprecedented ways a 
corpus of stories that ―engage earthly love and premarital relationships.‖
7
  Filmmakers 
had previously broached these topics, and notable examples include Makhmalbaf‘s Time 
for Love and Rakhshan Bani-Etemad‘s Narges [Narges] (1991) and Rusari-ye ābi [The 
Blue Scarf] (1993). However, this period marked the first time that the issue of love (and 
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especially earthly love) met popular acceptance,
8
 a radical shift from the public backlash 
that Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love sparked less than a decade earlier. Increased attention 
on screen to social and romantic relations similarly demanded more time devoted to 
women on screen and the development of more complex female characters. Hassaninasab 
argues that the second of Khordād made possible a more diverse set of permissible 
female characters. He notes, for example, the shocking image of a woman holding a knife 
on the film poster for Qermez [Red] (1998) by director Fereydun Jirani.
9
 Many films 
from this period are interested in the daily lives of women and promote their roles within 
society and not just within the family. This kind of variety, which does not necessarily 
limit itself to the ―ideal‖ Muslim woman, would have been problematic during the first 
two decades of the Islamic Republic.
10
 
 The argument that the Genre of the Second of Khordād comprises films with new 
set of shared concerns hinges on the notion that Khatami‘s liberal cultural policies made 
possible the rise of these thematic developments. For Hassaninasab, the Genre of the 
Second of Khordād offers the opportunity to consider what films are about and what their 
stories tell when filmmakers are less restricted in what they can and cannot represent.
11
 In 
Hassaninasab‘s schema, the films that constitute the Genre of the Second of Khordād are 
tied to the Reformist Movement because they were made possible by the open cultural 
atmosphere that Khatami‘s presence created. However, the present chapter attempts to 
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build on Hassaninasab‘s concept and incisive analysis in order to propose a broader 
understanding of the Genre of the Second of Khordād. This chapter argues that a Genre 
of the Second of Khordād, whose name is grounded in the very birth of the Reformist 
Movement, must be in dialogue ideologically and philosophically with Khatami and his 
policies. Additionally, our definition of this genre must account for more than just 
thematic developments, and should also attempt to delineate formal and structural 
changes that took place in the films that were created during this period. My analysis of 
two films by ‗Abbas Kiarostami and one film by Bahman Farmanara will attempt to 
theorize the Genre according to these terms. Hassaninasab‘s analysis proves 
tremendously useful to this task because without these thematic innovations, the 
ideological connections and resulting structural and technological developments would 
have never been possible.  
 
New Roads, New Directions 
On May 18, 1997, five days before Mohammad Khatami‘s landslide electoral 
victory, Abbas Kiarostami‘s film Ta’m-e gilās [Taste of Cherry] (1997) momentously 
won the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival. Although Iranian cinema had 
previously enjoyed much success at international festivals, this award marked its first 
major win, and it catapulted Iranian cinema and Abbas Kiarostami onto the international 
film scene in unprecedented ways. However, film critics and scholars soon began 




for example, wrote a critical review12 of the film, which Mehrnaz Saeed-Vafa has 
positioned as the critic‘s commentary on the political nature of the film‘s win at 
Cannes.
13
 Azadeh Farahmand similarly argues that ―Kiarostami‘s The Taste of Cherry 
won the Palme d‘Or at Cannes in 1997, the year that Khatami was elected Iran‘s 
president, his image as a moderate leader circulating in the western Media.‖14As Hamid 
Reza Sadr points out, Time magazine further solidified the connection between Reformist 
politics and Kiarostami‘s film when it selected Taste of Cherry as one of the ten best 
films of the year and in the same issue praised Khatami for his willingness to engage in 
international dialogue.
15
 Time‘s (perhaps unintentional) suggestion that both Khatami‘s 
―dialogue among civilizations‖ and Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry attempted to engage 
Iran globally in similar ways hints at a deep ideological relationship that has yet to be 
fully excavated. I argue that Abbas Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry, although seemingly 
apolitical, reflects the philosophical crises that Khatami‘s Reformist Movement 
ultimately sought to reconcile, and the film participates in a new popular discourse that 
culminated with Khatami‘s political platform.  
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Abbas Kiarostami is one of a handful of directors who has remained steadily 
productive both before and after the Revolution. Born in 1940, Kiarostami came of age at 
a unique time in Iran‘s history. He was born a year before the Allied invasion of Iran and 
the 1950s and 1960s marked a golden age of Persian poetry in the country. Hamid 
Dabashi identifies the uniqueness of mid-century Iran as a having a profound effect of 
Kiarostami‘s professional and artist life.16 In 1968, he enrolled in the School of Fine Arts 
at Tehran University, where he studied painting and design and worked as a traffic guard, 
no doubt influencing his cinematic interest in roads and traffic. Following his graduation, 
he began working in advertising, creating posters and commercials, and in 1969 he 
established a filmmaking department within the Institute for Intellectual Development of 
Children and Young Adults, which would ultimately produce his first film, Nān va 
kucheh [Bread and Alley] (1970), a twelve-minute neo-realist film about a boy‘s 
encounter with an aggressive dog. Since that time, Kiarostami has regularly released 
films, and his long career within Iran suggests that he is a perceptive and adaptive artist. 
His film Taste of Cherry observes and documents a society in change, as a new reformist 
discourse attempted to repair the discontent with the revolution that had washed over the 
country.  
Taste of Cherry is a minimalist film that follows Mr. Badi‘i as he circles the dusty 
outskirts of Tehran in his Land Rover. He drives almost aimlessly looking for someone to 
bury him after he commits suicide. During the course of his travels, he picks up three 
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men: a Kurdish soldier, an Afghan seminary student, and an Azeri taxidermist. To each 
of his passengers, Mr. Badi‘i offers a considerable sum of money to come to the grave 
site he has prepared for himself in order to cover him with dirt. All three men are visibly 
uncomfortable with the frankness of Mr. Badi‘i‘s offer. Each passenger reacts to Mr. 
Badi‘i differently, their responses conditioned by their varying ages and social 
perspectives. The young Kurdish soldier is made so uncomfortable that he just jumps out 
of the car while it is still moving. The seminary student attempts to dissuade Mr. Badi‘i 
by offering Islam‘s perspective on suicide. The taxidermist, who is a bit older and more 
experienced, offers his own experiences overcoming despair in order to convince Mr. 
Badi‘i to put off his plans and wait for something better. However, once he sees that the 
protagonist is unwilling to change his outlook, the taxidermist reluctantly accepts the 
offer so that he can pay his sick daughter‘s medical bills.  
However, the film‘s final scenes unravel the certainty of Mr. Badi‘i‘s plans. The 
viewer sees Mr. Badi‘i outside of his car for the first time as he tracks down the 
taxidermist at work. Mr. Badi‘i requests that the taxidermist shake and throw rocks at him 
to ensure that he is dead, because it is possible he will just be sleeping. This request is 
followed by uncertain and voyeuristic images of Mr. Badi‘i‘s shadow in his apartment 
that do not clearly indicate whether or not the protagonist takes the pills to kill himself. 
The uncertain momentum comes to a head when the scene changes to reveal Mr. Badi‘i 
lying in his uncovered grave, and the viewer is confronted with the possibility that he or 




the film abruptly destabilizes the viewer‘s investment in Mr. Badi‘i‘s decision when 
Kiarostami calls cut and the actor playing Mr. Badi‘i stands up and begins interacting 
with the film crew. This coda powerfully reminds the viewer of the film‘s fictionality, 
and it accords with other efforts by Kiarostami, in which he draws attention to cinema‘s 
delicate balance between fiction and reality.  
Despite this point of consistency between this film and Kiarostami‘s previous 
works, Taste of Cherry also marks a significant departure from the director‘s earlier 
aesthetic. These points of difference coincide meaningfully (and not coincidentally) with 
features of the Reformist aesthetic that I have described so far. In particular, Taste of 
Cherry was unique at the time of its release for its urban focus. Kiarostami‘s neorealist 
style had previously depended on and drew inspiration from rural environments and 
settings. However, with Taste of Cherry the director reorients his camera to an urban 
perspective as he maps a set of concerns specific to a Tehran-based intellectual class. 
Additionally, although Kiarostami has a longstanding interest in the journey as a 
narrative strategy, Taste of Cherry‘s emphasis on the circular journeys is unique to this 
film and central to its examination of an urban intellectual class. These circular journeys, 
which differ from the more linear-based treks that defined Kiarostami‘s earlier films, 
resonate with the Sufi journeys popular in Iranian cinema in the early 1990s.  
Although these aspects of the film play into a larger Reformist aesthetic, the film 
furthers our understanding of a Genre of the Second of Khordād by representing two of 




Cherry participates in the global transmission of culture (through film festivals like 
Cannes) while also stressing the importance of this kind of exchange. I similarly suggest 
that the film addresses the Reformist Movement‘s most basic philosophical question: 
how does one reconcile a revolutionary and Islamic political system with more tempered 
reformist democratic ideals? This argument hinges on the idea that both Taste of Cherry 
and Mohammad Khatami‘s Reformist Movement are reactions to popular concern in Iran 
in the late 1990s, and as such they are products of a particular socio-political moment and 
ideologically tied to one another.  
Scholars have paid great attention to Kiarostami‘s use of the journey as a 
narrative structure.17 Most of these analyses aptly draw attention to the Persian poetic 
tradition and the significance of the quest to Sufi philosophical thought. Film critic 
Godfrey Cheshire, for example, draws on the ideas of Iran scholar Henry Corbin, to trace 
Kiarostami‘s allegorical journey back to the eleventh century. He contends that Persian 
philosophers and poets at that time found themselves at a crossroad between East and 
West and their respective esoteric and empirical modes of thinking. It was in this context, 
Cheshire claims, that the quest became a spatialized metaphor for the philosophical 
inquiry and traversal of new geographies and worldviews.18 The implication of 
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Cheshire‘s argument is that the journey is a means through which Kiarostami navigates 
through and reconciles western and Iranian modes of storytelling, and the corollary of 
this conclusion is the importation of a western aesthetic onto an Iranian form in 
Kiarostami‘s films.19  
David Orgeron significantly moves beyond the unilateral limits of the crossroads 
metaphor and instead casts Kiarostami‘s films and specifically Taste of Cherry into a 
different kind of traffic terminology. He suggests that Taste of Cherry promotes cultural 
exchange as a two-way street.20 Building off of Kiarostami‘s famous 1992 claim that 
films rank among pistachios, carpets, and oil as Iran‘s most significant exports,21 Orgeron 
argues that the ―language of imports and exports…is the language of traffic,‖ and  ―Taste 
of Cherry clearly testifies against the one-way movement of this traffic.‖22 Although 
Taste of Cherry might, as Kiarostami‘s critics have claimed, qualify as ―export-ready,‖ it 
is also ―a film about reclaiming or returning to the local and the dangers of a culture that 
too readily embraces ‗exports.‘‖23  
Orgeron underscores global cultural transmission in Taste of Cherry by drawing 
our attention to a particularly witty moment in the film. Mr. Badi‘i chats with a man 
whose job is to collect empty plastic bags in the dusty wastelands outside of Tehran. The 
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man‘s shirt clearly reads U-C-L-A. This moment in the film clearly draws the viewer‘s 
attention to the far-reaching power of American culture. After all, even a trash collector 
in an abandoned construction site outside of Tehran carries a proclamation of American 
culture on his person. But Orgeron also aptly notes that this moment in the film ―is also a 
reference to the film-school culture that has deemed Kiarostami auteur of the moment.‖24 
This example highlights for Orgeron Taste of Cherry‘s commentary that displacement 
and dislocation are regular features of the human condition. The journey—and traffic in 
particular—becomes within this order an attempt to overcome this social, spatial, and 
temporal detachment by enabling social, cultural, and, I would argue, political relations 
and communities.  
Orgeron sees the isolation born of Kiarostami‘s ―mournful journeys‖ as 
representative of a broad category of human alienation. However, it is possible to narrow 
Orgeron‘s theoretical framework to suggest that Taste of Cherry‘s treatment of alienation 
is a cinematic recreation of the sense of isolation that Iran was experiencing in the late 
1990s. Mohammad Khatami‘s political platform, which sought to appeal to and engaging 
with a global community, appealed to an Iranian populous that had grown discontent with 
the isolating policies created first by the Revolution and later by the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic. As I shall demonstrate, Khatami‘s concept of a ―Dialogue among 
Civilizations,‖ presented to the United Nations for the first time in 1998, conceives of 
intercultural exchange in terms similar to Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry.  
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Mohammad Khatami‘s address to the UNESCO Roundtable on the ―Dialogue 
among Civilizations‖ on September 5, 2000 represents one of his most pointed 
descriptions of this concept, which he introduced to the United Nations two years earlier. 
During this speech, he aims to outline the ―historical, theoretical, and, for the most part, 
non-political grounds for the call to dialogue among civilizations.‖25 Khatami begins his 
speech by highlighting Iran‘s ―exceptional‖ geographic location, a position that has put 
the nation ―on a route of political hurricanes as well as pleasant breezes, of cultural 
exchange and also venues for international trade.‖26 Like Taste of Cherry, Khatami offers 
a spatial model for understanding and encouraging cultural, political, and economic 
exchange. He likens the ―movement of ideas and culture‖ to the natural and persistent 
―migration of birds.‖27 This focus on movement, the transmission of culture and ideas, 
recalls a statement that Kiarostami made about the representations of the journeys in his 
films. He said, ―The journey is very important to me… you don‘t know how far they 
go…where they lead, and you don‘t know where they end. But it‘s important just to be 
moving.‖ In this schema, movement becomes a means through which connections are 
made and ground—whether physical or metaphoric—is traversed.  
In the absence of global dialogue, Khatami warns of the imminent possibility of 
―cultural homelessness,‖ which would ―deprive people of solace both in their own culture 
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and in the vast open horizon of global culture.‖28 His speech thereby touches on the same 
anxieties about isolation and dislocation that Kiarostami‘s film represents. As a way past 
this sense of alienation, Khatami suggests that we ―seek new ways for human life‖ by 
aiming for a ―meta-historical discussion of eternal human questions.‖ This kind of 
discourse, Khatami proposes, will allow us to move beyond the ―historical horizon‖ that 
all human beings ―inevitably‖ inhabit. He offers ―the ultimate meaning of life and death, 
goodness and evil‖ as two possibilities.29 Significantly, Taste of Cherry creates a sense of 
empathy regarding issues of life and death, and transmits Iranian attitudes towards 
suicide to a global audience.  
Azadeh Farahmand argues that Kiarostami‘s films allow Western audiences to 
remain ―cold, detached observers‖ by forcing identification with a ―middleman,‖ whose 
own distance from the film‘s subjects protects the viewer ―from any shock, unpleasant 
encounter or guilty conscience.‖30 However, Taste of Cherry, which repeatedly places the 
viewer in the middle of conversations about suicide, overturns Farahmand‘s theory and 
suggests that the opposite may be true. Far from being absolved of a guilty conscience, 
the viewer of Taste of Cherry is traumatically reminded of his or her lack of agency with 
regard to Mr. Badi‘i‘s suicide. Throughout the film, the camera‘s position, which 
switches between the driver‘s seat and the passenger‘s seat, puts the viewer in the middle 
of the exchanges about suicide that take place between Mr. Badi‘i and his passengers. 
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Because the audience never gets much information about Mr. Badi‘i or his motivations, 
the viewer is made to identify with the various passengers. As a result, the viewer is 
forced into the uncomfortable and passive position of knowing about Mr. Badi‘i‘s 
suicidal plans but remaining unable to intervene. This filming technique, which inserts 
global audiences (through events like film festivals) in the middle of Iranian discussions 
about life and death, serve Khatami‘s call for a dialogue about the ―fundamentals,‖ a 
discussion that will replace ―misunderstanding and confusion‖ with ―empathy and 
compassion.‖31 
Khatami stresses the role of the artist in intercultural dialogue and the creation of 
empathy and compassion. He praises artists for not seeing ―the sea, mountain and forest 
as mere mines and sources of energy, oil and fuel.‖ According to Khatami, ―artists 
engage in dialogue within and through the sacred language of spirit and morality‖ and 
their ―language has remained safe from the poisonous winds of time,‖ even in ―a 
world…thoroughly controlled by political, military and economic conditions.‖32 Art is 
therefore at the center of Khatami‘s call to global dialogue and artists on the frontline of 
this exchange. Hamid Reza Sadr suggests that Khatami‘s ―strategy was no secret: he 
wanted to use cinema, sport and other cultural avenues to improve the country‘s 
standing.‖33 Sadr further indicates that filmmaking, which had been ―nurtured by 
Khatami‖ during his tenure as Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance was at the 
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forefront of this process. Certainly, Taste of Cherry‘s success at the Cannes Film Festival 
participated in cultural exchange, both by touching international audiences and clearing 
the way for future successes on the international circuit. The film‘s participation in 
international festivals also foresaw a kind of cinematic cultural exchange that would be 
more clearly developed in subsequent years.  
In his article, ―Discovering Form, Inferring Meaning: New Cinemas and the Film 
Festival Circuit,‖ Bill Nichols writes specifically about post-revolutionary Iranian cinema 
in order to chart the experience of discovering ―new cinemas‖ on the international film 
festival circuit. He likens film festival audiences to ―tourists,‖ who are encouraged to 
―submerge‖ themselves in ―strange worlds,‖ in which they listen to ―unfamiliar 
languages‖ and observe ―unusual styles.‖34 This act of submersion, Nichols argues, 
initiates a process of ―recovering the strange as familiar,‖ which consists of two parts: 
―discovering form‖ and ―inferring meaning.‖35 While the former might include formal 
innovations or the degree to which a film conforms to or rejects the standards of 
Hollywood, the latter engages ―insights or lessons about different cultures.‖36 The effect 
of this process is that ―festival-goers…experience a precarious, ephemeral moment in 
which an imaginary coherence renders Iranian cinema no longer mysterious but still less 
than fully known.‖37 Nichols‘ theorization of the film festival experience confirm the 
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tenets of Khatami‘s ―Dialogue among Civilizations,‖ in which he identifies art as a 
crucial means through which cultures might make themselves more fully known to one 
another. 
There is historical evidence to suggest that filmmakers and enthusiasts picked up 
on Khatami‘s recommendation for a dialogue among civilizations. The Search for 
Common Ground (SFCC) organized a ―US-Iran Cinema Exchange‖ in 1999 with the 
collaboration of Iran‘s House of Cinema. The meetings to plan this exchange took place 
in Cannes in 1998 and 1999, and there is a clear geographic—and also an implicit 
philosophical—connection between these meetings and Kiarostami‘s win in 1997. 
Planners identified a number of events in both Iran and the United States at which Iranian 
and American representatives would be present.  While the impact of such an exchange 
on cultural dialogue is clear, the political exchange it facilitated is also noteworthy. As a 
part of the agreement, both parties agreed to facilitate entry visas, the US agreed to waive 
finger-printing for participants, and the possibility of equipment donations made through 
a third party was also suggested.38 Azadeh Farahmand suggests that these exchanges were 
―timely tools…for easing tension, and brining Iran-US contact to the surface through…a 
neutral and cultured medium.‖39 These successful exchanges were the culmination of 
Mohammad Khatami‘s call to international dialogue. At the same time, they were 
enabled by Abbas Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry, which promoted two-way exchange 
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through its representation of journeys and also brought Iranian cinema to international 
recognition with its participation in and success at important film festivals.40  
As previously suggested, Taste of Cherry engages a fundamental question about 
the meaning of life and death. Because of the universality of this issue, scholars have 
thoroughly examined the film as a philosophical statement that engages the fleeting 
nature of human life, and they have made connections to the commentaries on death in 
the literature of Iranian authors like ‗Omar Khayyam and Sadeq Hedayat.41 The Iranian 
government also took this candid discussion of suicide at face value. Saeed Zeydabadi-
Nejad indicates that the film‘s coda, which shows the actor who plays Mr. Badi‘i 
standing up from the grave and interacting with Kiarostami, was a move on the director‘s 
part to appease censors, who otherwise saw the film as promoting suicide.42 However, 
despite this kind of scholarly and governmental engagement with the film‘s 
representation of life, death, and suicide, Taste of Cherry betrays a sense that the issue of 
suicide is less the thrust of the film and more of a means through which Kiarostami 
probes a cross section of society. In other words, certain moments in the film suggest that 
Mr. Badi‘i‘s suicide is being used to access something bigger.  
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Laura Mulvey identifies this feature of the film in her discussion of Kiarostami‘s 
―uncertainty principle.‖ She describes this ‗uncertainty principle‘ as the way in which the 
director creates an aesthetic that is built on an assumption that ―the spectator‘s desire 
know and understand is heightened by a conscious sense of uncertainty about even the 
truth or reality of what seems to be happening.‖43 Mulvey notes that Mr. Badi‘i‘s story 
literally drives the narrative forward, but the viewer is left with the impression ―he—or 
Kiarostami—might be undertaking the whole exercise as a social experiment.‖44 She 
attributes this impression to the opaqueness of the film‘s main character and the obscurity 
of his reason for suicide. Certainly the lack of information that the viewer gets about Mr. 
Badi‘i contributes to this overall sense.  
However, there are also moments in which Kiarostami wryly casts doubt on both 
his own and the main character‘s intentions. For example, the seminary student invites 
Mr. Badi‘i to eat with him and a friend who has prepared a meal. Mr. Badi‘i declines the 
offer by saying, ―Thank you! I know he‘s cooked but eggs are bad for me. Some other 
time! Goodbye!‖ Both Mr. Badi‘i‘s concern for his health and his look to the future 
undermine and contradict the conversation he has just had about his upcoming plans to 
kill himself and the seminary student‘s beliefs about suicide. Later, as Mr. Badi‘i is 
driving the taxidermist to work, he pulls out into traffic. His passenger yells, ―What‘s 
wrong with you? Are you in a hurry to die?‖ At this point in the film, the viewer is well 
aware of the fact that Mr. Badi‘i is actually in a hurry to die. By including this line in the 
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film, Kiarostami positions the forthcoming suicide as joke-worthy, thereby lessening the 
severity or seriousness or the film‘s supposed premise.  
These ironic moments in the film invite the viewer to think outside of the 
narrative structure (i.e. Mr. Badi‘i‘s plans to kill himself) and contemplate a set of 
concerns related but not necessarily directly tied to the conversations that take place 
between the film‘s protagonist and his various passengers. These counter examples to Mr. 
Badi‘i‘s suicidal plans indicate—without necessarily devaluing the significance of the 
life/death discourse that the film establishes—that something else is at play with regard to 
the discussion of suicide.  I argue that Taste of Cherry is, as others have suggested, a 
philosophical inquiry but its stakes are not necessarily life or death; instead, the film 
undertakes the same philosophical project as Mohammad Khatami‘s Reformist 
Movement, attempting to reconcile a body of inherited policies with a contradictory set of 
future desires.  
Taste of Cherry‘s premise—a man looking for someone to bury him after he has 
committed suicide—offers a rather interesting paradox within an Iranian-Islamic context. 
On the one hand, suicide is considered a grave sin according to Islamic law, a fact 
emphasized in the film by the seminary student. A person who takes his own life is 
denied passage into paradise. On the other hand, burial is a rite of passage according to 
Islamic tradition and functions as one step in the process of gaining entrance into 
paradise. Whether or not someone who has committed suicide is eligible for a proper 




hadiths that indicate that during his own lifetime the Prophet Mohammad refused to 
perform funeral prayers for individuals who had committed suicide.45  Shari’a or Islamic 
law constitutes a spectrum, wherein mandatory and lawful actions (halāl) constitute one 
end, prohibited actions (harām) form the other end, and in between are actions, which are 
to varying degrees desirable or undesirable. Mr. Badi‘i‘s goal, suicide and burial, create 
tension between these two ends of the spectrum, and his foresight and intentionality strike 
the viewer as particularly strange.  
Ultimately, it is the tension that arises from Mr. Badi‘i‘s two-part pursuit (his 
suicide and subsequent burial) that cinematically recreates the Reformist Movement‘s 
most fundamental philosophical concern. Mohammad Khatami‘s moderate political 
platform, which encouraged concepts like global engagement, civil society and the rule of 
law, was in constant tension with the revolutionary system of governance that he both 
inherited and helped create. Olivier Roy, for example, argues that the biggest task that 
Khatami and his supports faced was secularizing a political system within a society that is 
culturally and socially invested in ―its heritage and origin: an Islamic Revolution.‖46 He 
also claims that in broader terms Khatami‘s election brought to light ―contradictions‖ 
about the relationship between religion and politics in the Iranian constitution.47  
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The contradictions in Khatami‘s political philosophy extend beyond the 
constitution itself and reach to his own leadership style. Keyvan Tabari notes that one of 
the great ―paradoxes‖ of Khatami‘s leadership, and especially his promotion of a rule of 
law, was that he claimed an ―open mind‖ while also working from the seat of a system 
that limits political participation to those individuals ―who pass a strict loyalty test.‖48 
Khatami‘s support of the Islamic Republic (as a governing system), the Iranian 
constitution, the velāyat-e faqih, and the at times the basij did not readily accord with his 
promise of open democracy and civil society. Indeed, Abdolkarim Soroush, who, 
according to Roy, provided a philosophical framework for Khatami‘s early work49, 
criticized Khatami for these contradictions. Soroush argues that Khatami‘s ―practical 
vacillation‖ was the result of ―theoretical vacillation.‖50 
These paradoxes, contradictions, and vacillations would ultimately open Khatami 
up to criticism. However, at the time that he was elected in 1997 (just days after Taste of 
Cherry‘s win at Cannes), the possibility of reconciling these competing desires brought 
hope to Iranian society. 51 Khatami‘s promise to pay homage to the Revolution of 1978-
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1979 while also moving the country forward appealed especially to a sense of stagnation 
and revolutionary discontent that came to a head in the country in the late 1990s. Taste of 
Cherry‘s great success is conveying this sense of stagnation while attempting to navigate 
through it. Like the Reformist Movement in 1997, the film attempts to represent the 
challenges of overcoming one‘s own history and suggests hope for the future. Within the 
film, this process is largely abstract, in the same way that the Reformist Movement and 
its initiatives were largely an abstraction at this point, and it is for this reason that Taste of 
Cherry forms an integral part of a Genre of the Second of Khordād.  
 Taste of Cherry constructs tension visually and conceptually through its 
representation of journeys. The film‘s visual structure depends on medium-shots of Mr. 
Badi‘i‘s Land Rover circling through the dusty outskirts of Tehran. These shots, which 
show the car making small circles and big circles, punctuate the main character‘s various 
conversations. In his study of the film, Marco Della Grassa has carefully charted the 
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Alberto Elena suggests that this schema is a meditative structure that forces the viewer to 
contemplate on the nature of the discussion that has just unfolded. 53 
However, Elena‘s explanation alone does not account for the images that the 
viewer sees on the screen during these contemplative periods, and he does not explain 
how theses visual clues impact the viewer‘s meditation. A substantial portion of the 
moments of silence is devoted to shots of Mr. Badi‘i circling. The film‘s visual structure 
is in direct contrast with its narrative. The film‘s dialogue, which focuses heavily on 
suicide, establishes a life-death continuum that forms a linear structure, intersecting and 
overlapping the visual structure‘s circularity. The journey to death as a linear process is 
underscored by the taxidermist, who warns, ―Life is like a train that keeps moving 
forward, and then reaches the end of the line, the terminal. And death waits at the 
terminal.‖ The character‘s use of a transportation metaphor is significant, because it 
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encourages a comparison with the circular journey that the car literally makes as he 
speaks. 
As previously suggested, the film‘s circular movements reference a Sufi journey, 
a quest whose destination ultimately becomes the experience of movement itself. 
However, Taste of Cherry‘s circularity also signifies Iranian history and especially the 
ways in which Iranian society has perceived its own history. One of the products of Iran‘s 
very long history is the cultural discernment of certain patterns and cycles. We might, for 
example, consider the fact that Iran‘s nationalist discourse in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century formed around revivals of the country‘s s pre-Islamic history and 
fixated on the fall of the Sassanian Empire after the Muslim conquest in 644.54 Similarly, 
Ayatollah Khomeini cast Iran‘s participation in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in terms of 
the Battle of Karbala, a seventh-century event that foreshadowed the division between 
Sunni sand Shi‘is and during.55 In addition to these revival efforts, there is a sense of 
repetition in Iran‘s modern history. The twentieth-century Iran experienced two 
revolutions, first the Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911) and later Islamic Revolution 
(1978-1979). 56 By the late 1990s, there was concern that the most recent revolution had 
failed to deliver on its promises, and there was also growing frustration that the country 
was stuck in cycles of political turmoil that failed to create change. A sense of stagnation 
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emerged from this cyclical history and made popular the revolutionary discontent that 
began developing the time of Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love and Dariush Mehrjui‘s 
Hāmun.  
Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry conveys this sense of stagnation to the viewer. 
Certainly, the tension between silence and dialogue (outlined above) contributes to this 
overall feeling. The long periods of silence encourage contemplation at the same time 
that they make the viewer restless and uncomfortable. The film also visually constructs 
stagnation with its setting, the function of which is never made entirely clear. This dirt-
filled space might be a construction site. We see heavy machinery, but piles of dirt are the 
only things being moved around or constructed. At one point, Mr. Badi‘i gets out of his 
car and the viewer only sees his shadow. A dump truck backs up and dumps a pile of dirt 
onto the shadow. The shot widens, and Mr. Badi‘i is covered in a cloud of dirt. Both he 
and his shadow are effectively buried. It is possible to read this scene as foreshadowing 
Mr. Badi‘i‘s suicide and his burial. However, a more fitting interpretation at this point in 
the film might stress the feeling of being buried alive, which captures the sense of futility 
that arose from the stagnation that Iranian society experienced at this time. Mr. Badi‘i 
stresses this feeling during his discussion with the seminary student. He says, ―There 
comes a time when a man can‘t go on. He is exhausted.‖ The character‘s sentiment 
resonates with the discontent of a generation, the origins of which we saw in films like 




The film‘s minor characters also contribute to the film‘s representation of 
stagnation and ineffectiveness. Mr. Badi‘i‘s first passenger, the Kurdish soldier, suggests 
that he is in a rush to return to the barracks. However, after a series of follow-up 
questions, the soldier admits that he is hastily making his return even though he is not 
required to report back for duty for at least another hour. Mr. Badi‘i points out 
ridiculousness of rushing back only to wait. The film‘s protagonist often seems to be in 
the position of pointing out the characters‘ inefficiency. At one point, he chats with an 
Afghani laborer, whom he invites for a ride in his Land Rover. However, the worker 
claims that he cannot leave his post even on a holiday, because he must ensure that no 
one steals the machinery. Mr. Badi‘i points out that the machine he is guarding is so big 
that no one could possibly steal it. However, the Afghani worker insists that he must 
remain in his watchtower. The film‘s main character also chats with a Lor,57 who collects 
plastic bags around the construction site. When Mr. Badi‘i asks him for a favor, the Lor 
replies, ―I just collect bags.‖ The man walks away and the title sequence begins. The 
ethnicity of these characters is significant. In this film, Kiarostami maps Iran‘s ethnic and 
cultural diversity, and he gives particular weight to those groups that have been 
marginalized. By showing these marginalized groups in the context of futility, the 
director demonstrates how far this sense of stagnation reaches. He positions it as a 
national condition.  
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The hope of the Reformist Movement—or perhaps the myth of the Reformist 
Movement—arose from a desire on the part of Iranian society to overcome this 
stagnation. By the mid-1990s, Iran found itself stuck in the historical circles that the film 
Taste of Cherry so powerfully depicts. Khatami‘s reformist platform offered a way out of 
this circular pattern by changing the popular discourse in the country. He offered a new 
vocabulary for discussing the changes that might help Iran to realize fully its Islamic 
Republic, a set of terms that stressed the ―republic‖ and built on the Islamic foundations 
put in place by Khomeini. Taste of Cherry picks up on this willingness to contemplate 
past decisions. The wise taxidermist, for example, tells Mr. Badi‘i, ―You think something 
is good, and then you realize you‘re wrong. The main thing is to think hard. You believe 
what you do is right but then you realize it is wrong.‖ Throughout Taste of Cherry, Mr. 
Badi‘i‘s fixation on suicide as a ―way out‖ is analogous to Khatami‘s promise to guide 
Iran to reform. As Mulvey and others have indicated, the character‘s interest in suicide 
functions more on the level of theory than praxis, and I argue that the discussion of 
suicide in the film allows Kiarostami to convey cinematically a longing for a ―way out‖ 
that has a broader appeal to Iranian history at this particular junction (i.e. during and 
preceding the 1997 elections).  
However, the Taste of Cherry‘s complexity emerges when one attempts to trace 
this metaphor to some end. The film features two narrative layers: one aural and one 
visual, one linear and one circular. It suggests that the linear journey between life and 




history. And yet the film confounds its own philosophical reasoning when the taxidermist 
says, ―Of course, death is a solution but not at first, not during your youth. Forgive me for 
dragging you off along this rocky road.‖ This statement throws doubt on the linear 
progression as a ―way out‖ and redeems the circular journey as hopeful. The ―rocky 
road‖ is a reference to a point earlier in their conversation when the taxidermist tells Mr. 
Badi‘i to take an alternative route to the city. When Mr. Badi‘i says he does not know the 
way, the taxidermist replies, ―I know it. It‘s longer but better and more beautiful. I‘ve 
been a prisoner of this desert for 35 years.‖ In this way, the film advocates the reform that 
Khatami‘s movement promised rather than revolution. In other words, the taxidermist‘s 
monologue, which is so powerful it causes Mr. Badi‘i to contemplate his plans, suggests 
that it is not necessary to reorganize conceptually one‘s journey; sometimes the longer 
and more beautiful route is the way out. Khatami‘s Reformist Movement similarly 
acknowledged Islamic Republic‘s youth—at that point not even twenty years—and 
sought to work within the existing structure rather than completely shifting gears and 
advocating for another revolution.  
The power of the taxidermist‘s monologue is revealed in the film when Mr. Badi‘i 
begins doubting his plans. Although no other character is able to sway his beliefs on 
suicide, after his conversation with the taxidermist, Mr. Badi‘i changes his tone 
significantly to suggest that he may not kill himself at all, that he might just be asleep in 
the grave. The film ultimately positions hope outside of the linear journey to death and 




characters‘ decisions, the possibility that Mr. Badi‘i might spare his life and continue 
driving in circles is hopeful. As the next chapter will more fully demonstrate, reform has 
been a similarly a circular concept in Iran‘s modern history, and Taste of Cherry locates 
hope in the reformist cycles at this historical juncture. Tehran has functioned as a 
physical manifestation of the country‘s reformist efforts, a feature stressed in the previous 
chapter and one that I will examine in the next chapter as well. One of Taste of Cherry‘s 
final scenes shows Mr. Badi‘i moments after his conversation with the taxidermist, in 
which he casts doubt on his plans to commit suicide. He meaningfully stares at the 
Tehran skyline as the sunsets. This scene, colorful with the sun‘s final moments in the 
sky, is strikingly different from the rest of the film, which is literally brown with dirt. 
Several cranes are at work in the center of the skyline, reminders of the patterns of 
construction and deconstruction that define Tehran. The bright colors and the crane 
revive the possibility of hope and of reform. Although Taste of Cherry never fully 
advocates either, the brief possibility acts a momentary reprieve from the film‘s 
otherwise heavy stagnation.  
Abbas Kiarostami‘s  Dah [Ten] (2002) picks up on Taste of Cherry‘s reformist 
aesthetic and contributes further to our understanding of a Genre of the Second of 
Khordād. Like Taste of Cherry, Ten was released in the context of one of Khatami‘s 
campaigns, this time shortly after his reelection in 2001.  Not surprisingly, then, with Ten 
Kiarostami returns to and expands upon many of stylistic and contextual features that 




international film festival scene. After his success with Taste of Cherry, Kiarostami stated 
that although film festivals had played an important role in supporting his work, that 
phase in his life was over.58 Nevertheless, he screened Ten at Cannes in 2002, where it 
received little attention. This movie also represents Kiarostami‘s return to an urban space. 
After Taste of Cherry, Kiarostami released Bād mā rā khvāhad bord [The Wind Will 
Carry Us] (1999), which takes place in a Kurdish region of Iran and conformed more 
closely to the director‘s previous rural aesthetic. However, Ten is firmly rooted in the 
streets, concrete, and traffic of the capital city.  
Ten comprises a series of ten discussions between Mania Akbari, a real-life visual 
artist and photographer, and various passengers as she drives around Tehran. The movie 
takes place entirely within the confines of her SUV, and the most striking similarity 
between the Ten and Taste of Cherry is Kiarostami‘s use of the car as a narrative devise. 
Ten was shot with two digital video cameras posted on the dashboard, one in front of the 
passenger‘s seat and the other in front of driver‘s, and I will discuss this digital 
innovation in more depth later. We only see footage from one of these cameras at any 
given time, and Kiarostami carefully controls the viewer‘s access to images of the 
characters. For example, during the first sixteen-minute sequence, the viewer is unable to 
see the driver. Instead, we only see her ten-year-old son, with whom she is arguing. 
Because we only see the son and his uncomfortable movements as he accuses his mother 
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of being selfish and loving no one but herself, we are made to identify with him.59 This 
strategy puts the viewer in the uncomfortable position of identifying with a boy who uses 
what Alberto Elena calls ―verbal violence‖ to berate his mother.60 As a result, the viewer 
grapples with and challenges this identification, and Geoff Andrew suggests that 
Kiarostami‘s use of this technique encourages active viewing.61 
Each of the ten sequences in Ten begins and ends abruptly, and as Andrew Ganz 
and Lina Khatib have pointed out, Kiarostami does not adjust the camera‘s zoom, so each 
passenger fills the frame differently,62 a feature that adds to the movie‘s overall choppy 
feel. Ten‘s various sequences form a countdown that begins with ten and ends with one. 
This structure creates the impression that the movie is building up to something, that 
Akbari‘s SUV has a final destination. However, the final sequence (number one), which 
is the movie‘s shortest, simply repeats images and scenes that the viewer has already 
seen.   
Like Taste of Cherry, Ten establishes tension between circular narratives and 
linear through repeated images and confined spaces on the one hand and by structuring a 
descending numeric sequence on the other. As Negar Mottahedeh notes, the repetition of 
dialogues, images, and long gazes within a confined space ―becomes tedious,‖ and Ten 
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―appears to have nothing worth watching.‖63 Mottahedeh‘s observation suggests that this 
movie deceives its viewers by offering very little on the surface. However, ―the 
audience‘s predictable fatigue soon turns into a stimulating intellectual and emotional 
participation in [a] new game.‖64  
Alberto Elena incisively determines that ―Ten is a film whose relevance within the 
director‘s career will probably take some time to determine with any accuracy.‖65 By 
considering Ten vis-à-vis a reformist aesthetic, we might shed light onto the movie and 
its position within Kiarostami‘s larger body of work. An examination of Ten also allows 
us to better understand reform as an aesthetic movement in Iranian cinema. In particular, 
it brings into focus the ways in which reform literally re-formed the conventions of 
Iranian cinema in post-Khomeini Iran.  
Scholars have noted that Ten diverges from Kiarostami‘s previous works with its 
focus on the condition of Iranian women.66 Indeed, the director has been criticized for 
rendering women absent from most of his films. He has explained his lack of attention to 
women‘s issues by pointing to the codes of censorship that limit how he can represent 
women on screen, and he claims that he does not ―give any false impressions‖ that grow 
out of these restrictions.67 He later admits this omission as a mistake, one that he redeems 
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in Ten by ―giving a realistic picture of the Iranian middle-class woman as she actually is.‖ 
He says, ―I can assure that it is all very true to life…In other Iranian films there is always 
someone who goes around adjusting the women‘s headscarves just before they start 
filming, but that is frankly the death of cinema.‖68  His observation about women‘s 
scarves serves as a clear reference to the rule that all women must be properly veiled 
whenever on screen, even in scenes that depict their private lives where they would not 
normally be required to cover. Certain films meaningfully draw the viewer‘s attention to 
the cinematic absurdity that this rule creates. For example, Tahmineh Milani‘s Afsāneh-
ye āh [Legend of a Sigh] (1991) features a scene in which a young woman springs from 
bed already wearing her scarf.69  
In Ten Kiarostami chooses to navigate around this trap by confining the narrative 
space to a car‘s interior, a scenario that he believes more closely approximates women‘s 
reality. Just as in Bani-Etemad‘s Under the Skin of the City, Ten establishes the car as a 
specialized space, bound by its own rules and regulations. While Under the Skin of the 
City brings to focus the car as a source of social and economic mobility, Ten identifies 
the car in Iranian society as a semi-privatized space, susceptible to certain public laws, 
like those that dictate the modesty of one‘s clothing, but private enough for intimate 
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conversations and sometimes transgressions of normal gender relations. Adam Ganz and 
Lina Khatib argue that Ten is different from other films about women that were released 
in Iran at the turn of the twenty-first century, because it gives the audience ―direct access‖ 
to a woman‘s space, and this perspective radically alters the relationship between object 
and subject. Its lack of wide shots ultimately creates a spatialized female intimacy that 
other Iranian films fail to achieve.70  
While scholars have been quick to recognize the shift in Kiarostami‘s work to 
include the representation of women, a trend that begins in The Wind Will Carry Us 
(1999) and culminates with Ten (2002), little attention has been paid to the reasons for 
this considerable move. Why, after almost thirty years in the film industry,71 does 
Kiarostami choose to shift his focus to include women‘s issues at this particular juncture 
in history? In the same way that Taste of Cherry and Mohammad Khatami‘s Reformist 
Movement react in kind to the stagnation that weighed heavily on Iranian society in the 
mid- to late-1990s, Ten similarly responds to growing social concern, in step with the 
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Reformist Movement as it became less a philosophical venture and more invested in 
particular social issues.  
Farzin Vahdat suggests that ―considerable attention‖ to women‘s participation in 
Iranian society was a ―distinctive characteristic‖ of Khatami‘s platform.72 During his 
presidency, in step with concepts like civil society, democracy, and human rights, 
Khatami addressed the oppression of women and even criticized the faqih [Islamic Jurist] 
as ―not just‖ given its historical context.73 In 1997 he famously stated that ―women and 
men are different, but women are not the second sex and men are not superior.‖74 In 2000 
Khatami published a book called Zanān va javānān [Women and Youth], in which he 
stresses the significance of engaging both women and young people in systems of 
governance. He argues that one role of government is to facilitate women‘s recognition of 
―their rights and capabilities‖ and to allow them to ―acknowledge their merits.‖75 With 
this statement, he moves beyond the previously held notion that men, and their 
government in particular, must guard women. As a result of this progressive thinking, the 
feminist magazine Zanān [Women] was a major supporter of Khatami during both of his 
elections. During his presidency, what appeared to be women‘s reform marked the streets 
of Tehran, and the enforcement of dress codes was relaxed considerably (and visibly). 
Press restrictions were also relaxed, and in 1998 the secular, feminist journal Jens-e 
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dovom [Second Sex] received a permit for publication. Khatami also established a Center 
for Women‘s Participation, which was lead by Vice President Zohreh Shoja‘i and 
encouraged the formation of women‘s-based NGOs.  
At the same time, there was an explicit paradox in Khatami‘s line of thinking with 
regard to women. He notes the special status of woman in the home, and family, her role 
as model in private space, and the paradox, he claims, emerges when one considers 
whether this special place in the home will marginalize her in society.76 Khatami calls on 
Iranian society to contemplate, ―how we can have women in the public sphere without 
the disintegration of the family?‖77 However, during his presidency, he never succeeded 
in solving this paradox.78 He was also unable to overcome conservative forces to achieve 
the level of women‘s rights that he promised. Most notably, he failed to get the Guardian 
Council to ratify the UN Convention of on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was the same fate as many of the bills 
in support of women‘s rights that the sixth Majlis (2000-2004) passed. Despite—or 
perhaps because of—these failures, Khatami‘s presidency brought discussions about 
women‘s rights in Iranian society to the forefront in unprecedented ways.  
Abbas Kiarostami‘s Ten functions as a response to this heightened discourse 
about women. It critiques the status of women during Khatami‘s presidency, and more 
specifically it challenges the policies that regulated the representation of women and their 
                                                          
76
 Khatami, Zanān va javānān, 32.  
77
 Khatami, Zanān va javānān, 33.  
78




condition on screen. The film‘s penultimate (1:24) segment is especially poignant in this 
regard. Mania converses with her friend, whom the viewer meets in earlier sequences. 
The friend has grown dependent on a man who refuses to marry her, a fact she has finally 
accepted. Mania comments that the woman‘s veil is particularly tight, a fact that the 
viewer has already recognized based on earlier images of her. Mania jokes, ―Are you 
modest? Why is your veil so tight? It doesn‘t suit you.‖ This observation triggers a 
minute-long scene in which the viewer is uncomfortably forced to watch the friend as she 
plays with her scarf, slowly pulling it off to reveal that she has shaved her head. By any 
measure, this scene is powerful and shocking, but especially within the context of post-
Revolution Iranian cinema, in which even the slightest transgression in women‘s clothing 
is perceived as a potential national threat.  
In this scene, we watch as Kiarostami (and the actress) unexpectedly and blatantly 
violate the law, and at the same time we are forced to witness the women‘s vulnerability: 
her shaking hands as she adjusts her scarf, her uncertain laugh as Mania interrogates her 
about cutting her hair, her tears, and ultimately her bald head. The mid-shot image, 
generated from a mounted, stationary camera, refuses to change its perspective or alter its 
focus to provide the viewer with some visual relief. Instead the viewer remains an 
uncomfortable voyeur for a relatively long stretch of time. This scene violates the laws of 
on-screen modesty at the same time that it challenges them. At the center of the law 




woman unveils but she has no hair, and this image draws attention to and undermines the 
very foundations that ground the laws that regulate women‘s public appearance.  
Negar Mottahedeh positions Ten as a ―feature-length coda‖ to Kiarostami‘s work, 
which, she argues, constantly points to the process of filmmaking. As a postscript to such 
a collection, Ten acts as a representation of the condition of making films in the post-
Revolutionary period. She claims that the movie exposes in the director‘s body of work 
an ―attempt to allegorize the restrains and the possibilities of cinematic enunciation under 
the stringent laws dictating modesty in the Islamic Republic.‖79 Certainly, the movie‘s 
penultimate scene reveals this critique of the film industry and underscores the perils of 
navigating the standards of modesty that the Islamic Republic has determined for the 
industry.  
It is significant to note that Mohammad Khatami, in his role as Minister of 
Islamic Culture and Guidance, played a crucial role in establishing the post-
Revolutionary film industry, which is inextricably tied to the films of Abbas Kiarostami. 
Indeed, shortly after Khatami began his tenure as Minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance in 1982, the Ministry was charged with enforcing a set of guidelines that 
governed the exhibition of film and video. These regulations demanded that films 
represent ―chaste‖ women who participate in society while raising ―God-fearing and 
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responsible children,‖ and directors must not use women to ―arouse sexual desires.‖80 
Khatami‘s ministry was charged with interpreting these ambiguous guidelines, and at that 
time the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance prescribed the ―commandments for 
looking (ahkām-e nigāh kardan),‖ which took the shape of ―laws that enforced the 
veiling of Iranian women from their male counterparts both on and in front of the 
screen.‖81  
Kiarostami‘s Ten, as a statement on the process of filmmaking, points to this 
history and Khatami‘s legacy within it, especially with the scene in which a woman 
unveils herself on screen. Ten effectively creates tension between the open discourse 
about women‘s rights and the contradictions of the laws of modesty that determine the 
very shape of women on screen and the nature of film industry as a whole. In this way, 
the movie highlights the contradictions of Khatami‘s leadership (presidency and ministry) 
in the Islamic Republic by drawing attention to the incongruity between his presidential 
policy towards women and his profound impact on the film industry. The tension that Ten 
creates ultimately points to the paradox of Khatami‘s thinking with regard to women, the 
challenge of reconciling woman‘s specialized role in private space with her right to 
function openly in public spaces. Like Khatami‘s Reformist Movement, Ten never 
provides a solution to this paradox, and as such it cannot officially be part of a film 
industry that demands women‘s modesty. Ten was the first film by Kiarostami to be 
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banned by the Islamic Republic, and it marked the first time that the director openly 
criticized regulations on the film industry.82 In an interview with Shahrām 
Tābe‘mohammadi in 2000, Kiarostami confirmed his belief that filmmakers ought to 
work within the codes of censorship.83 Ten therefore demonstrates a notable shift in the 
director‘s attitude towards the film industry, and this shift was a direct corollary of the 
paradoxes of Mohammad Khatami‘s Reformist Movement and especially its policies 
regarding women.  
Ten‘s relationship to the Reformist Movement is less direct than we see in the 
films of Rakhshan Bani-Etemad, which explicitly depict Mohammad Khatami and the 
Reformist Movement. Instead, Ten and Taste of Cherry, released immediately before and 
after Khatami‘s two elections, are tied to the Reformist Movement with their ability to 
capture an atmosphere of socio-political concern to which Khatami‘s movement was 
similarly reacting.  As a result the films intervene philosophically on behalf of and in 
opposition to the tenants of the Reformist Movement. However, Ten‘s social critique also 
furthers our understanding of the Genre of the Second of Khordād and demonstrates how 
the reformist aesthetic transformed the shape of movies in Iran and restructured the 
industry as a whole. Specifically, Ten‘s innovative use of digital video cameras and 
footage has had a profound effect on the Iranian cinema, and it has reconfigured what it 
means to operate within the regulations of the Iranian film industry. It is not surprising 
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that Kiarostami‘s first foray into digital video, which in and of itself is a democratizing 
form because of ease of access, occurred in Taste of Cherry. The footage at the end of the 
film, which unravels the narrative the film has constructed, was shot using a digital 
camera. And as Saeed-Vafa and Rosenbaum have noted, the journalistic-quality of this 
footage opened Kiarostami up to censure by critics who believed this technology to be 
unbecoming of Kiarostami‘s art-house style.84 
Nevertheless, Ten takes this new medium to a new level and is shot entirely with 
the use of digital video cameras. Kiarostami‘s short movie 10xTen (2004), originally 
intended to be an extra on the French DVD of Ten, takes place in the dusty setting of 
Taste of Cherry and represents the director‘s most pointed commentary on the digital 
form and its effect on his transforming vision for Iranian cinema. In 10xTen, Kiarostami 
advocates for the use of digital forms, because they make possible the ―disappearance of 
direction.‖ He claims that the digital camera, small and sometimes concealable, 
encourages the ―artist to work alone again,‖ which in turn invites ―new discoveries.‖85 
And as Andrew Ganz and Lina Khatib notes, the digital camera ―continues looking when 
the film camera averts its gaze,‖ and it ―does not attempt to frame the action but only 
cover it.‖86 However, the disappearance of direction does not mean the disappearance of 
the director, and Ten‘s 90 minutes were fashioned from over 23 hours of raw footage 
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gathered over several days. Kiarostami whittled the movie‘s shape and controlled 
precisely what the viewer sees and hears.  
The farer-reaching effect of Kiarostami‘s digital innovation in Ten is the 
reinvention and addition of industries and the creation of new aesthetics.87 Digital 
technology allows Iranian artists to override the censorship process, which regulates 
every step of filmmaking in the country. As director Samira Makhmalbaf has noted, the 
only way to film using expensive 35mm equipment is to rent it from central authorities, 
which requires approval and constant guidance. However, digital video only requires 
preliminary approval.88 The result is that films like Ten drastically diverge from their 
original scripts. And as Geoff Andrew suggests, digital technology ―empowers‖ world 
cinemas like Iran, because it allows directors to ―tell their own stories‖ rather than imitate 
the forms and styles that Hollywood promotes.89 New forms naturally burst from this 
empowerment, and Kiarostami states that ―with 35mm there is an expectation for you to 
tell a story. But with digital, I think we‘ll get used to new styles, so maybe we don‘t need 
to rely so much on stories.‖90 This impetus to experiment, the commitment to re-form, is 
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Death of the Filmmaker 
 
In 2000 Bahman Farmanara, a contemporary and friend of Abbas Kiarostami, 
released Bu-ye kāfur ‘atr-e yās [The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine]. The film 
marked Farmanara‘s long-awaited directorial return to Iranian cinema after an absence of 
nearly a quarter-century. The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, a relatively short 
film (93 minutes), is interrupted midway by a two-minute clip of Khatami giving a 
speech. The main character, played by Farmanara himself, watches the president on TV 
and the film‘s viewer is made to watch with him. The mise-en-scène signals a 
complicated relationship between Khatami and Farmanara, and it positions the film as an 
important and defining part of the Genre of the Second of Khordād. Farmanara lies on his 
couch listening to Khatami and above him hangs a picture of a man in Qajar attire whose 
face has been erased. The informed viewer immediately recognizes the man in the picture 
as Shāzdeh Ehtejāb [Prince Ehtejab], the title character in modernist novel published by 
Hushang Golshiri in 1969. Farmanara made his second feature-length film and a name for 
himself in Iranian cinema by turning the novel into a successful film in 1974. The picture 
hanging over the director‘s head in The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine bears 
striking resemblance to the original cover of the book and the movie poster, and its 
presence creates an interesting tension within the film.  
While watching Farmanara‘s most recent film, the viewer is confronted with 
evidence from the most successful film from his early career. The director‘s cinematic 




foreground. This moment in the film indicates that Khatami and his movement are 
impacting the director‘s career and shaping his film as we watch it. By keeping Khatami 
on screen for over two minutes, Farmanara does more than simply reference Khatami‘s 
Reformist Movement; he also provides the viewer with a sample of the president‘s 
philosophies that informs how the viewer experiences the remainder of the film.  
Certainly, The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine benefited from Khatami‘s 
administration. Farmanara‘s requests for permits had been denied previously, and he 
received his first permit to direct within the Islamic Republic during Khatami‘s 
presidency, no doubt a direct result of the relatively liberal cultural environment that was 
fostered at that time.  However, as I demonstrate in this section, The Smell of Camphor, 
the Scent of Jasmine is also interested in the Reformist Movement‘s role in redefining the 
intellectual figure in post-Revolution Iranian society. It is the film‘s exploration into the 
evolving character of the Iranian intellectual that makes its relationship with the 
Reformist Movement ideological rather more than practical.   
Because The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine is largely autobiographical, 
a fact reiterated by the director‘s role as the main character, who is also named Bahman, 
the basic facts of his life prove useful to the present analysis of the film. Bahman 
Farmanara was born in 1942 in Tehran and studied film first in London and later at the 
University of Southern California. He returned to Iran in the mid-1960s and began 
working for Iranian national television, first promoting art films on the network and later 




popular acclaim and instantly solidified the director‘s place as a serious filmmaker in 
Iran‘s New Wave. Farmanara followed Prince Ehtejab with Sāyeh’hā-ye boland-e bād 
[Tall Shadows of the Wind] (1978), also based on a story by Golshiri. Like his first film, 
Tall Shadows of the Wind was and continues to be controversial and features a scene that 
juxtaposes images of a mullah praying and a man masturbating. A year later the 
Revolution halted Farmanara‘s directing career and he and his family eventually settled 
in Canada, where he successfully ran a film distribution company. His work took him to 
Los Angeles, where he lived for a brief period of time, before returning to Iran in the 
mid-1980s to deal with family issues. He decided to remain in Iran rather than return to 
his work in Los Angeles, because his family‘s textile business was in need of leadership.  
Almost immediately, he began to submit scripts to the Ministry of Islamic Culture 
and Guidance, a necessary first step in the process of obtaining a permit to make films in 
Iran. However, until The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, all of his scripts were 
denied a permit, and Farmanara has suggested that authorities took particular offense to 
his representation of Islam in Tall Shadows of the Wind and they were suspicious of the 
fact that he was successful before the Revolution and left immediately after it.
91
 The 
director worked as a producer and taught in the Cinema Department at the Arts 
University in Tehran while continuing to submit scripts. Shortly after Khatami‘s election, 
the complex system of censorship in Iran loosened slightly, and the process no longer 
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required the submission of scripts for preliminary approval.
92
 Nevertheless, Farmanara 
continued to submit his scripts as a precaution, worried that the films would later be 
denied a permit. Hoping to capitalize on Khatami‘s election, he submitted a particularly 
political script that was denied a permit. However, his next proposal, a film about a dying 
director who wants to make a documentary about his own death, unexpectedly received a 
permit, and that film would ultimately become The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of 
Jasmine. Since then, Farmanara has directed three other films: Khāneh’i ru-ye āb [A 
House on Water] (2001), Yek bus-e kuchulu [A Little Kiss] (2005), and Khāk-e āshnāi 
[Familiar Soil] (2008).  
The Smell o f Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine is an autobiographical exploration of 
mourning, disillusionment, and the fate of intellectualism within Iran. It tells the story of 
Bahman Farjami, a director who has not made a film in over twenty years. Farmanara 
plays the role of Farjami himself, and the similarities between the director‘s name and the 
character‘s are striking. The name Farjami literally means ―concluding‖ or ―near the 
end,‖ and this clever naming adds to the overall sense of death that pervades the film. 
Farjami suffers from a heart condition and his death is imminent. On top of that, he 
mourns his wife, who died five years earlier, and his colleagues and friends, who have all 
died recently, but more than anything, he mourns his life, his failures, and his career as a 
filmmaker. The film is divided into three acts: a Bad Day, Funeral Arrangements, and 
Throw a Stone in the Water. In between each of these acts are scenes of Fajāmi sitting on 
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a train traveling to some unknown destination.The progression of acts coupled with 
Farjami‘s name and travel indicates that for Farmanara, like Kiarostami, the journey to 
death functions linearly. This understanding of death is reaffirmed in the film when 
characters refer to birth and death as arrival and departure respectively.  
Like Taste of Cherry, The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine is a 
philosophical inquiry into perceptions of life and death, and it falls into the category of 
art that Khatami describes as addressing ―eternal human questions.‖ The Smell of 
Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine‘s investment in Khatami‘s ―Dialogue among 
Civilizations‖ is also conveyed filmically through its main narrative device. Throughout 
the film, Farjami claims that he is making a documentary about funeral rituals in Iran for 
Japanese television, an enterprise that no one questions because these kinds of 
intercultural exchange had become increasingly common at this time. However, the 
documentary serves as a front that Farjami uses to gather the resources he needs to create 
a meta-film about his own funeral.  By arranging the funeral and the details of the film, 
Farjami attempts to exert control over his final act, both in terms of execution and 
representation. However, after a heart attack and near-death experience, Farjami 
reassesses the value of life, and the momentum of the film‘s final act is driven by doubt 
about whether or not Farjami can call off the funeral/film that he has arranged for 
himself.  
As the preceding summary suggests, The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine 




―does not recognize that he is making a public spectacle of his mourning…precisely at a 
historical juncture when the mutation of his personal creative ego into a public wake is no 
longer acceptable.‖
93
 Dabashi‘s observation that Farmanara introduces his private 
mourning to a public forum is incisive, and the film reveals its personal and 
autobiographical nature at several points. Farmanara puts himself in the role of the main 
character, whose name is nearly identical to his own. 
In addition to referencing the height of his career with the picture of Shāhzdeh 
Ehtejāb, Farmanara also alludes to the beginning of his career. He played a small role in 
Ebrahim Golestan‘s masterpiece Khesht o āyeneh [Brick and Mirror] (1965), which is 
about a taxi driver who discovers an infant in the back of his car. The taxi driver spends 
most of the film trying to find the baby‘s mother, and he encounters cynicism at every 
turn. In The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, Bahman Farjami picks up a woman 
walking by herself, and when she exits the car, she leaves behind her stillborn child in a 
plastic bag. While in Brick and Mirror, the baby ultimately becomes a symbol of hope, a 
positive force in the taxi driver‘s life, in The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, the 
baby is another source of mourning; it is the death of a long but unproductive career.  
The film also mentions the recent deaths and funerals of directors Bahram 
Reypur, Hajir Dariush, Jajal Moqaddam and Sohrab Shahid-Saless, all of whom were 
Farmanara‘s friends and colleagues. The presence of these deceased directors within the 
film‘s text leads Dabashi to label the film as a public means through which Farmanara 
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privately mourns his colleagues, a format that no longer has relevance in Iranian 
society.
94
 However, I argue that The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine offers a 
broader applicability, and the deaths of these renowned directors come to symbolize 
within the film‘s context the death of a certain kind of intellectualism. The film brings to 
focus the futility of an entire generation of artists and intellectuals, disempowered by a 
new governance system that evaluates their work according to new terminology and a 
new set of standards. Indeed, after mentioning the deceased directors, Farjami describes 
the present environment, saying ―When a filmmaker doesn‘t make films or a writer 
doesn‘t write that is death. In fact, I am not afraid of dying, I am afraid of living a futile 
life.‖ This well-known line from the film captures the anxiety of a generation of 
intellectuals, who were prolific and celebrated before the Revolution but unable to 
continue their work after the Revolution.  
The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine‘s representation of the defeat of the 
intellectual recalls the figurative bleeding out of the intellectual in Dariush Mehrjui‘s 
Hāmun a decade earlier. What distinguishes The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine 
is the ultimate resurrection of the intellectual in the film and during the period of 
Khatami‘s presidency. If the film had stopped at Farjami‘s farjām, his end, then it might 
have fallen into Dabashi‘s categorization, too narrowly focused to appeal to a society no 
longer invested in that dying intellectual generation. However, the film features Farjami‘s 
funeral, wild and out of control, unlike anything that he had planned. Farjami is present 
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as both a participant (i.e. the deceased) and an invisible observer, unable to change the 
camera angles or stop people from crying. A phone call announcing the birth of Fajāmi‘s 
grandson interrupts dismantles the procession. The funeral disappears—it has never 
happened—and Farjami is imbued with new hope and a desire to return to his childhood 
and to nature. Farmanara explains the name of the last act, ―Throw a Stone in the Water‖ 
as a reference to a quotation from Kafka: ―When you throw a stone in the water, you 
can‘t control the waves.‖ The film ends with Farjami throwing a stone into water, and 
Farmanara has suggested that this act is a statement: ―I am alive. I am back and I am 
going to keep working.‖
95
 This ending suggests the possibility of working within the 
existing structure of the Islamic Republic and participating in a new kind of 
intellectualism. 
This conclusion to The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine does not strike the 
viewer as unreasonable, because the film provides the information and tools necessary to 
reconstruct (or reform) the intellectual figure. Khatami and the Reformist Movement play 
a significant role in this process and function as representative examples of the new 
Iranian intellectual. And at the same time the film provides counterexamples to this 
model and examines the real-life fate of those intellectuals unwilling or unable to 
repurpose themselves and conform to the new standards of intellectualism in the Islamic 
Republic. In his analysis of The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, Hamid Dabashi, 
recognizing Farmaara‘s strengths as a director, also criticizes the film because it attempts 
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to mutate the ―creative ego‖ of ―old-fashion intellectuals‖ into ―collective will,‖ an effort 
that is unable to account for the changes in Iranian society that were conditioned by the 
―rapid globalization of all national interests.‖
96
 However, as I demonstrate, Dabashi 
overlooks the fact that Farmanara‘s film agrees that ―old-fashioned‖ intellectualism no 
longer has a function in Iranian society, and the film identifies Khatami‘s Reformist 
Movement as a site of new and emerging modes of intellectualism in post-Revolution 
Iran.  
In an interview with Dabashi, Farmanara explains that after the Revolution 
everything in Iran became politicized. Before the Revolution, intellectuals were 
especially political. After the Revolution, the spread of politics into almost every aspect 
of life demanded the democratization of intellectualism.
97
 This democratization in turn 
required that the intellectual be well-versed in and sympathetic to a number of different 
modes of thinking, not just one‘s own ideological belief set. Farmanara indicates that the 
need on the part of intellectuals to access broader sources of information is represented in 
the film with the use of newspapers. At several points in the film, we see references to 
conservative newspapers. Characters read them and they are on display on tables and 
desks. 
The most notable example is Keyhān, a newspaper that is under direct control of 
the Supreme Leader and one of the most influential publications in Iran. Even though 
Farjami is represented as an artist and intellectual, a director with a demonstrated 
                                                          
96
 Dabashi, Close Up, 249 
97




knowledge of both Western and Iranian thought and a flawless American accent, 
conservative newspapers like Keyhān appear on his coffee table. And this moment in the 
film suggests the need for the intellectual to ―foster a much wider connection.‖
98
 While 
this detail may seem small, it is unprecedented in Iranian cinema, and Farmanara notes, 
―It is like a bombshell‖ that ―young people will notice.‖
99
  
Khatami similarly promoted broader connections through the press. Indeed, one 
of his major contributions to the country during his first few years as president was a 
rapid liberalization of the press. Almost immediately following his election, the 
Khatami‘s administration made it easier for Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance to 
issue press permits, and within the first year of Khatami‘s presidency, 779 new press 
permits were issued, which raised the total number to 930.
100
 In other words, there was 
approximately a 500% increase in press permits and press activity in one year. However, 
like many of Khatami‘s initiatives, this one was thwarted by conservative forces, which 
had grown resentful of Khatami‘s relationship with the press.
101
 Beginning in 1999 and 
continuing in 2000, the Majles, lead by speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, passed a series 
of laws that limited freedom of press and initiated the closure of several prominent 
reformist newspapers. The 1999 closure of Salām, the most popular reformist newspaper 
at the time, prompted student demonstrations that were violently squalled. This incident, 
which remains one of the greatest blemishes on Khatami‘s presidency, calls attention to 
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the contentious nature of the press in Iran at this time. In The Smell of Camphor, the 
Scent of Jasmine, which was released in the wake of these battles, the subtle use of 
newspapers is a reminder of the debates over open press and significance of this issue to 
the Reformist Movement.  
In contrast to the more restrained use of newspapers in the film, Farmanara‘s 
inclusion of a video clip of a speech by Khatami forcefully draws the viewer‘s attention 
to the Reformist Movement. In Under the Skin of the City, Rakhshan Bani-Etemad also 
uses a real Khatami speech; however, she uses just the sound bite in order to contrast 
Khatami‘s words with images from the street. In contrast, Farmanara inserts an entire 
video clip, and the effect of this technique is that the viewer is made to watch and focus 
on the video of Khatami without additional visual stimulus. The intensity of the 
presentation of Khatami in this manner signals the importance of his speech to the film. 
Khatami argues that ―the fate of the social aspect of religion will always depend on our 
viewing of religion in such a way that it is compatible with freedom.‖ With this 
statement, he establishes the necessity of multidisciplinary thinking when it comes to the 
study and practice of religion.  
Khatami studied western philosophy at the University of Isfahan and then 
undertook traditional seminary training Qom. He thereby embodies the coalescence of 
two different modes or styles of thinking. Certainly, his attempts introduce democracy, 
civil society, and the rule of law into Islamic thinking mark a significant step in the effort 




great philosophical contributions to Iranian society, and the view of religion as something 
that can be pitted against or reconciled with freedom also harkens back to Abolkarim 
Soroush‘s ideas that were discussed in Chapter Two of this study, wherein religious 
knowledge is a manmade tool through which humans approximate and access religious 
truth to the best of their abilities.  
Within the scheme that Khatami describes, freedom is the undisputed champion in 
human societies. He says, ―If you read the pages of history, you will notice that anything 
that has confronted freedom has suffered in the process…If religion has confronted 
freedom, it has been damaged. If justice has confronted freedom, it has been damaged, 
and if development and construction have confronted freedom, they too have been 
damaged.‖ Khatami cites two examples to make his point that to challenge freedom is to 
dismantle one‘s own cause. His first example is ―from the Middle Ages when religion 
and freedom confronted one another, and religion suffered the defeat. The other one is 
from the world of Communism in our age, when economic justice and freedom 
confronted one another and justice lost, even though the people might not have gained 
their freedom either.‖ These two examples both reference ideologically closed periods, in 
which political systems did not accommodate freedom and consequently suffered. The 
irony of this speech in the film is that viewer watches it as Farjami lies motionless on his 
couch, unable (as in lacking the freedom) to work and direct films. Nevertheless, the film 




frameworks and brings together different types of knowledge and ideologies in order to 
appeal to broad, popular audiences. 
While The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine positions Khatami as the new 
intellectual, it also considers the fate of those intellectuals who were unable to work 
within the new structure of the Islamic Republic. One of the film‘s most daring aspects is 
its direct, though subtle, reference to the qatl’hā-ye zanjireh’i [serial murders], the name 
given to a number of unexplained murders of dissident intellectuals in the late 1990s.
102
 
These intellectuals were, by and large, what remained of the generation of pre-Revolution 
intellectuals, who were deeply ideological and usually socialist or communist. In the film, 
one of Bahman Farjami‘s friends, presumably a fellow intellectual, disappears for several 
days. When he returns, he has been badly beaten and he eventually dies. In the several 
years following Khatami‘s election, a number of intellectuals, artists, writers, and 
translators and their families suffered similar fates or suffered other violent deaths.  
The unexplained murders of intellectuals in the Islamic Republic began as early as 
1988, in a fashion strikingly similar to murders carried out by SAVAK, the Shah‘s 
intelligence and security agency, in the decades before the Revolution. However, the 
murders gained unprecedented momentum and organization once Khatami was elected 
president. This connection between the escalating murders and Khatami‘s new leadership 
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lead some people to the conclusion the murders were directly related to Khatami‘s 
victory and a backlash against his cultural liberalism.
103
  
The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine furthers our understanding of the 
Serial Murders as a reaction to the Reformist Movement at the same time that it criticizes 
the nation for enabling such defiant and violent acts against the basic tenants of human 
rights. In the film, Farjami is flipping through the channels on TV and he stops at a report 
on violence in Sierra Leone. The program shows images of the mutilated bodies of Sierra 
Leoneans, and explains that rebel forces cut off the arms and/or feet of those captured 
individuals who support the current president. The report condemns the acts of violence 
as ―medieval‖ and inhumane. Farjami changes the channel and begins watching 
Khatami‘s speech. The implication of the sequencing of these two videos is clear: the 
violence perpetrated against supporters of Iran‘s current president (Khatami) is just as 
brutal and inhumane as the political violence in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The reference to the Serial Murders has very little bearing on the narrative 
development in The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine. However, it does provide 
further evidence that the old style of intellectualism, tied to a single ideology and directed 
at an elite class, simply cannot function within the Islamic Republic. Although more 
horrific, these deaths evoke the same feeling of death that has gripped Bahman Farjami 
because he cannot work. The Serial Murders are tragically part of the dismantling of the 
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old style of intellectualism in Iran. The new intellectualism, which emerges from the 
remains of the old, is born of figures like Khatami, who work with Islam and within the 
structure of the Islamic Republic, and seek reform and not revolution. Bahman Farmanara 
advocates this kind of intellectual work in The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine 
when Farjami discovers new inspiration to work within his confinements. As Farmanara 
suggests, the film‘s ending recognizes that ―this hand has been dealt to us. What are we 
going to do? Either we are going to roll with it and try to make something positive out of 
it, or we can bang our heads against a brick wall…‖
104
 In this way, the film attempts to 
participate in the Reformist Movement‘s effort to rethink what it means to be an 
intellectual in the Islamic Republic.  
 
Conclusion 
The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine‘s investment in a reformist aesthetic 
involves more than just participation in the redefinition of the Iranian intellectual. The 
film also suggests the ways in which new mediums were reforming the film industry and 
democratizing filmmaking in Iran. Like Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry and Ten, 
Farmanara‘s film also plays with the possibilities of video as a new way of making 
movies in Iran. Shortly after Khatami‘s election, Farmanara submitted a script for a 
highly political film called I Hate Kiarostami, a title intended to throw off censors. The 
director thought that he might be able to capitalize on Khatami‘s victory, but the script 
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was rejected. Farmanara was particularly upset by that rejection and concerned that he 
may never work as a director in Iran again, because he was denied permission even after 
the country‘s most moderate president was elected into office. In response, Farmanara 
wrote a synopsis for a script about a dying director who has been refused permission to 
direct but decides to make a movie about his own funeral using a video camera, because 
such a movie would not require permission from the Ministry of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance. He claims that he submitted the synopsis ―as a joke,‖ and much to his surprise, 
the Ministry asked for a full script, which ultimately earned Farmanara a permit to begin 
work on The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine.
105
  
Although The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine was shot using 35mm 
cameras and is technically a film, it represents video as a medium full of possibility, and 
just as Rakhshan Bani-Etemad‘s Under the Skin of the City is a narrative film about 
documentary filmmaking, The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine is a film about 
video-making. As Farjami arranges his funeral and enlisting producers and actors, he 
constantly faces questions about his permit. Each time he must explain that he did not 
finally receive a permit but is making a documentary for Japanese television. However, 
the Japanese documentary is just a front; and Farjami really intends to videotape his own 
funeral. The act of preparing for the video, of serving as the director, ultimately helps 
revive Farjami‘s hope. Within The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of Jasmine, digital video 
functions as a possible for new intellectualism, a new source of productivity and broad 
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appeal. It is possible to suggest that the Genre of the Second of Khordād with its attention 
to digital medium offers filmmakers a new means of working within the film industry and 






New Forms in Cinema and Media Post-Khatami Iran 
 
 
In 2005 Khatami‘s second term came to an end, and the limit of two consecutive 
terms for the president in Iran precluded him from seeking reelection. The subsequent 
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose hard-line conservative platform radically 
differed from Khatami‘s moderate policies, indicated the country‘s frustration with the 
Reformist Movement and its inability to liberalize the government during Khatami‘s 
eight-year presidency.
1
 During the 2005 elections, Ahmadinejad positioned himself as a 
populist candidate, in contrast to his main rival Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami, 
both clerics and members of the ruling elite. With the support of Supreme Leader 
Khamenei, Ahmadinejad promised to address the country‘s economic problems, and 
especially its alarming unemployment rates, which helped him garner more than 60% of 
the vote.
2
 Ultimately the 2005 elections marked the rise of the neoconservative 
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 Almost immediately, Ahmadinejad and his newly formed cabinet began altering 
cultural policies and adjusting their stance on film in particular. In 2005, the newly 
appointed Minister of Culture, Hossein Saffar-Harandi declared a ban on the distribution 
and exhibition of films that promoted ―secularism‖ and ―feminism.‖
4
 There was an 
expectation that Ahmadinejad would tighten the government‘s control of the film 
industry, and in 2006 conservative members of the majles criticized the president because 
they claimed that the films released during his first year were ―not significantly different‖ 
from ―Khatami era‖ films and did not meet the ―higher values of the Islamic regime.‖
5
 
This criticism brings to focus two important features of Iranian cinema after Khatami‘s 
presidency. First, the new president‘s conservative atmosphere generated new 
contestations about the film industry and new attempts to refashion it. Second, the 
reformist aesthetic project that began and developed during Khatami‘s presidency 
remained relevant during Ahmadinejad‘s first term.  
While most of this study is devoted to demonstrating that cinema and the 
Reformist Movement intersected at various points in Mohammad Khatami‘s political 
career, this chapter argues that these intersections created a reformist aesthetic that 
continues to develop and transform even after the Reformist Movement, as a political 
entity determined by Khatami‘s presidency, has ended.  Cinema has continued to seek the 
relevance of Khatami‘s popular discourse, and specifically it has attempted to evaluate 
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these terms of his political platform after the failure of the Reformist Movement to create 
the changes that this terminology promised. These films were released after Khatami‘s 
presidency and do not benefit practically from his political leadership but are nevertheless 
invested in a reformist aesthetic that might have otherwise been overlooked if one only 
considered the Reformist Movement‘s impact on cinema in terms of its ability to foster a 
culturally liberal political atmosphere. 
This chapter examines Massoud Bakhshi‘s Tehrān anār nadārad [Tehran Has No 
More Pomegranates] (2007), an experimental documentary, and the music video ―‗Eshq-e 
sor‘at” [Love of Speed] (2007), performed by the underground band Kiosk, directed by 
Ahmad Kiarostami, and released on YouTube. I use this comparison to argue that reform 
as an aesthetic movement functions outside of the temporal limits of its political 
antecedent. Although both works were released two years after Khatami‘s presidency 
ended, and did not benefit directly from his cultural liberalism, they still participate in 
central reformist debates. Specifically, they interrogate the legacy of Khatami‘s political 
platform, which included concepts like ―civil society‖ and ―religious democracy.‖ Their 
experimentation with form further suggests that the reformist aesthetic possesses a 
momentum that permits it to develop and transform without explicit contact with the 
political movement that inspired it. By considering a film alongside a music video, I hope 
to use reform to connect innovations in cinema to trends in new media and youth culture 





Filming Reform, Reforming Film 
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates is a self-described ―musical, historical, 
comedy, docu-drama, love story, experimental film,‖ and although relatively short (68 
minutes), it manages to encompass all of the styles and genres to which it lays claim.  
The film is truly experimental and changes mediums, switches narratives, and makes 
disorienting jumps in space and time. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates takes 
Eisenstein‘s notion of cinematic montage to an extreme by forcing disparate images to 
collide across distant temporal and social boundaries. The film actively resists the 
informing logic that often determines the documentary genre, and for this reason 
Mohammad Sa‘id Mohassesi questions whether the film can even be categorized as a 
documentary.
6
 Amir Puriya goes so far as to suggest that the film is zed-e mostanad or an 




However, viewing the film through the lens of reform allows us to approach the 
question of categorization from a different vantage point. I argue that reform acts as one 
kind of an informing logic that guides the viewer‘s experience with the film and his or 
her understanding of it. Reform functions as a point of entry into the narrative and it is a 
strand that can be traced throughout. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ composite 
style posits a profound statement about the history and legacy of reform in Iran, and 
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because the film is also about the process of (documentary) filmmaking in the country, it 
theorizes reform as an aesthetic possibility.  
Mohassesi sees Tehran Has No More Pomegranates in the same tradition as 
Kamran Shirdel‘s The Night It Rained,
8
 and it is the functionality of these two films, 
rather than their particular contents, that links them together so cogently. As Chapter 
Three demonstrated, Shirdel‘s The Night It Rained establishes and plays with disconnect 
between the images we see and the sounds that we hear. This methodology encourages 
the viewer to challenge the formation of truth and to question truth as an epistemological 
category. Bakhshi‘s Tehran Has No More Pomegranates similarly creates tension 
between sound on the one hand and image on the other. The film sets this tone within its 
first minute. The viewer is confronted with wild images of traffic of Tehran at night, and 
at the same time a voice reads from Zakariya Qazvini‘s thirteenth-century text Āthār al-
bilād wa-akhbār al-‘ibād [Monuments of the Countries and the History of their 
Inhabitants]:
 9
 ―Tehran is a large village near the city of Rey, full of gardens and fruit 
trees. Its inhabitants live in anthill-like underground holes. The village‘s several districts 
are constantly at war…‖ This description of Tehran does not align with the images we 
see of a modern metropolis in motion.  
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This moment early in the film, before the narrative has even officially begun, 
generates difference (through audio-visual collision) and the viewer must reconcile this 
difference by neglecting either the audio or the visual or by coming to some conclusion 
about why the difference exists. In both cases, the reliability of (the) film is brought into 
question, because the viewer is forced to contemplate how the film is constructing an 
―accurate‖ portrait of Tehran. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates constantly requests 
that viewer engage with the text on this critical level. Five minutes into the film, after the 
viewer has already come to terms with its basic premise, a warning flashes on the screen: 
shabāhat-e ādam-hā va havādes-e film bā namuneh-hā-ye vāqe’i dar besiyāri az 
mavāred ettefāqist [similarities between the people and events of this film with (and?) 
real examples is, in many cases, coincidental].
10
  
The tentativeness of this statement provides it with complexity. The facts of this 
film are not entirely untrue, but in many cases they are. This notion is repeated later in 
the film when ―found footage‖ is overlaid with a narrative voice that reminds viewers, 
―Owing to problems in verifying facts, this film is probably full of mistakes.‖ Nosrat 
Karimi, who provides the voiceover in this section, repeats his warning twice, because he 
messes up the first time. The apprehension of both statements challenges the viewer to 
determine which people and events merely bear resemblance to the historical world and 
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which people and events are grounded in the historical world. The resulting uncertainty 
ultimately makes it difficult to latch onto specific arguments within the documentary.  
Nevertheless, reform is one theme that is established early in the film and featured 
throughout, and the narrative premise of the film plays a crucial role in signaling the 
importance of reform to the film. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ basic narrative 
structure takes the form of a production report, written as a letter from the director to the 
president of the Documentary Center (within the Ministry of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance). Throughout the film, the Massoud Bakhshi‘s voice, as a narrative voice, 
describes in his letter the process of making the film, which, he claims, remains 
incomplete. At the beginning of the film/letter, Bakhshi identifies himself with details 
including his name, birthplace, marriage status, and employee number at the 
Documentary Center. He explains that he wrote the script for the film five years earlier. It 
took that amount of time to obtain the proper permits to begin production, and he shows 
the permit on screen, along with other official documents including his ID card and 
contract. However, Bakhshi notes that ―Tehran is constantly in a state of reform,‖ so the 
five-year-old script was no long relevant to Tehran today. Accordingly, the director and 
his crew decided to produce a different film, one that compares an old ―found‖ 
documentary with images of contemporary Tehran.  
The director‘s description of the trajectory of Tehran Has No More Pomegranates 
locates reform temporally, geographically, and structurally within the film‘s text and 
context.  Tehran Has No More Pomegranates premiered at the 25
th




February 2007.  The five-year window that the director mentions in his letter positions 
the film‘s origins well within Khatami‘s presidency. Additionally, the director‘s repeated 
mention of permits and the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance serves to intimate 
Khatami, who, during his tenure as Minister of Culture, played an important role in 
forming the institutions that oversee filmmaking in the Islamic Republic. The atmosphere 
of reform that gave rise to Tehran Has No More Pomegranates is underscored by the 
director‘s suggestion that Tehran is in a constant state of reform.  
This observation captures the presence of reformists in the capital city and also 
points to the cycles of construction and transformation that Tehran as a physical space is 
experiencing. Like Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the City, Tehran Has No 
More Pomegranates uses the city of Tehran to signal reform. Finally, the atmosphere of 
reform literally reshapes the Massoud Bakhshi‘s project and determines a new direction 
for the film. As a result, we see reform impacting the methods and aesthetics of 
filmmaking. The connections between Tehran Has No More Pomegranates and reform, 
which Bakhshi introduces early in the film, are gradually developed and made more 
complicated as the film proceeds, and together they constitute a convoluted but cogent 
statement about the legacy of reform in the post-Khatami period.  
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ basic structure comprises two main 
components. First the director and his film crew compare images of contemporary Tehran 
to images of the city from an old ―documentary‖ that they allegedly found in the archives 




attempts to construct a ―realistic‖ image of Tehran by focusing on the institutions that 
define it. Reform as a historical and political institution has important bearing in both 
sections. In the first part, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates evaluates the effectiveness 
of reform as a historical process and considers its late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century narratives. In the second section, the film questions how reform, an institution 
with its roots in Iran in the nineteenth century, plays out in contemporary Tehran, a 
sprawling mega-metropolis. The film‘s methodology engenders a comparative and cross-
historical perspective, and Tehran Has No More Pomegranates ultimately guides the 
viewer to the conclusion that reform –as an alternative to revolution—is an ineffective 
instrument for the enactment of social and political change in Iran.  
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates establishes reform as a category of inquiry 
when the voiceover in the ―found‖ documentary declares that Naser al-Din Shah, upon 
returning to Iran from Europe, declared himself an eslāhtalab or reformist. Naser al-Din 
Shah, the Qajar ruler of Iran from 1848 to 1896, was the first king in Iran‘s modern 
history to travel to Europe. He published his travel diaries and was responsible for 
initiating the process of westernization in the country.  Naser al-Din was especially 
fascinated by western technology during his trips abroad, and he was the person who 
brought filmmaking technology to Iran, an exceedingly important point upon which I will 
expand later in this chapter. However, for now it is important to recognize that, according 
to Tehran Has No More Pomegranates, nineteenth-century reform in Iran was tied to 




attempts to reform the gardens of Iran by introducing new produce. This discussion is 
followed by sounds from the bazaar: tut-e farangi [strawberry, lit. European berry], gujeh 
farangi [tomato, lit. European plum], ―hamash farangiyeh!‖ [all of it is 
European!].Ultimately, the film questions the effectiveness of the changes that Naser al-
Din Shah made by comparing them with similar phenomena in contemporary Tehran.  
Although modern Iran has been in a constant state of transformation, undergone 
several waves of reform and experienced at least two revolutions, Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates demonstrates that very little has changed between the nineteenth and 
twenty-first centuries. The film utilizes such points of comparison to introduce this 
argument to the viewer, and in the process emphasizes it through the use of humor, which 
ultimately strengthens rather than tempers the director‘s critique of reform. The 
beginning of the ―found‖ documentary introduces old Tehran as a place of ―clay huts, 
grand gardens and narrow alleys,‖ and Tehranis of that time as ―illiterate, stupid, and 
vulgar people.‖ In contrast, Bakhshi, the narrator of contemporary Tehran, claims that 
―by the grace of God, today we have wide highways and wise citizens.‖  However, the 
images that the film presents as evidence fail to support this argument. 
We see a wide highway made narrow by an expansive traffic jam, and mention of 
―wise citizens‖ is punctuated with images from the zurkhāneh, an ancient form of 
athleticism that emphasizes physical prowess but does not conform to the narrative 
voice‘s claim of wisdom. The carnivalesque music and the slow motion that accompany 




seemingly the pursuit of a wise individual. This scene abruptly cuts to a wide-angle shot 
of a supermarket that emphasizes the narrow aisles, a contemporary rendering of the 
narrow alley. This scene, in contrast to the preceding, is in fast-motion, which 
emphasizes the narrowness of the alleys that people are quickly navigating. All of these 
images (the highway, the zurkhāneh, and the grocery store) combined are on screen for 
less than a minute. Nevertheless, their impact is profound and stays with the viewer as 
these exact images are repeated throughout the film again and again. Although these 
shots are very contemporary –  they are colorful, industrial, and in-motion – they 
ultimately signal the absence of reform rather than reform itself. The images demonstrate 
that while the technology has changed, the basic conditions have remained the same. 
Certainly, these examples are extreme and exaggerated, but the film functions in a 
polarized domain and sometimes reverts to polemics.  
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates introduces twentieth- and twenty-first 
century reform efforts counter-intuitively through the figure of Amir Kabir, a nineteenth-
century reformist appointed as Prime Minister by Naser al-Din Shah in 1848. Like all of 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century figures, Amir Kabir is introduced through the 
―found‖ documentary, whose voiceover declares, ―The Shah appointed the reformist 
Amir Kabir as prime minster. He opposed court bribery and corruption. He condemned 
all kinds of crimes: stabbing and lewdness.‖ Amir Kabir, often considered Iran‘s first 
reformist, attempted to modernize and westernize the country while working within the 




―found‖ documentary encourages Massoud Bakhshi to locate reforms in contemporary 
Tehran. He says, ―I discovered that reforms are still widespread in Tehran. Today the 
state reforms trees, grass, parks, and male facial hair.‖ This statement, though humorous, 
functions as a biting critique. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates suggests that ―today‘s 
state‖ is only interested in reforming the surface of the city, and certainly these surface 
changes do not meet the standards of systematic reform (e.g. rule of law, civil society, 
and religious democracy) that Mohammad Khatami promised. 
The film‘s references to Amir Kabir and to the surfaces of Tehran draw the 
Reformist Movement of Khatami‘s presidency into a much broader conversation of 
reform in Iran. In particular, they reference Khatami‘s predecessor Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, who served as president between 1989 and 1997 during what is popularly 
known as the ―Period of Construction.‖ During this time, the country attempted to 
recover from the devastating losses of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, and many of these 
reconstruction efforts visibly took place on Tehran‘s surface. In the early 1990s, Tehran 
underwent a renewal under the city‘s mayor at the time, Qolamhossein Karbaschi.
11
 
Many of Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s efforts focused on the privatization of the economy in 
Iran. However, Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s platform was ―economically liberal‖ but 
―philosophically‖ traditional,
12
 and he also attempted to control bodily surfaces, including 
facial hair and women‘s dress. Nevertheless, Hashemi Rafsanjani imagined his policies 
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as reforms, and he remains a proponent of Amir Kabir and his reformist efforts. Hashemi-
Rafsanjani wrote a biography of Amir Kabir called Amir Kabir yā qehremān-e 
mobārezeh bā este’mār [Amir Kabir or the Hero of the Battle with Imperialism]. By 
drawing on the elements of Hashemi Rafsanjani‘s political career, Bakhshi positions 
Khatami‘s reformist efforts as a continuation of the previous presidency. In doing so, he 
creates the same sense of untimeliness that haunts Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s Our 
Times…  
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates cuts from the brief critique of Khatami and 
Hashemi Rafsanjani back to the ―found‖ documentary and the voiceover notes, ―But 
Amir‘s reforms didn‘t satisfy the corrupted court so they killed him.‖ At this moment, the 
documentary film breaks and the viewer sees the magnetic film meaninglessly spinning 
and hears the startling sound of the film‘s flapping. This transition offers a startling 
conclusion to the representation of nineteenth-century reform, Amir Kabir and his efforts. 
It underscores the fate (i.e. the death) of reform in the nineteenth century. By juxtaposing 
nineteenth-century reform with (the absence of) contemporary reform efforts, Massoud 
Bakhshi establishes reform as a cyclical process in Iranian history. His film, although a 
more or less complete history of modern Iran, mentions but does not develop a discussion 
of any of the revolutions that radically altered the country‘s political systems. For 
example, the ―found‖ documentary that forms the basis of the film‘s first section ends as 
the Revolution of 1978-1979 is happening. Instead, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates 




The film‘s juxtaposition of two of the cycles of reform encourages the viewer to 
speculate on the progress of current reform and its potential fate. The film‘s 
representation of the lack of progress of nineteenth-century reform and its ultimate 
collapse suggests reform as an unsustainable and ineffective means of enacting change.  
The film‘s critique of progress, especially within the context of reform, continues 
into the twentieth century. The documentary voice notes rise of Reza Khan, his 
overthrow of Qajar Dynasty in 1925, and subsequently the establishment of the Pahlavi 
regime. This narrative is accompanied by shots of the Pahlavi military rigidly marching. 
Reza Khan had been a military leader, and the images in Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates remind viewers of the military nature of his regime. The shots of the 
Pahlavi military are laced with images of the Qajar military in procession, which the 
viewer has already seen. 
By placing these chronologically disparate images next to one another, the film 
encourages the viewer to note the similarities between them. While the technology of the 
Pahlavi military is more advanced, the basic structure of the two military processions is 
strikingly similar. In the Iranian context, nineteenth-century reforms are aligned with 
westernization, and in the twentieth century westernization means modernization. A 
direct trajectory developed alongside the advent of western technology. However, with 
scenes like this one, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates questions the impact that 




The discussion of nineteenth-, twentieth-, and twenty-first-century reform allows 
us to understand better Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ alternative title. During the 
opening sequence, the film first introduces itself as تهراى/طهراى  or Teheran/Tehran and 
moments later offers تهراى اًار ًدارد or Tehran Has No More Pomegranates as its title. 
Although the director ultimately favors the latter, the former is in some ways more 
provocative. It captures the tension between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries and 
it acts as a metaphor for reform both during and between these periods. The alternative 
title تهراى/طهراى  plays with the spelling of the capital city. Although both spellings are 
pronounced exactly the same in Persian, the first spelling (طهراى) is an older spelling that 
comes directly from Arabic. The newer spelling ( اىتهر ) started gaining more acceptance 
during the late nineteenth century, during roughly the same period as the Qajar reforms.
13
  
The film posits the orthographical change as analogous with the reforms of both 
the nineteenth and the twentieth/twenty-first centuries: just the surface form is changing, 
not the meaning or pronunciation. This change on the surface brings to mind Tehran Has 
No More Pomegranates‘ critique of contemporary reform, which takes place on trees, 
grass, and facial hair. The futility of these surface reforms is expanded later in the film, 
when Bakhshi describes contemporary Tehran as the ―age of false construction,‖ in 
contrast to the era of mass construction that followed increased oil revenues in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This statement is followed by images of half-completed building and 
bulldozers meaninglessly pushing around dirt. These shots recall similar images in both 
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Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the City and Kiarostami‘s Taste of Cherry, and once 
again we see that the reformist aesthetic is invested in the city of Tehran as a dynamic 
space that accommodates and represents the sense of futility against which the Reformist 
Movement initially reacted and to which it would ultimately fall powerless.  
After the ―found‖ documentary ends as the Revolution of 1978-1979 is unfolding, 
the film crew of Tehran Has No More Pomegranates decides to shoot a ―realistic‖ image 
of contemporary Tehran. However, establishing a vantage point for this realistic picture 
of Tehran proves challenging, because, as the Bakhshi notes, ―Tehran has thousands of 
extraordinary subjects, each worthy of an entire film!‖ After careful observation, the film 
crew determines that the law and a trend the film identifies as the motorcycle 
phenomenon (padideh-ye motorsiklet) are the two most important institutions in Tehran 
today. The former is particularly relevant to the discussion of reform in the film. Viewers, 
especially at the time of Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ release in 2007, would 
immediately recognize this reference to the law as a gesture towards Mohammad 
Khatami‘s promise to follow the ―rule of law‖ in Iran. Bakhshi claims, ―Tehran is much 
more law and democracy abiding than ever before,‖ but his stress on the word ―besiyār‖ 
[much] adds a hint of sarcasm to his claim. The instability of Bakhshi‘s statement is 
compounded by the accompanying song, the lyrics of which claim, ―Here, everything is 
shaking, trembling, shaking.‖ At this point in the film, the soundtrack (the narrative voice 
and music) undermines the effectiveness of Khatami‘s promise to bring democracy and 




The film further pokes fun at these concepts as it continues to document the 
filmmaking process. The cameraman suggests that the crew capture the Tehran cityscape, 
and Bakshi says, ―I, as a respecter of democracy, had to accept this idea.‖ The 
cameraman‘s request is followed by ―the young photographer,‖ who uses ―democracy as 
a pretext‖ to ask to shoot portraits of Tehran‘s citizens, and once again the director has to 
acquiesce. The images that follow both of these requests—presumably the products that 
the cameraman and photographer generate—capture the paradoxes of contemporary 
Tehran. Shots of wild traffic in Tehran appear alongside scenes from the zurkhāneh, and 
an old man uses a stick and mallet to gin cotton as a bright yellow train passes behind 
him. All of these images point to the tension between modern and traditional forces in 
Iranian society. Within the film‘s context, the role of democracy in producing these 
images positions it on the spectrum between modernity and tradition that the images 
themselves create. In doing so, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates questions the place 
of democracy in this polarized system. How does democracy, as Khatami conceived of it, 
reconcile these competing forces? Is it even able? Tehran Has No More Pomegranates 
merely alludes to these questions. However, as I demonstrate in the next section, Kiosk‘s 
music video ―‘Eshq-e sor‘at‖ [Speed of Love] makes a strong statement in this regard.  
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates more directly challenges Mohammad 
Khatami‘s Reformist Movement by critiquing the terms that he introduced into poplar 
discourse in Iran. Specifically, the film suggests that Khatami‘s abstractions, like ―civil 




sense, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates applies a methodology that is similar to 
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s in Under the Skin of the City. In both films, the city of Tehran 
offers local socio-political, economic, and geographic problems that the Reformist 
Movement is unable to accommodate. While Bani-E‘temad‘s film is interested in 
Tehran‘s north-south divide and the economic problems it engenders, Bakhshi‘s film 
expresses concern for the city‘s density problem and for the earthquake that experts have 
predicted will devastate Tehran at some point in the near future. As I demonstrate, in both 
cases, Bakhshi examines these physical problems within the context of Khatami‘s 
terminology. In doing so, he applies the basic mechanisms of the montage theory that 
determines the film‘s visuality in order to encourage the viewer to question the expansive 
reach of Khatami‘s proposed reforms.  
In their evaluation of Tehran, Massoud Bakhshi and his film crew conclude that in 
recent years the city‘s most pressing issue, ―alongside of civil society, democracy, and 
these kinds of things‖ is the problem of density. The film defines density as ―the space 
that one occupies in Tehran!‖ and they determine that the distribution of space is different 
for every citizen in the city. To illustrate this fact, the film returns to an earlier example 
that compares a citizen from North Tehran to a citizen from South Tehran. Babak jān is a 
London-born construction manager, who lives with his wife in a 600-square-meter 
apartment in North Tehran. According to the film‘s calculations, Babak and his wife each 
have 300 square-meters. In contrast, Āqā Ja‘far, a Kurdish employee at a brick factory, 




accordingly each member in his family has a density of five square-meters. This example 
suggests that the disparities in the distribution of space are geographically determined, 
and this conclusion is supported by Bakhshi‘s claim that certain ―truths about south and 
north Tehran‖ are revealed ―just by changing the location of the camera.‖ The 
accompanying shots demonstrate the differences in density that distinguish Tehran‘s 
cityscape and are determined by the city‘s north-south divide.  
Bakhshi slyly includes his analysis of Tehran‘s density problem within the 
context of Khatami‘s Reformist Movement. He configures the uneven distribution of 
space alongside of Khatami‘s terminology (civil society and democracy), and the initial 
formulation seems to give credence to the abstract ideas of the Reformist Movement. 
However, Bakhshi lends urgency to the issue of density by developing it within the 
context of the film and providing it with visual evidence and materiality. Civil society 
and democracy, in contrast, are rendered visually inaccessible to the viewer throughout 
the film and remain distant from the physical and spatial problems (i.e. density) that 
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates develops. Bakhshi further trivializes the reformist 
terminology by following ―civil society‖ and ―democracy‖ with ―va in harf’hā‖ [and such 
words]. This dismissive term locates Khatami‘s political agenda the realm of abstraction; 
it consists of words that exist separately from action. By placing the notion of density 
alongside civil society and democracy, Tehran Has No More Pomegranates forces the 
viewer to reflect on the impact (or lack thereof) that the Reformist Movement had on the 




When Massoud Bakhshi announces that civil society and democracy are among 
Tehran‘s most pressing concerns, it is with a sense of irony, because much of the film is 
structured around the social and economic disparities that are, for many Tehranis, much 
more urgent. One of the film‘s most persistent characters is a man named Ja‘far khān, a 
recent immigrant to Tehran, who replies‖ nārāzi‖ [unsatisfied] during all of the film‘s 
polls about the city‘s current state. Towards the end of the film, the crew decides to ask 
him why he is dissatisfied with everything. The interview takes places in front of a 
trashcan, upon which the motto ―shahr-e mā, khāneh-ye mā‖ [our city, our home] has 
ironically been stenciled. In one of the film‘s most lucid moments, Ja‘far khān explains:  
 
I have been in Tehran for three months. I have seen what happens in the 
parks and on the streets. I have seen the poor. They are without money and 
homeless. The homeless are forced to sleep in parks. They have nowhere 
else to go.  But the policemen attack them and beat them, which they don‘t 
even do to dogs. These are human beings…Everyone is human. Yes, we 
are hungry and homeless, but we are humans. 
 
As he makes this plea to humanity, the film switches to scenes from a Qajar-era film that 
plays first forward and then backwards. Ja‘far khān‘s speech, coupled with the Qajar 
images (forward and reverse), suggests that some of the urban problems that plague 
Tehran are historically grounded, and have been overlooked and unattended by 
successive regimes and political movements, including the Reformist Movement.  
 The film‘s final critique of reform is similarly related to Tehran‘s physical 




geological (rather than socio-economic) structures of the city. Bakhshi claims that his 
crew ―peered under the surface of the city‖ and discovered a ―menace…a horrible threat.‖ 
According to the film, experts predict that an earthquake will devastate Tehran in the near 
future, and 65% of Tehran‘s buildings will be destroyed. The film casts this predicted 
earthquake into a historical cycle, likening it to the earthquakes that devastated the cities 
Rudbar in 1990
14
 and Bam in 2003. The film‘s commentary on the cyclical nature of 
Iran‘s history continues as it speculates on the condition of Tehran following the 
earthquake, citing ―past mistakes‖ as the reason for the expansiveness of the earthquakes‘ 
destruction. Tehran Has No More Pomegranates predicts that Tehran will be reduced to 
shambles, but the vocabulary it uses to describe this state recalls exactly the thirteenth-
century quotation by Qazvini about Tehran at that time. According to the film, post-
earthquake Tehran will return to its origins. This idea is framed by the film‘s final shot, 
which shows the discovery of a tiny pomegranate—the kind of pomegranate that Tehran 
no longer has—outside of the city.  
 Tehran Has No More Pomegranates ties the predicted earthquake to the 
Reformist Movement when it concludes that ―after the earthquake democracy, reformist 
movements (jonbesh-e eslāhāt), and civil society will no longer exist.‖ The still images 
that follow this statement depict the aftermath of the Bam earthquake in 2003, and they 
powerfully capture the human suffering caused by natural disaster. 
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In the context of such suffering, terms like ―democracy‖ and ―civil society‖ and 
concepts like ―reform‖ appear sterile and powerless. The film‘s observation that there 
will not be a place for the Reformist Movement after the earthquake epitomizes the film‘s 
humoristic style. Obviously, amid such destruction, philosophical promises do not carry 
the same urgency, and the film‘s mention of these reformist ideals seems just as out of 
place as the concepts themselves in a post-apocalyptic Tehran. The poor placement of the 
Reformist Movement in this world strikes the viewer as amusing, but at the same time it 
forces one to consider the inability of the Reformist Movement to address the 
foundational (and even geological) issues that teem under Tehran‘s surface. The 
earthquake significantly ends the film‘s history of Tehran at the same time that it ends the 
critique of the Reformist Movement. Just as the film begins with reform so too does it 
end with reform, and this fact is crucial to establishing reform as an informing logic 
within Tehran Has No More Pomegranates‘ structure.  
 At the same time that the film concerns itself with the history and legacy of 
political reform, it also bears in mind the reforms and transformations that are born from 
the relationship between certain films and the Reformist Movement. Indeed, Tehran Has 
No More Pomegranates is a meta-documentary, a documentary about documentary 
filmmaking. The director Massoud Bakhshi narrates the film as production notes for an 
incomplete film, and in the process creates the film that we are watching. Tehran Has No 
More Pomegranates constantly refers to its own creativity and its technological 




organizing its equipment and in the act of filming. Bakhshi employs the same method of 
juxtaposing contradicting sounds and images in order to draw attention, often ironically, 
to the film crew‘s presence on screen. For example, in one scene, we hear a sound bite of 
the modernist poet Forugh Farrokhzad reading a very famous line of her poetry: ―va in 
manam/zani tanhā/ dar āstāneh-ye fasl-e sard…‖ [And this is I/a lonely woman/ at the 
threshold of a cold season]. As these lines play, we see a woman alone, peering out of a 
window. However, the bright sun has cast a shadow on the wall below her window, 
creating a perfect silhouette of the film crew. The lines of poetry that Farrokhzad reads 
indicate to the viewer that the woman is alone, but the shadows on the wall playfully 
disrupt that possibility.  
 In addition to representing the bodies of the members of the film crew, Tehran 
Has No More Pomegranates often shows the technology that it uses, and in particular it 
alludes to 35mm film. There are countless images of film being loaded, film being 
repaired, film playing, and film in canisters. All of these references serve as reminders 
that Tehran Has No More Pomegranates is in fact a film, created and preserved in 
celluloid.  Tehran Has No More Pomegranates also readily identifies itself as a film that 
is composed, in part, by other films. Massoud Bakhshi‘s composite film is achieved 
through the inclusion of a ―documentary‖ that the film crew allegedly finds in the 
archives of the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance. Bakhshi‘s use of this kind of 
archival material positions the film within the global tradition of  ―found footage‖, an 




Although the found documentary in Bakhshi‘s film is overlaid with a narrative 
voice that lends it authority, authenticity, and continuity, the informed viewer quickly 
identifies the images that establish the documentary as visual traces of Iran‘s cinematic 
history. The film features scenes from Mirza Ebrahim Akkasbashi Sani al-Saltaneh‘s 
early camera work with the Qajar court (1900), Ardeshir Irani and Abdolhossein 
Sepanta‘s Dokhtar-e Lor [Lor Girl] (1932), Ahmad Faruqi Qajar‘s Tehrān-e emruz [Iran 
Today] (1962),  Kamran Shirdel‘s Tehrān pāytakht-e Iran ast [Tehran is the Capital of 
Iran] (1966), Bahram Bayzai‘s Kalāgh [Crow] (1976), and others. Moreover, the voice 
that provides narrative to the documentary belongs to Nosrat Karimi, a famous actor and 
filmmaker, whose role as Aqa Jun on the popular 1976 television show Dāyi jān 
Nāpol’on [My Uncle Napoleon] makes sound of his voice immediately recognizable. 
Therefore, as quickly as the film creates the illusion of a coherent ―found documentary,‖ 
it also destabilizes the unity of the components that make up the embedded text. William 
C. Wees, an early theorist of found footage, observes that whether films that use archival 
images ―preserve the footage in its original form or present it in new and different ways, 
they invite us to recognize it as found footage, as recycled images.‖
15
  
Wees categorizes trends in found footage as constitutive of ―collage,‖ a practice 
separate from mere appropriation. Collage, the use of montage in the context of found 
footage, ―probes, highlights, contrasts;‖ whereas, ―appropriation accepts, levels, 
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 Tehran Has No More Pomegranates seems initially to approximate the 
latter by assembling the disparate archival images and sounds under the auspices of a 
single documentary, thereby creating a sense of leveling or homogenization. However, by 
splicing the ―found‖ documentary with contemporary shots of Tehran, the film ultimately 
achieves Wees‘s notion of collage. This technique, creating filmic unity and then tearing 
it apart, demonstrates how celluloid film is constantly being reformed and reshaped 
within Tehran Has No More Pomegranates. Significantly, Bakhshi shows the process of 
film being cut and manipulated on screen, which serves as a reminder that film can be 
formed and reformed, and old images can thereby be preserved and at the same time 
generate new meanings in different contexts. 
The particular sounds and images that Bakhshi preserves in his film are especially 
important because they establish a trajectory within which the director positions his own 
film. The two scenes that Bakhshi repeats most often in Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates come from Mirza Ebrahim Akkasbashi Sani al-Saltaneh‘s early camera 
work with the Qajar court (1900) and Ardeshir Irani and Abdolhossein Sepana‘s 
Dokhtar-e Lor [The Lor Girl] (1932). These two films represent two of the most 
important moments in Iran‘s early cinematic history. The grainy moving images shot by 
Akkasbashi depict Mozzafar al-Din Shah‘s visit to Belgium in 1900, and scholars 
generally agree that they are the first moving images shot by an Iranian. Akkasbashi, 
whose name references the fact that he was a photographer for the Qajar court, was 
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responsible for bringing film technology to Iran, with the support and encouragement of 
Mozzafar al-Din Shah, the son of Naser al-Din Shah. Mozzafar al-Din Shah shared his 
father‘s interest in technology and reform. Negar Mottahedeh argues that these images, 
which were taken during a flower ceremony, emphasize the exchange of glances between 
the Iranian men of the Qajar court and European women. Iranian cinema has since its 
inception been grounded in the tension between engendered gazes.
 17
 While Mottahedeh 
overstates the gendered aspects of the gaze, the geographic part of her argument is useful, 
and Akkasbashi‘s images reinforce the idea that late Qajar reform efforts were grounded 
in western technology.  
The second film to which Tehran Has No More Pomegranates devotes significant 
screen time is the 1932 film The Lor Girl. This film is significant as the first talkie film in 
Iranian cinema. As such, it marked the first time that audiences could relate to the 
characters on a linguistic level and hear them speak Persian.
18
 Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates makes ready use of The Lor Girl‘s sound capabilities. Multiple times 
during his film, Bakhshi plays a sound bite of The Lor Girl‘s main female character 
Golnar screaming ―Ja‘far,‖ laying it over a diverse set of images from contemporary 
Tehran.  
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The film‘s politicized content was also an innovation at the time. The Lor Girl 
tells the story of Ja‘far, a young bureaucrat who is sent to Lorestan, a particularly 
unyielding province at the time. He falls in love with a tea house attendant named Golnar, 
who is being captive held by a band of thieves. Ja‘far defeats the bandits, and he and 
Golnar escape to India, fleeing the chaos of Iran. They eventually return to Tehran when 
they hear about Reza Shah‘s efforts to modernize the country. Hamid Reza Sadr argues 
that The Lor Girl, through its plot, location, and characters, encompasses many of Reza 
Shah‘s reforms. For example, Ja‘far‘s challenges in Lorestan parallel those of Reza Shah, 
whose first course of action was to centralize power and break up the tribal system that 
governed much of Iran. Similarly, Sadr views Golnar‘s arrival to the city as an echo of 
Reza Shah‘s ―attempt to bring modernity through secularization, industrialization, and the 
nuclearization of the family.‖
19
  
By referencing Akkasbashi‘s early moving images and The Lor Girl, Tehran Has 
No More Pomegranates positions itself within a tradition of innovation. At the same 
time, the film makes an important observation about the relationship between socio-
political reform and cinematic reform. The advent of Iranian cinema and the invention of 
talkie technology in the Iranian context occurred alongside two of the most significant 
reform efforts of the early twentieth century. While scholars like Hamid Naficy have 
argued that revolution, and specifically of the Revolution of 1978-79, have radically 
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altered the course of Iranian cinema,
20
 ultimately reform, a more subtle discourse, has 
encouraged some of the most profound changes in Iranian cinema. Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates focuses on reform throughout and reconfigures the history of Iranian 
cinema to favor a reformist orientation.  
The film envisions itself as part of this relationship between cinematic and 
political reform movements. It focuses on the history of political reform at the same time 
that it plays with possibilities that come with restructuring actual film. Indeed, critic 
Mohammad Sa‘id Mohassesi indicates his surprise that in this digital age, well after 
Kiarostami‘s 10 establishes digital video as viable experimental form, 35 mm film 
remains the Bakhshi‘s medium of choice.
21
 However, with Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates, Massoud Bakhshi offers an alternative to the digital push, and he revives 
old-fashioned celluloid film as young and experimental. Specifically, by combining 
archival footage with new footage, the film creates new contexts and as a result generates 
new meanings. He literally re-forms old films, a process that we see on screen. This 
methodology accords with Mohammad Khatami‘s Reformist Movement, which similarly 
sought to re-contextualize (i.e. within the Islamic Republic) the historical cycles of 
reform that began in the nineteenth century.  
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 One of the major contributions of Tehran Has No More Pomegranates to 
documentary filmmaking in Iran is its far-reaching appeal. It was the first documentary to 
be shown widely in theaters since the Revolution of 1978-1979, and it fared well at the 
box office.
22
 This fact demonstrates how the film also attempts to reshape limits of the 
genre. It opens up possibilities that filmmakers like Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad never saw. 
While Bani-E‘temad attempts overcome the limited reach of documentary films by 
bringing elements of documentary filmmaking to narrative film, Massoud Bakhshi 
physically reshapes the conventions of the genre by juxtaposing a sundry set of 
contemporary and archival images and laying them alongside an equally diverse 
soundtrack. The effect of this methodology is an aesthetic that is as humorous as it is 
critical, and one that actively resists the informing logics that normally determine 
documentary filmmaking. The success of Tehran Has No More Pomegranate in 2007 
ultimately speaks to the momentum that the reformist aesthetic possessed even after 
Khatami‘s presidency ended. The relationship between cinema and the Reformist 
Movement continued to evolve even after the benefits of Khatami‘s liberal cultural 
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“Demukrāsi-ye Dini, Pitzā-ye Qormeh Sabzi” 
The historical-political context that Tehran Has No More Pomegranates examines 
and the methodologies it creates and expands have developed coevally with certain 
innovations in the application of new media within the Iranian cultural sphere. 
Specifically, the music video ―‘Eshq-e sor‘at‖ [Love of Speed], performed by the 
underground band Kiosk, directed by Ahmad Kiarostami, and released on YouTube in 
2007, shares in the film‘s aesthetic concerns and its critique of Mohammad Khatami‘s 
Reformist Movement. While Tehran Has No More Pomegranates self-reflexively draws 
attention to the tangible canisters of celluloid film that preserve its images, ―Love of 
Speed‖ is a digital video whose images and sounds formlessly wander almost infinite 
Internet space, tagged and shared on various social networking sites and available to 
nearly everyone. Despite these differences in form and access, a very real, if not 
unexpected, relationship exists between the two texts, and elements of the reformist 
aesthetic that I have described throughout this study inextricably bind them together. By 
closely examining the music video for ―Love of Speed,‖ one can more precisely delineate 
the nature of this relationship. In turn, it is possible to argue that reform as an aesthetic 
movement continues to evolve even as Khatami‘s presidency has ended. Further, this 
relationship between philosophical film and the products of youth culture establishes 
reform, rather than revolution, as a new model for the analysis of cultural productivity in 




Recent efforts in cultural studies have attempted to validate and develop a 
vocabulary for the analysis of music videos, which serve as complex cultural products 
that draw on musical, poetic, performative, and cinematic traditions, and thereby 
provocatively cross the disciplinary boundaries that so often determine our scholarship. 
In their book Music Video and the Politics of Representation, Diane Railton and Paul 
Watson attempt to recover music videos from the commonly held view that they are 
meaningless by-products of capitalism or, even worse, irrelevant.
23
 Instead, Railton and 
Watson offer a view in which music videos are deeply political, often subversive, 
contribute to our understanding of race, class, gender and sexuality, and even capable of 
resisting the capitalist modes of production that create them. Moreover, the authors 
incisively note that music videos bring to focus the fact that screens are no longer the sole 
domain of cinema.
24
 In this age of hyper-technology, most individuals have multiple 
screens (television, phones, mp3 players, iPads, etc.) that they use countless times each 
day. Music videos since their inception have demarcated the democratization of screens 
through venues like MTV, and they continue this trend with the Internet as the primary 
means through which music videos are distributed to our various screens.
25
 
While Railton and Watson‘s study open up music videos as a medium worthy of 
serious scholarship, the framework they develop is limited in its scope. The authors draw 
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almost exclusively on the American music video tradition, and the critical questions that 
they ask about race, class, and gender privilege American and western European values 
and conceptions. Railton and Watson also position their study vis-à-vis capitalism; they 
are reacting against the idea that music videos are just by-products of capitalism and offer 
the possibility that music videos can resist capitalist models. They work under the 
assumption that music videos are tied to the music industry, and the transmission of 
music videos goes in tandem with the exchange of capital. Kiosk‘s ―Love of Speed‖ 
allows for the expansion of Railton and Watson‘s framework by accounting for music 
videos that draw on non-western traditions and function as products in global 
transmission. At the same time, an analysis of ―Love of Speed‖ enables preliminary 
theorization of those music videos that emerge from non-industrialized underground and 
repressed music scenes that are not tied to the same capitalist models that dominate the 
American popular music industry. Like the examples in Railton and Watson‘s study, 
Kiosk‘s video is deeply political, but the marriage of lyrical and visual elements in the 
video requires the contextualization of trends within Iran‘s modern cultural and 
intellectual history.  
―Love of Speed‖ was the first single off of the Kiosk‘s second album by the same 
title, released in 2007, a year after the band members left Iran and settled in the United 
States and Canada. Kiosk formed underground in 2003 at a time when underground 
music scene Iran was reaching its height. However, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s election in 




later to pursue their music with fewer restrictions, which in turn allowed them to pursue 
greater social and political critique in their music. The underground music scene in Iran, 
like the film industry, is very much tied to notions of reform and Khatami‘s reforms in 
particular. The policies that emerged after the Revolution of 1978-79 drastically 
restructured the music industry in Iran. Female singers were banned from performing in 
public, and all forms of music deemed ―western‖ were similarly forbidden. These policies 
were based on statements by Ayatollah Khomeini but codified and implemented by 
Khatami‘s Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance during the Islamic Republic‘s first 
decade. However, just as with cinema, one can detect a significant transformation in 
Khatami‘s beliefs about music between his tenure as Minister of Culture and his 
presidency.  
Indeed, the liberal cultural policies that emerged following his election in 1997 
benefited music Iran as well. In 1998, the ban on western-style pop music was lifted,
26
 
and Laudan Nooshin argues that one can trace the origins of the current underground 
music scene in Iran to that moment when the ban was lifted.
27
 She credits this change in 
policy with restructuring the way that Iranian society interacted with music; it marked a 
shift wherein Iranians were no longer just consumers of western pop music but also 
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producers of their own pop music.
28
 The possibility of legally producing western music 
significantly increased the number of bands in Iran. Nooshin also attributes the liberal 
cultural atmosphere that Khatami‘s presidency fostered and specifically discourses of 
civil society with the rise of active musicians in the country.
29
 All of these factors have 
created ―an unregulated grass-roots popular music movement,‖ a new phenomenon in 




However, like filmmakers, musicians in Iran need permits (mojavvez) from the 
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance in order to distribute or perform their music in 
public. Although the new policies in 1998 meant that groups that performed certain kinds 
of western music could conceivably receive permits, the reality was that very few did, 
and that fact remains true today.
31
 Generally, the pop bands that have succeeded in 
obtaining permits from the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance perform songs that 
are almost indistinguishable musically from their counterparts in the Los Angeles-based 
Iranian expatriate pop music industry, but lyrically are deeply religious and draw on 
traditional Shi‘i motifs and images. As a result, the underground music scene in Iran is 
necessary political, because bands perform musical acts of resistance every time they 
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produce in a public form music that is unsanctioned by the government, even if their 
songs have no social or political critique. At the same time, the current underground 
music scene and its many frustrations are tied to Khatami. As Nooshin notes, his election 
created momentum for the creation of a popular music industry in Iran, founded on the 
hope that Khatami‘s reforms would allow music that began underground to come to the 
surface. However, that possibility was never realized, and by 2007 when ―Love for 
Speed‖ was released, the underground music scene in Iran had come to a head and had 
nowhere to go.  
The music video ―Love of Speed‖ powerfully captures both the personal 
frustrations of underground musicians and the disillusionment of Iranian society as a 
whole as it comes to terms with the end of both Khatami‘s presidency and moderate 
reform in the country. The music video, is especially well suited to representing the 
various levels of concern about the Reformist Movement‘s legacy after Khatami‘s 
presidency, because as a form the music video has to reconcile in some way the various 
layers (musical, lyrical, visual) that it comprises. In her groundbreaking study of the 
music video as a distinct genre, Carol Vernallis explains that music videos create a 
multitude of complex meanings by establishing give-and-take between sound and image. 
The complexity is compounded by modes of discontinuity that are necessitated by the 
genre‘s temporal limits.
32
 Music videos are relatively short, because at the time of their 
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The interplay of sound and image and the genre‘s temporal limits profoundly 
affect the music video‘s ability to narrate. Vernallis identifies debates in the field about 
whether music videos function according to narrative, like some movies or television 
shows, or whether they act as ―postmodern pastiche that actually gains energy from 
defying narrative conventions.‖
34
 She uses this debate to expose the fact that attempts to 
examine music videos through the lenses of other forms and genres fail to capture the 
rich meanings that emerge from the collision of the various elements that form the basis 
of a music video. Instead, Vernallis argues that videos take shape according to the song‘s 
form, which favors ―episodic‖ or ―cyclical‖ rather sequential direction.
35
 Further, music 
videos follow the concerns of pop music and implement a ―consideration of a topic rather 
than an enactment of it.‖
36
 This model proves useful to an analysis of Kiosk‘s music 
video ―Love of Speed,‖ because the video generates a cohesive critique of the Reformist 
Movement, and this critique defies the conventions of narrative, but not in a self-reflexive 
postmodern way. Instead, the video‘s lyrics and images generate a system of 
contradictions and playful suspense that positions Khatami‘s Reformist Movement in the 
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context of a larger set of contradictions that define urban life in Iran. In this way, Kiosk‘s 
music video operates in a manner similar to Massoud Bakhshi‘s Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates, which also seeks to position reform as just another urban problem.  
On the level of both lyric and image, the music video ―Love of Speed‖ begins by 
establishing Iran, and Tehran specifically, as a site of paradox, a place where 
contradictions live in a functional—if not somewhat unsettling—harmony. The video‘s 
first few moments capture the unique tension between opposing forces in contemporary 
Tehran, at the same time that the opening scene demonstrates the profound connection 
between word and image in the video. The song‘s countdown, ―seh, do, yek, boro‖ [three, 
two, one, go], coincides with a counter on a traffic light, and traffic, which is an 
important motif throughout the video, begins as the song beings. The framing of this 
opening scene depends on the traffic right coming from the right side of the frame and a 
mosque that fills the left side of the frame. 
The video visually achieves balance by creating tension between the traditional 
and contemporary elements that determine the Tehran cityscape. While the mosque 
architecturally and religious represents tradition, traffic is one of the quintessential 
markers of life in a contemporary metropolis and traffic lights operate as the mechanism 
that systemizes and regulates vehicular movement. The tradition-modernity theme is 
picked up and repeated as the video continues. We see shots of different kinds of city 
traffic, including busy streets, narrow alleys, and big highways. The video creates visual 




bright digital billboard advertising BMWs, before finally settling on a huge neon, hillside 
side that resembles the Hollywood sign but reads ―yā Hossein.‖
37
 Once again, we see the 
juxtaposition of religion and tradition on the one hand and contemporary city life on the 
other.  
The song‘s first words, which begin after the instrumental introduction that ends 
with the ―yā Hossein‖ sign, confirm the juxtaposition of tradition and modernity as an 
important concern in the song and video: ―qodrat-e ‗eshq o ‗eshq-e qodrat/ modernitiyeh 
yā sonnat‖ [the power of love and the love of power/modernity or tradition].  The arrival 
of the sung word also introduces the video‘s unique way of performing its lyrics. 
Throughout the music video, the lyrics are lip-synced by people on the streets of Tehran, 
rather than the band Kiosk.
38
 Lip-syncing is a standard, though not uniform, convention 
in the music video genre, which, in its most basic form, seeks to create (or underscore) a 
relationship between word and image. It is also a means through which the performer 
visualizes the production of voice and claims authorship of the work. However, Kiosk 
subverts this convention and plays off of viewer expectation, and in turn the band 
heightens the relationship between word and image. We are more aware of the image, 
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because the body does not match the voice; we sense the disconnection between the voice 
we hear and the person we see.   
The video‘s lip-syncing technique, drawing on the relationship between the lyrics 
and the people on the streets of Tehran, positions the person who performs the lyrics as 
somehow representative of the lyrics being performed. However, like the montage in 
Tehran Has No More Pomegranates, the mismatched lip-syncing in ―Love of Speed‖ 
forces the viewer to determine the nature of the relationship between two disjointed 
layers. The delivery of the song‘s first lyrics, mentioned above, establishes this system 
with a particularly rich juxtaposition. The words ―qodrat-e ‗eshq o ‗eshq-e qodrat/ 
modernitiyeh yā sonnat‖ [the power of love and the love of power/modernity or tradition] 
are performed by a cleric who is standing on the street with a huge work of graffiti 
behind him. Immediately the viewer is struck by the fact that this man is not Arash 
Sobhani, the lead singer of Kiosk, and something other than voice connects the word and 
image. The lyrical structure takes ―the power of love‖ and inverts into the ―love of 
power,‖ The fact that in Iran religious institutions hold a great deal of power is 
emphasized by the presence of a cleric on screen, and the lyrics (―the love of power‖) call 
into question the motivation and legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.  
The opening couplet‘s second line propels the discussion of power into a temporal 
dimension by asking ―modernity or tradition?‖ The cleric‘s performance on screen 
suggests, perhaps somewhat ironically, that tradition and modernity exist side-by-side in 




video he is singing along to an underground rock song, and standing next to graffiti. 
Nevertheless, there is uneasiness in his performance, which makes it especially jarring 
and introduces the idea that perhaps tradition an modernity cannot comfortably exist in 
Iranian society—an  idea that is repeated in the song‘s refrain and its critique of the 
Reformist Movement.  
Throughout the music video, just as in the first performance, the interplay 
between word and image is playful and humorous at the same time that it is critical. For 
example, at one point in the video, Kiosk claims, ―doktor-e qalb nemikhāim, jarāh-e fak o 
bini‖ [we don‘t want cardiologist, just facelifts and nose jobs]. This lyric pokes fun of the 
fact that Iran is a world capital for cosmetic surgery, and nose jobs are especially 
common among young, upper-class Iranian women.
39
 The two women who perform these 
lyrics epitomize the kind of Tehrani woman who puts a lot of effort into her appearance. 
This moment in the video is representative of the humor that runs throughout the work, 
but also contains a serious critique. The lyric implies that Iranian society favors surface 
transformations (plastic surgery) rather than address the heart of the problem 
(cardiology). This preference is inscribed onto the bodies of women, both within the 
video and on the actual streets of Tehran. 
40
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The lip-syncing methodology created in ―Love of Speed‖ establishes a 
relationship between word and image that ultimately enables the video‘s critique of the 
Reformist Movement. Carol Vernallis argues that lip-syncing participates in a ―history of 
articulations‖ that every music video contains.
41
 Most professionally produced music 
videos feature a vast number of articulation points. First, for the song‘s production, 
singers and musicians lay separate vocal and instrumental tracks; sound engineers mix 
and add new layers; and producers and editors cut and reorganize. As the music video is 
filmed, the song is played on set and performers react to it and add new interpretations, 
then the video footage is edited and reorganized before the song is laid on top of the 
images.  
The most important point in this history for ―Love of Speed‖ is the moment at 
which performers react to and interpret the song‘s lyrics while on the set of the music 
video. Because the song‘s lyrics are performed by everyday people rather than the band 
members, we witness a wide range reactions and interpretations that do not necessarily 
belong to the band. This feature of the video is most apparent during the song‘s refrain: 
―demukrāsi-ye dini, pitzā-ye qormeh sabzi‖ [religious democracy, qormeh sabzi pizza].
42
 
Several times in the video, the performers break into laughter when they say this line. 
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 Qormeh sabzi is a traditional Iranian stew. Both in terms of taste and execution, it would be very difficult 
to create a qormeh sabzi pizza. Nevertheless, several months after the ―Love of Speed‖ music video 
premiered, there were reports that an Iranian team won third place at an international pizza competition 
with a ghormeh sabzi pizza. However, I was unable to find confirmation of this victory in non-Iranian 
sources. It is also worth noting that even the phrase ―pitzā-ye ghormeh sabzi‖ is contradictory, because the 




The performers‘ react to the idea of a pitzā-ye qormeh sabzi [qormeh sabzi pizza], 
which combines a traditional Iranian dish and pizza, and the inability of the non-
professional actors to maintain a straight face marks the incongruity of these two dishes. 
The ridiculousness of qormeh sabzi pizza punctuates and accentuates the incongruity of 
the couplet‘s first line: ―demukrāsi-ye dini‖ [religious democracy], a more serious 
concept being evaluated by the song‘s refrain. The song‘s lyrical structure recalls the 
structure of certain genres in the classical Persian poetic tradition, in which the two 
mesra‘s that form a bayt, or couplet, generate unity. In ―Love of Speed,‖ there is an 
equational or analogous relationship between the two terms of the couplet. In the case of 
the song‘s refrain, the coupling of religious democracy and qormeh sabzi pizza renders 
the former just as implausible (and undesirable) as the latter. With four words, Kiosk 
destabilizes the notion upon which the Reformist Movement was premised. Khatami‘s 
efforts sought to create a religious democracy and introduce democratic ideals into the 
Islamic Republic‘s governance. His promise was that Islamic democracy could be created 
in Iran and that it would be the country‘s ultimate solution. However, ―Love of Speed‖ 
casts doubt on that possibility by making a joke of it, and bringing it down to the same 
level as a ridiculous food combination.  
―Love of Speed‖ was released two years after Khatami‘s presidency ended, and 
its critique of the Reformist Movement‘s most basic premise benefits from hindsight that 
allows it to evaluate the effectiveness of Khatami‘s efforts. In between the lip-syncing 
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performances, the music video for ―Love of Speed‖ features shots from the streets of 
Tehran. Many of these images establish the contradictions that determine contemporary 
life in Tehran. For example, we see a group of women in chādors entering a mosque, a 
huge billboard for Dolce and Gabbana, a verse of Nezami‘s poetry,  posters of Jack 
Nicholson and Marlon Brando and a car with an ornate Fatimah sticker in its rear window 
parked next to a car with the popular ―Peeing Calvin‖ decal on its bumper.  
However, another category of images depict Tehran as a troubled and problematic 
city. There are shots of dilapidated buildings, street violence, poverty, and pollution. 
Because the criticism of ―religious democracy‖ is repeated several times – it is in fact the 
only lyric repeated in the song – ―Love of Speed‖ situations the Reformist Movement in 
the context of Tehran‘s contradictions and problems. Like Tehran Has No More 
Pomegranates and Rakhshan Bani-‗Etemad‘s films, ―Love of Speed‖ positions Tehran as 
a space where the lack of reform is especially visible.  
 
Conclusion 
The video‘s last scene is especially powerful and, at twenty seconds, significantly 
longer than any other shot. It shows a man spraying a pile of wet trash with a hose, 
kicking it, stomping on it, doing anything he can to get it to go down a wired drain in the 
street. Because the scene stays on screen for an uncomfortable amount of time, especially 
after the video has trained the viewer to become accustomed to rapid visual changes, the 




to questions about the practicality of the man‘s efforts. Might it be easier to pick up the 
small pile and throw it away? Or is a pile of trash really supposed to go down a street 
drain? This scene is particularly interesting because an almost identical scene exists in 
Massoud Bakhshi‘s Tehran Has No More Pomegranates .In both instances, this act 
functions as a metaphor for what the Reformist Movement was able to achieve. The final 
evaluation posited by the film and the music video two years after Khatami‘s presidency 
is that very little was achieved, and nothing that could not have been accomplished 
through other means, despite the energy and resources that were expended. As ―Love of 
Speed‖ and Tehran Has No More Pomegranates demonstrate, Post-Khatami Iran has 
been marked by the same sense of futility and hopelessness that afflicted the intellectual 
classes in the early and mid-1990s.  
As the final scene in the music video ―Love of Speed‖ demonstrates, the city of 
Tehran acts as a dynamic space that conforms to the contours of the successes and 
failures of the Reformist Movement, and the metaphorical and transformational powers 
of Tehran represent one of the definitive features of the reformist aesthetic, especially in 
those works created during and after Khatami‘s election in 1997.  However, the ―Love of 
Speed‖ music video furthers our understanding of the relationship between visual media 
and Tehran, because it makes evident the ways in which urban locality can be transmitted 
globally. Although the music video is grounded in the actual streets of Tehran and 
intervenes in the national, sociopolitical concerns of post-Khatami Iranian society, it is 




The video was filmed in Iran by a Los Angeles-based, Iranian-born videographer, 
and local Iranians perform a song released by an Iranian band, whose members currently 
live in the United States and Canada. Most importantly, the music video was released and 
continues to be transmitted and accessed on the internet. In her study of the role of the 
internet in the development of Iranian national identity among individuals in exile, Janet 
Alexanian argues that new media has allowed the Iranian nation ―to be imagined as a 
transnational entity.‖
43
 The ―Love of Speed‖ music video proves that the reformist 
aesthetic has entered this transnational public sphere, and it is a fitting place for the 
artistic responses to the Reformist Movement, because Khatami sought to free Iran from 
its global isolation and to initiate global dialogue. The video ―Love for Speed‖ on 
YouTube creates a critical but also a complicated and visually exciting picture of 
contemporary life in Iran that is open and accessible to the world.   
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Reform at Its Limits 
 
 
While most of this study considers a narrow definition of reform, specifically the 
interpretations of Mohammad Khatami and his supporters, as a means of concluding, I 
would like to examine reform more broadly, not necessarily as historical process but 
rather as an epistemological category that has profoundly impacted how Iranian history is 
constructed and imagined. At the risk of simplifying a complicated narrative, Iran‘s 
modern history has been defined by cycles of reform and revolution, revolution and 
reform. These two concepts have dominated the modes of discourse in the country‘s 
intellectual history for over a century, and they have existed in constant tension with one 
another. The discussions of reform at the end of the nineteenth century ultimately gave 
rise to the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, just as the 
Revolution of 1978-79 gave rise to the reform efforts of Khatami at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. Although many of the changes in Iranian society over the last 
century have been born of the balance between these two opposing entities, our 
conception of Iran‘s modern history most often takes shape around revolution as the point 
of focus. However, this dissertation encourages the re-conceptualization of Iran‘s history 
and considers the discussions of reform that have occurred alongside revolution as 




 For over thirty years, a significant portion of scholarship in Iranian studies has 
been driven by the urgency to understand the causes and the effects of the Revolution of 
1978-79. Certainly, those works that focus on the Islamic Republic take the Revolution as 
their starting point, as the single event that radically restructured governance and 
profoundly affected other aspects of Iranian society. However, the more interesting trend 
involves scholarship that examines much earlier periods (e.g. the nineteenth century) but 
was published after the Revolution. Many of these monographs position their arguments 
in terms of the Revolution, indicating that some aspect of Iran‘s pre-Revolution history 
might help us better understand why such a radical event took place.
1
 The connections 
that these works draw between their arguments and the Revolution are often loose and 
perhaps function as a way of introducing a complicated part of the world to a more 
general reading audience by referencing a well-known event. Nevertheless, the effect of 
this scholarly trend is the same; recent Iranian historiography privileges the Revolution as 
the single most important event in the country‘s long history. In the process, it shapes an 
understanding of Iranian history that overlooks or downplays more subtle transformations 
like reform.  
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 The primacy of the Revolution of 1978-79 has been a particularly prevalent trend 
in the study of Iranian cinema. Film scholars have especially taken seriously Khomeini‘s 
statement about the powerful potential of cinema for educational purposes. This 
statement took place during Khomeini‘s first speech after his return to Iran in 1979 as the 
Revolution was unfolding and taking shape. As a result, scholars have understood an 
inextricable connection between the Revolution and the development of cinema during 
subsequent years. Khomeini‘s identification of cinema as an educational tool 
immediately imbued it with new politicized potential, and many scholars of Iranian 
cinema from the last thirty years attempt to understand the effect that the Revolution has 
had on the film aesthetic and the film industry.
2
 These efforts often consider the impact of 
new cultural policies implemented immediately following the Revolution or attempt to 
evaluate the effect of the political charge with which the Revolution imbued Iranian 
cinema. Both trends, which continue to define the limits of inquiry for much cinema 
scholarship in the past decade, fail to adequately account for the emergence of reform in 
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 Unlike revolution, which is generally understood as radically and immediately 
restructuring political and social systems within a given society, reform is best 
conceptualized as a gradual process that plays out over time and develops according to a 
particular trajectory. The films analyzed throughout this study demonstrate how reform, 
and especially Khatami‘s Reformist Movement, sheds light on how certain works within 
Iranian cinema operate aesthetically and philosophically. However, it is worth 
considering how the reverse is also true; the history of cinema described in this study 
helps us to trace the contours of reform in the Islamic Republic and to understand better 
how it took shape and direction.  
 
A Visual History of Reform 
The process of reform, as captured in the films and videos I have analyzed, 
comprises four stages that begin with revolution itself. The Revolution of 1978-79 
ushered in a new understanding of what film could achieve in society and the kind of 
values it could represent. Khomeini‘s belief in the educational power of cinema and his 
concern about its ability to corrupt society, and especially the youth, initiated a set of 
policies aimed at promoting indigenous filmmaking while at the same time limiting the 
kinds of topics that could be treated cinematically and controlling the manner in which 
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permissible issues were represented on-screen.
4
 Revolutionary figures like Mohammad 
Khatami and Mohsen Makhmalbaf showed their commitment to the Revolution at this 
time by participating respectively in the creation and enactment of these policies. 
However, the emerging traces of reform could be discerned following the end of the Iran-
Iraq War in 1988 and the death of Khomeini in 1989. Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love 
(1991) and Khatami‘s support of the film indicate the shift away from commitment to the 
rigid policies born of the Revolution and speak to the early signs of discontent during this 
period.  
Certain films released at this time, like Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love and Dariush 
Mehrjui‘s Hamun (1989), allow us to understand better how intellectuals and artists 
developed strategies to deal with their discontent during this phase in the process of 
reform. These strategies, which are only the early signs of reform in the Islamic Republic, 
are relevant to the more developed discourses of reform that emerge at the end of the 
decade because they remain committed to Islamic governance and attempt to function 
alongside the possibility of an Islamic republic. The intellectual and artistic strategies for 
the reconceptualization of the possibilities of the Islamic Republic primarily involved 
notions of relativism and the revival of mysticism. Makhmalbaf‘s Time for Love 
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advocates for moral and cultural relativity, confounding the Islamic Republic‘s singular 
interpretation of Islam and calling into question one‘s ability to access religious, moral, 
and cultural truth. The film‘s message speaks to Khatami‘s own call for relativity in his 
defense of Makhmalbaf‘s work, as he created the space for future reforms by suggesting 
that Khomeini‘s policies were extreme measures necessitated by revolutionary context 
but did not constitute a unilateral and unchanging body of work. These conceptions of 
relativism and the nature of truth fit into a larger discussion of mysticism that was being 
articulated and rediscovered during the same period, the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Mehrjui‘s Hamun powerfully depicts the intellectual turn to mysticism as a mechanism 
for dissent. The intellectual appeal to mysticism that is captured cinematically in 
Mehrjui‘s film is historically documented in this period in the philosophies of 
Abdolkarim Soroush, a prominent reformist philosopher, who drew from the mystic 
tradition and especially its critique of truth to articulate an expansive and complicated 
plea for pluralism. 
The third stage in the process of reform, which coincides with Khatami‘s 
presidency between 1997 and 2005, recognizes the intellectual efforts of the early 1990s, 
and the films from the turn of the twenty-first century advocate a recasting of 
intellectualism in Iran, a movement epitomized in The Smell of Camphor, the Scent of 
Jasmine by Mohammad Khatami, whose broad intellectual appeal stretched between 
western philosophical traditions and Islamic theology. Abbas Kiarostami‘s Taste of 




and mid-1990s, and Kiarostami also performed the fundamentals of reform in this film, 
as he attempted to produce a challenging and provocative film while working within the 
limits of the film industry in Iran. Khatami‘s candidacy for president in 1997 marked a 
crucial turning point in the third phase, because it indicated the transference of reform as 
an intellectual movement to a more popular forum.  Khatami‘s political platform 
demanded the articulation of abstract ideas as concrete concepts, and in doing so Khatami 
reconfigured the terms of popular discourse in Iranian society, introducing terms like 
―democracy,‖ ―civil society,‖ ―rule of law,‖ and ―dialogue among civilizations.‖ The 
election of Khatami in 1997 and the political hope that his new discourse generated are 
central concerns of Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad‘s Under the Skin of the City (2001).  
However, Khatami‘s presidency and the availability of his political platform in 
public forums opened up the terms of reform to critique. At the same time that Under the 
Skin of the City demonstrates the powerful draw of Khatami as a public figure and his 
reforms as solutions to the country‘s troubles, it also interrogates the relevance of his 
global agenda by exposing local, urban problems. Bani-E‘temad‘s evaluation of the 
reform is more fully explored in Our Times… (2002) as she depicts the 2001 elections 
and Iranian society‘s discontent with Khatami‘s progress during his first term. A similar 
critique of the Reformist Movement‘s inability to address the country‘s social problems, 
especially with regard to gender emerges in Kiarostami‘s Ten (2002). At the same time, 
these cinematic efforts participate in the very reforms they critique. The freedom with 




Iranian cinema, and this phenomenon was undoubtedly the result of the liberal cultural 
atmosphere fostered by Khatami and concepts like ―civil society.‖  
The final stage in the process of reform that emerges from the films examined in 
this dissertation involves the failure of organized political reform. The end of Khatami‘s 
presidency and the election of Ahmadinejad marked the end of reform and the rise of 
neoconservatism in Iran. The inability of Khatami to create significant change through 
Islamic Republic‘s existing structures (like velāyat-e faqih) suggested for many Iranians 
the failure of reform as a viable political solution in contemporary Iran. The responses of 
visual media, like Massoud Bakhshi‘s Tehran Has No More Pomegranates (2007) and 
Kiosk‘s music video ―Love of Speed‖ (2007), to Khatami‘s presidency use the benefit of 
hindsight to bring the failure of the Reformist Movement into focus by using humor and 
new forms to criticize and trivialize its efforts. At the same time, Bakhshi‘s film in 
particular encourages viewers to consider Khatami‘s Reformist Movement alongside a 
tradition of reform in Iran‘s modern history. The film‘s dismissive evaluation of reform 
throughout Iran‘s modern history centrally positions the inadequacy of reform within an 
Iranian context.  
 
Pushed to the Green Limits 
The history of reform that is visually constructed by the films and videos in this 
dissertation ends with the critique of the Reformist Movement in the post-Khatami 




revolution—continues to evolve and develop in Iran. The events following the Iranian 
elections in 2009, often referred to as jonbesh-e sabz or the Green Movement, encourage 
us to think about how reform as a political movement and as an aesthetic are pushed and 
expanded, and how they might very well give way to revolution. In June 2009 Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad sought reelections, and his strongest challenge came from reformist 
candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. On June 13, 2009 the results of 
the election where announced and Ahmadinejad‘s term as president was renewed. Almost 
immediately, Iranians poured onto the streets in protest and claimed the results were 
fraudulent. Protests continued throughout the summer and were aggravated on June 29, 
2009 when the Guardian Council certified the electoral results and again on August 5, 
2009 when Ahmadinejad was sworn into his second term. The basij, a voluntary 
paramilitary organization under the supervision of the Supreme Leader and in this case 
pro-Ahmadinjad, attempted to quell the protests and often resorted to violence.
5
 The 
Green Movement has continued its efforts under the banner of The Green Path of Hope, 
and loose leadership is provided by Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and other reformists.  
One of the most striking and recognizable aspects of the recent Green Movement 
in Iran is the visual media response that has occurred alongside the protests, and the 
aesthetic shape of these efforts speak to the reformist aesthetic that developed in cinema 
under Khatami, in the same way that the Green Movement‘s politics are a continuation of 
Khatami‘s Reformist Movement. On a practical level, the elections of 2009 reinstated the 
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active involvement of filmmakers in the electoral process. Mohsen Makhmalbaf tirelessly 
supported Mousavi before and after his campaign, and following the announcement of 
Ahmadinejad‘s victory he used extensive connections with foreign media to denounce the 
results. Makhmalbaf also sent his youngest daughter Hana to make a documentary about 
the election.
6
 Similarly, the director Majid Majidi, well-known for his films about 
children, directed all of Mousavi‘s commercials during his campaigning efforts.
7
 
Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad continued the project she initiated in Our Times… and filmed a 
documentary about the elections called Mā nimi az jam’iyat-e Irān hastim [We are One 
Half of Iran‘s Population] (2009).  
However, some of the most striking visual representations of the elections of 2009 
and the subsequent Green Movement were generated by normal Iranians on the streets of 
Tehran, and it is these efforts that most powerfully speak to the reformist aesthetic that is 
the central concern of this study. The events following the elections were made visible 
across the globe through the use of digital video and social networking sites. Because of 
the proliferation of handheld devices in recent years, almost everyone has ready access to 
a video camera. Iranians made use of these devices to capture and record their protests in 
2009, and the rest of the world was able to visualize the protests, and because of the 
point-of-view perspective that naturally occurs with this kind of handheld, in-the-middle-
of-the-action video-making, people thousands of miles away were able in a sense to 
experience the protests as well. The most disturbing use of this technology was the video 
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of Neda Agha-Soltan being murdered during a protest. The video was shared on 
YouTube and Facebook and contributed to the making of Agha-Soltan as a kind of 
martyr figure for the cause.
8
  
The Green Movement‘s use of technology and new media in this way was later 
appropriated and expanded during the revolutions across the Arab world in the spring of 
2011. The similarities between these events allow us to reflect on the possibility that the 
reformist aesthetic, as a phenomenon in steady dialogue with revolution, has a place in a 
more transnational context as well. Because of the novelty of the Green Movement‘s 
widespread use of media and its broad appropriation the reformist aesthetic, one can 
position the Iran as the originary case. Nevertheless, the events of the Arab Spring 2011, 
and especially revolutions in places like Tunisia and Egypt, offers a glimpse into the 
possibilities of this aesthetic when the push for reform crosses into revolution.  
Abbas Kiarostami advocates the use of digital video as a means of eliminating the 
role of the director in filmmaking by making his presence on set obsolete. However, the 
wide use of digital video during the Green Movement demonstrates how digital video 
might eliminate the role of the director through different means. When nearly everyone 
has the ability to make and distribute videos, the director, as filmmaker and auteur, no 
longer holds the same authority and the reformist aesthetic is no longer the sole ambit of 
professional filmmakers.  
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The very acts of protest following the 2009 elections similarly evoked the 
reformist aesthetic, especially with regard to the role and representation of time and 
space. The Green Movement sought to constitute itself aurally as a revolution. Protestors 
revived and revised slogans from the Revolution of 1978-79 to once again call for 
revolution, and they played and sang songs popular during the previous revolution. 
Similarly, the spaces they constructed attempted to recreate the revolutionary experience, 
and protestors occupied many of the same physical locations as the protests that 
composed the Revolution of 1978-79. On a more a visual level, Green Movement 
activists created and revised political graffiti on the walls of Tehran, which began during 
the Revolution of 1978-79 as representative of a third world, anti-imperial struggle but 
which counter intuitively became state domain under the Islamic Republic. All of these 
efforts emphasized the significance of the physicality of Tehran but also attempted to 
reset time and created a general sense of the untimeliness of revolution.  
The elections of 2009 and the Green Movement indicate that the reformist 
aesthetic is being taken to its limits, pushed to the extreme. It is being replicated and 
appropriated by thousands of individuals en masse.  In his now classic, but still 
alarmingly relevant, article ―You Say You Want a Revolution?: Hypertext and the Laws 
of Media,‖ Stuart Moulthrop considers what it would take to revolutionize an aesthetic 
that has developed gradually over time, and specifically he examines the potential threat 




discussion, he questions what will happen to hypertext—a new medium full of 
revolutionary potential—if taken to its limit.  
Moulthrop draws on the ideas of media theorist Marshall McLuhan, and 
specifically the idea that ―every form, pushed to the limit of its potential, reverses its 
characteristics,‖ to argue that even something as revolutionary as hypertext might 
implode and revert back to the old orders of control.
9
 Although Moulthrop‘s discussion 
does not account for cycles of reform, his observations about aesthetics/literacy and 
revolution are, nevertheless, provocative. If we consider revolution and reform as 
binaries—deconstructed and intertwined but in opposition nonetheless—is it possible that 
reform in Iran, both aesthetic and political, might once again give in to the pulls of 
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--- 10 (Abbas Kiarostami, 2002, Iran/France/USA) 
--- Apple / Sib (Samira Makhmalbaf, 1998, Iran/France) 
--- Blue Scarf, The / Rusari-ye ābi (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 1993, Iran) 
--- Boycott / Bāykot (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1985, Iran)  
--- Bread and Alley / Nān va kucheh (Abbas Kiarostami, 1970, Iran) 
--- Brick and Mirror / Khesht va āyeneh (Ebrahim Golestan, 1965, Iran) 
--- Circle, The / Dāyereh (Jafar Panahi, 2000, Iran/Switzerland/Italy)  
--- Close-up / Nemā-ye nazdik (Abbas Kiarostami, 1990, Iran) 
--- Cow, The / Gāv ( Dariush Mehrjui, 1969, Iran) 
--- Crow, The / Kalāgh (Dariush Mehrjui, 1976, Iran) 
--- Cyclist, The / Bāysikelrān (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1989, Iran) 
--- Divorce Iranian Style (Kim Longinotto and Ziba Mir-Hosseini, 1998, Iran/UK) 
--- Gilaneh / Gilāneh (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 2004, Iran)  
--- Hamun / Hāmun (Dariush Mehrjui, 1990, Iran) 
--- House is Black, The / Khāneh siāh ast (Forugh Farrokhzad, 1962, Iran)  
--- Legend of a Sigh / Afsāneh-ye āh (Tamineh Milani, 1991, Iran) 




--- Lor Girl, The / Dokhtar-e Lor (Ardeshir Irani, 1933, Iran/India) 
--- Marriage of the Blessed / Arusi-ye khuban (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1989, Iran) 
--- May Lady / Bānu-ye Ordibehesht (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 1997, Iran)  
--- Moment of Innocence / Nan va goldān (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1996, Iran/France) 
--- Nasuh’s Repentance / Tawbeh-ye Nasuh (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1983, Iran) 
--- Narges (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 1992, Iran) 
--- Night it Rained, The / Un shab keh bārun umad (Kamran Shirdel, 1967, Iran) 
--- Nights of the Zayenderud  / Shab’hā-ye zāyendeh rud (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1991, 
Iran) 
--- No One Knows About Persian Cats / Kasi az gorbeh’hā-ye Irāni khabar nadārad 
(Bahman Ghobadi, 2009, Iran) 
--- Nose Iranian Style / Domāgh, beh sabk-e Irāni (Mehrdad Oskouei, 2006, Iran/USA) 
--- Off Limits / Khārej az mahdudeh (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 1988, Iran) 
--- Offside / Āfsāyd (Jafar Panahi, 2006, Iran) 
--- Our Times… / Ruzegār-e mā… (Rakhshān Bani-E‘temād, 2002, Iran) 
--- Peddler, The / Dastforush (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1986, Iran) 
--- Prince Ehtejab / Shāzdeh ehtejāb (Bahman Farmanara, 1974, Iran) 
--- Red / Qermez (Ferydun Jeyrani, 1999, Iran)  





--- South of the City / Jonub-e shahr (Farrokh Gaffari, 1958, Iran) 
--- Tall Shadows of the Wind / Sāyeh’hā-ye boland-e bād (Bahman Farmanara, 1978, 
Iran) 
--- Taste of Cherry / Ta’m-e gilās (Abbas Kiarostami, 1997, Iran/France) 
--- Tehran is the Capital of Iran / Tehrān pāytakht-e Irān ast (Kamran Shirdel, 1966, 
Iran) 
--- Tehran Has No More Pomegranates / Tehrān anār nadārad (Massoud Bakhshi, 2007, 
Iran) 
--- This Is Not a Film / In film nist (Mojtaba Mirtahmasb and Jafar Panahi, 2011, Iran) 
--- Through the Olive Trees  / Zir-e darakhtān-e zeytun (Abbas Kiarostami, 1994, 
Iran/France) 
--- Time for Love / Nawbat-e āsheqi (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1991, Iran/Turkey) 
--- Two Sightless Eyes / Do cheshm-e bisu (Mohsen Makhmalbaf, 1983, Iran) 
--- Under the Skin of the City / Zir-e pust-e shahr (Rakhshan Bani-E‘temad, 2001, Iran) 
--- Where is the Friend’s House / Khāneh-ye dust kojāst (Abbas Kiarostami, 1987, Iran) 
--- Who Do You Show These Films to? / Beh ki in film’hā ro neshun midin (Rakhshan 
Bani-E‘temad, 1993, Iran)  
--- Wind Will Carry Us, The / Bād mā rā kh
v
āhad bord (Abbas Kiarostami, 2001, 
Iran/France) 
 
 
